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ABSTRACT
This d is s e r ta t io n  employs v ec to r a u to reg re ss iv e  techniques to
improve our e a p lr lc a l  understanding  of f is c a l  and so n e ta ry  po licy  and 
the e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  in th e  In terw ar period . The issu es
In v es tig a ted  Include: (a) the  v a l id i ty  of the  R icard ian  equivalence and 
deb t m onetization hypotheses; (b) th e  e f fe c t  of changes in th e  money 
supply on output, p r ic e s , and In te re s t  r a te s ;  Cc) the  la p a c t of changes 
In average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  and governaen t ex pend itu res  on the
aacroeconoay; and (d) th e  e f fe c ts  of d is ru p tio n s  in  f in a n c ia l 
ln te rn e d la tlo n  and d e te r io ra tio n  In th e  q u a lity  of p r iv a te  balance 
sh ee ts  on th e  aacroeconoay.
Two vecto r au to re g re ss iv e  models a re  estim ated  and variance
d eco ap o sltlo n s  (VDCs) and Impulse response fu n c tio n s  CIRPs) a re  
ca lcu la ted . In ad d itio n , a Konte C arlo in te g ra tio n  procedure i s  used to  
c a lc u la te  s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  fo r th e se  param eters. D e fic its , governaen t 
expend itu res, average m arginal tax  r a te s ,  K2, the  month r a te  on
prime commercial paper, the  w holesale p r ic e  index and in d u s tr ia l  
production en tered  the  f i r s t  VAR w hile th e  o th e r i s  com prised of th e  
aforem entioned v a ria b le s  p lu s  the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa 
co rp o ra te  and lo n g - te ra  U.S. governaen t bonds. The choice of th e se  
v a ria b le s  r e f le c t  th e o re tic a l c o n s id e ra tio n s  and th e  n e ce ss ity  to  avoid 
□ a ltte d  v a ria b le s  b ia s . In p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  in c lu sion  of average 
a a rg ln a l ta x  r a te s  i s  Intended to  c o n tro l fo r the  d ls to r t lo n a ry  e f fe c ts  
of tax es . A dd itiona lly , the  Inc lu sion  of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  Is
Intended to  cap tu re  th e  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  I t  Is  Im portan t to  
note th a t  th ese  l a t t e r  v a r ia b le s  have no t p rev iously  been included In a 
aodel o f the  type  used here.
The r e s u l t s  generated  a re  su p p o rtiv e  of th o se  s tu d ie s  th a t  have
found no s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  fo r  d e f ic i ts .  Average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  a re  
found to  have s u b s ta n tia l  e f fe c ts  on output, In te re s t ,  and p r ic e s  while 
the  e f fe c ts  of the  proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on output, In te re s t ,
p ric e s , and aoney, a re  s u b s ta n tia l .  These r e s u l t s  a re  su p p o rtiv e  of 
the  h y p o thesis  th a t  aacroeconoalc  ■ ode Is  which do not Include
measures of m arginal tax  ra te s  and of the  degree of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  
may be m lsspec lf led. More g en era lly , the  em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  
generated  provide more su p p o rt fo r B arro 's  m arket c lea rin g  approach




The purpose of th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  Is  to  pursue a program of 
resea rch  th a t  seek s to  Improve our understand ing  of f is c a l  and
monetary po licy  and of th e  macroeconomic ro le  o f d is ru p tio n s  In 
f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tio n  In th e  ln te rw ar period . This In v es tig a tio n  Is  
n e c e ss ita te d  by the  r e la t iv e  paucity  o f the  em p irica l l i te r a tu re  on the
In terw ar period and by th e  fa i lu re  of the  s u b s ta n tia l  l i te r a tu re  on the
p o st war era  to  s e t t l e  many of the  c o n f l ic ts  th a t  p e r s i s t  In
d iscu ss io n s  of macroeconomic po licy . Vhlle the  a n a ly s is  conducted In 
the  c h ap te rs  to  follow  does not pu rpo rt to  s e t t l e  th e se  d iffe ren c es , I t s  
co n tr ib u tio n s  to  th e  debate  a re  s ig n if ic a n t .
In o rder to  achieve th e  broad o b jec tiv es  Ind ica ted  above, I 
in v e s tig a te  some of the  s o re  p re ss in g  Issues fac ing  m acroeconomlsts 
w ith in  the  framework o f a v ecto r au to reg ress io n  of th e  type proposed 
by S ias(1980a> . The Issues to  be In v es tig a ted  Include: (a) the
macroeconomic e f f e c ts  of fed e ra l government d e f ic i t s  a s  summarized 
w ith in  th e  debate  surrounding  the  em pirica l v a lid i ty  of the  R icardian 
equivalence and deb t m onetization hypotheses; (b) th e  e f fe c ts  of 
changes In average a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  and governaen t expend itu res on 
the  aacroeconoay a s  measured by th e i r  impact on output, p rlo e s , and 
In te re s t  ra te s ;  (c) the  e f f e c ts  o f changes In the  money supply on 
output, p r ic e s , and In te re s t  r a te s ;  and (d) th e  independent e f f e c ts  of
1
2
d is ru p t lone In f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tio n  on macroeconomic v a ria b le s  of 
concern such a s  p r ic e s , In te re s t  r a te s ,  ou tput, and th e  supply  of money.
Two se p a ra te  v ecto r a u to re g re ss iv e  models a re  sp e c if ie d , e stim ated  
and In te rp re te d . The f i r s t  of th e se  models i s  com prised of seven
v a ria b le s . These a re : a sh o rt- te rm  In te re s t  ra te ;  a measure o f the
money supply; p ric e s ; In d u s tr ia l  production; d e f ic i ts ;  government 
expend itu res; and a measure of average a a rg ln a l ta x  ra te s .  V ltb th e  
exception of <d> above, t h i s  model a llow s us to  g en era te  em p irica l 
r e g u la r i t ie s  re le v a n t to  th e  re so lu tio n  of a l l  of th e  is su e s  of concern 
in th i s  d is s e r ta t io n .  The Inclusion  of a measure of average a a rg ln a l  
tax  r a te s  Is  o f p a r t ic u la r  s ig n if ic a n c e  s in ce  previous em pirica l s tu d ie s  
a ttem p ting  to  examine the  Issu es  under In v e s tig a tio n  hare have not
Included such a v a ria b le . As w ill become c le a r  In th e  follow ing 
ch ap te r, i t  Is  necessary  to  include m arginal tax  ra te s  In models th a t  
seek to  evalua te  th e  e f fe c ts  of f i s c a l  po licy  s in c e  th ese  tax es  have 
d ls to r t io n a ry  e f fe c ts  which the  c a re fu l a n a ly s t  must c o n tro l fo r i f  the  
pure e f fe c ts  of f i s c a l  v a r ia b le s  such a s  d e f ic i t s  a re  to  be Iso la ted . 
A dd itiona lly , w hile s u b s ta n tia l  e f f o r t  has been d ire c ted  a t  developing 
th e o re t ic a l  ex p lan a tio n s  of th e  e f fe c ts  of changes In m arginal tax  
r a te s ,  very l i t t l e  energy has been sp en t on em pirica l v e r if ic a t io n  of 
th e se  th e o re tic a l  e f fe c ts .  This, I th in k , Is  la rg e ly  due to  the 
d if f ic u l ty  th a t  surrounds th e  co n stru c tio n  of an a p p ro p ria te  tax  
measure.
In ad d ress in g  the  widely recognized In a b ili ty  of changes In the
money supply  to  adequately  ex p la in  th e  depth  and length  of the  Great
3
D epression, Bernanke (1983) used B arra 's  <1977) two s te p  procedure to  
show th a t  adding a proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  to  a  re g re ss io n  o f output 
an u n an tic ip a ted  shocks to  the  sonsy supply s ig n if ic a n t ly  Improved th e  
m odel's a b i l i ty  to  exp lain  both the  leng th  and s e v e r ity  o f th e  
f lu c tu a tio n s  in output during th a t  period . Bernanke's d ec is io n  to  
Include a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  r e f le c ts  a recu rrin g  theme in th e  
l i te r a tu r e  th a t  th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  of c re d it  and th e  s to ck  o f deb t In 
p r iv a te  balance sh e e ts  a re  im portan t de term inan ts  of investm ent and, 
thereby, of output. S u b s ta n tia l resea rch  e f f o r t  i s  c u rre n tly  being 
d ire c ted  a t  th i s  Issue  a s  a t te s te d  to  by th e  recen t work of Bemanke 
and G ertle r (1966, 1969), G ertle r (1988), Bernanke and B linder <1988), 
G ertle r and Hubbard <1986), Fazzari and Athey <1987), and B linder and 
S t ig l i t z  (1988). Given the  in c reas in g  im portance of th i s  Issue , I t  
seems useful to  extend th e  In v e s tig a tio n  to  a  la rg e r  sam ple and a 
broader framework. F u rth er, I t  should be noted th a t  Bernanke's use of 
a s in g le  equation  reduced form n e c e ss ita te d  th a t  he sak e  h igh ly  
questionab le  assum ptions about th e  exogeneity  of th e  r ig h t  hand s id e  
v a ria b le s . T h is makes h is  r e s u l t s  su b jec t to  the  type  of c r i t ic is m  
th a t  s t ru c tu ra l  models have been subjected  to  fo r  use d1 th e  p o ss ib ly  
spurious r e s t r ic t io n s  th a t  Sims (1980a) has d escribed  a s  "Incred ib le".
In response  to  the  above o b serv a tio n s , I sp ec ify  and e s tim a te  an 
e ig h t v a ria b le  vector a u to reg re ss iv e  model com prised of th e  v a r ia b le s  
in th e  p rev iously  mentioned seven v a ria b le  model p lus a proxy fo r 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  In ad d itio n  to  allow ing us to  in v e s tig a te  th e  e f fe c ts  
of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on v a ria b le s  such a s  in te r e s t  r a te s ,  p r ic e s , output,
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and the  supply of money, the  Inclusion  of t h i s  p ro ry  p a ra  I t s  ua to  
engage In a com parative a n a ly s is  o f the  r e s u l t s  generated  In th e  e ig h t 
and seven v a ria b le  models.
Host of the  e a p lr ic a l  work th a t  has been done an th e  is su e s  under 
co n sid e ra tio n  here have re lie d  on a o d e ls  th a t  req u ire  use of p o ss ib ly  
spurious r e s t r ic t io n s .  These p o ssib ly  spurious r e s t r i c t io n s  f a l l  in to  
th re e  broad c la s s e s . These are: (a) a  priori c la s s if ic a t io n  o f the  
s y s te a 's  v a r ia b le s  a s  exogenous and endogenous; <b) the  exclusion  of 
c e r ta in  exogenous v a ria b le s  f ro a  so ae  equations on th e  b a s is  o f 
supposedly c o rre c t a priori in form ation; and (c) req u irin g  th a t  th e  
re s id u a ls  be orthogonal a c ro ss  equations and where s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  
Is  adm itted  i t s  o rder is  freq u en tly  r e s t r ic te d .  In o rd er to  avoid th e  
use of h ighly  debatab le  r e s t r i c t io n s  of the  type ou tlined  above, v ecto r 
au to reg re ss iv e  ao d e ls  of th e  type suggested  by S la s  (1960a) a re  used 
in  th i s  d is s e r ta t io n .  These ao d e ls  a re  m u ltiv a ria te  reduced form 
ao d els  th a t  t r e a t  a l l  v a r ia b le s  in the  s y s te a  a s  Jo in tly  d e te ra ln ed . 
Therefore, i t  i s  not necessary  to  iap o se  p o ssib ly  u n ju s tif ia b le  
r e s t r i c t io n s  on th e  param eter space.
As c la r i f ie d  in  a l a te r  ch ap te r, the  in te rp re ta t io n  of a  v ec to r 
au to reg re ss io n  (VAR) i s  based on Impulse response  fu n c tio n s  (ISFs) and 
varian ce  decom positions (VDCs) derived  f ro a  th e  aovlng average 
re p re se n ta tio n  of th e  VAS. These param eters a re  u sually  rep o rted  
w ithout s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  o r any measure of th e  confidence th a t  can be 
p laced in  th e  p o in t e s tim a te s . As noted by Sunkle (1987), t h i s  i s  
equ ivalen t to  re p o rtin g  re g re ss io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  w ithout t - s t a t i s t l c e .
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Therefore, I use a  Monte C arlo In te g ra tio n  procedure to  c a lc u la te  
s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  fo r the  IEFs and VDCs.
11. Choloe o f U s e  Period 
As Ind ica ted  p rev iously , th e  t l a e  period  to  be considered  i s  the  
in te rw ar period . NcMlllln and Beard <1088) use d a ta  f ro a  th e  saee  
period In analyzing  the  e f fe c ts  o f fed e ra l d e f ic i t s  and in d ic a te  sev e ra l 
fa c to rs  th a t  a c tiv a te d  th e i r  choice o f t i e s  period . These include: (a) 
the  re la t iv e  paucity  of e a p lr lc a l  s tu d ie s  on the  Is su e s  under 
c o n s id e ra tio n  here  th a t  cover the  ln te rw ar p e r io d - - th ls  d e fic iency  has 
been recognized by Brunner (1088) who in co n sen tin g  on th e  s t a t e  of 
f i s c a l  policy  in sac ro th eo ry  ex h o rts  the  p ro fess io n  to  "... extend the  
e a p lr lc a l  work to  a s  many d if f e r e n t  p e rio d s  and s i tu a t io n s  involving 
la s  many) d if f e r e n t  in s t i tu t io n a l  a rra n g e a e n ts  a s  p o ssib le ."  — ; (b) 
th e  fa c t th a t  th e  ln te rw ar period was c h a rac te riz ed  by both d e f ic i t s  
and su rp lu ses  In c o n tra s t  to  the  p a s t  war e ra  which has been Marked by 
p e r s is te n t  d e f i c i t s '  ; and (c) the  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the  ao n e ta ry  
a u th o r i ty 's  re a c tio n  function  was s u b s ta n t ia l ly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  I t s  p o s t 
Vorld Var II fu n c tio n .3 I t  i s  usefu l to  note th a t  the  period
'I n  ch ap te r II we show th a t  under a  re g ia e  o f p e r s is ta n t  d e f ic i t s ,  
ra t io n a l  ag en ts  say  re v is e  th e i r  ex p ec ta tio n s  in  a  manner th a t  a l t e r s  
th e  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on the  aacroeconoay.
3As w ill becoae c le a r  In th e  d iscu ss io n  o f d eb t a o n e tiz a tla n  in ch ap te r 
II , a o s t  th e o re tic a l  fo ra u la tlo n s  of th e  r e la t io n s h ip  between budgetary 
d e c is io n s  and aoney supply growth a sc r ib e  a  c ru c ia l ro le  to  the 
ao netary  a u th o rity . S ince the  Federal Reserve S y s ta a 's  u l t l a a te  po licy  
g o a ls  have evolved over t l a e ,  i t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  i t s  re a c tio n  func tion  in 
th e  p o s t war e ra  d i f f e r s  s u b s ta n tia l ly  f ro a  th a t  In th e  ln terw ar 
period .
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under c o n sid e ra tio n  was ch a rac te rized  by th re e  of the  most d ram atic  
changes In governaen t reg u la tio n  of th e  f in a n c ia l m arkets. These 
changes — th e  Insurance of p r iv a te  bank d e p o s its , th e  p ro h ib itio n  of 
In te re s t  on desand d e p o s its , and the  G lass -  S te g a ll a c t  — make th e  
ln te rw ar period uniquely im portan t to  the  s tudy  of the nonmonetary 
e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l d is in te rm ed ia tio n  (see Friedman (1966)).
A dd itionally , th i s  view Is  re in fo rced  when one c o n sid e rs  th a t  th e
ln te rw ar period was ch a rac te rized  by m assive f lu c tu a tio n s  in  th e  
q u a lity  and q u an tity  of f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia tion  and in  th e  q u a lity  o f 
p r iv a te  balance sh ee ts .
Sims (1980b) and Burbldge and H arrison  (1965) have conducted 
s tu d ie s  th a t  co n cen tra te  on th e  ln te rw ar period . In both s tu d ie s  th e  
ln te rw ar period i s  defined a s  January 1920 -  December 1941. However,
I c l i l l i n  and Beard (1988) In a ttem p ting  to  co n cen tra te  on a peacetim e
economy e lim ina ted  the  war cycles  Id e n tif ie d  In F ires to n e  (1900) from 
th e i r  sample. Analyzing monthly da ta  and m easuring cy c les  from trough 
to  trough, F ires to n e  id e n tif ie d  December 1914 -  la r c h  1919 and June 
1938 -  October 1945 a s  war cy c les  and la r c h  1919 -  Ju ly  1921 a s  a 
p o st war cycle . T herefore, the  period  July 1921 - June 1938
corresponds to  the  peacetim e cy c le s  in F ire s to n e  (1900).
Barro (1981, 1987) has documented th e  d i f f e r e n t ia l  e f fe c ts  of
changes In tem porary and in permanent government purchases and tax es  
an the  macroeconamy. Given th e se  d i f f e r e n t ia l  e f fe c ts ,  I t  seems 
In ap p ro p ria te  to  t r e a t  government purchases and tax es  a s  homogeneous 
q u a n ti t ie s . However, s in ce  tem porary purchases and ta ra e  a re
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a sso c ia te d  w ith war cy c le s  and a re  usually  c lo se  to  zero in  peacetim e 
cy c le s , co n cen tra tin g  an a peacetim e economy o b v ia tes  th e  need to  
decompose th e se  s e r ie s  In to  th e i r  aforem entioned components. Given 
th e  foregoing c o n s id e ra tio n s , fo r th e  purposes o f th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  
the  ln te rw ar period is  defined  a s  July 1921 -  June 1938. This 
co in c id es  w ith X cX lllin  and B eard 's d e f in it io n .
II I . C hapter Overview
In the  fo llow ing ch ap te r, an a t t e s p t  i s  made to  review  the 
th e o re tic a l  and e a p lr lc a l  l i t e r a tu r e  on f is c a l  and monetary po licy . In 
p a r t ic u la r ,  a t te n tio n  Is  focused on hypotheses such a s  R icardian 
equivalence and deb t m onetization . A dd itionally , th e  e f fe c ts  of tax es , 
government spending, and money supply changes a re  reviewed. Chapter 
III i s  devoted to  a  th e o re tic a l  and em pirica l d iscu ss io n  of the  
l i te r a tu r e  on the  ro le  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  in  th e  determ ina tion  of 
aggregate  economic a c t iv i ty .  In a l l  c ases  th e  em pirica l review 
co n cen tra te s  on the  ln te rw ar period .
Chapter IV p re se n ts  a te ch n ica l d iscu ss io n  of th e  vecto r 
a u to re g re ss iv e  techn iques used In the  em p irica l c h ap te rs . The 
d iscu ss io n  ranges f ro a  sp e c if ic a tio n  to  In te rp re ta tio n . A dd itiona lly , 
an a ttem p t is  made to  provide a f lav o r of th e  ongoing debate  on the  
a p p ro p ria te  uses of VASs.
The e a p lr lc a l  r e s u l t s  on the  Issues d iscussed  In c h ap te rs  II and 
III a re  p resen ted  In c h ap te rs  V and VI. In ch ap te r V the  
aforem entioned seven v a ria b le  model Is  sp ec if ie d  and e stim ated  and the  
r e s u l ts  a re  In te rp re te d . S p e c if ic a lly , the  ro le s  of d e f ic i t s ,  governaen t
a
spending, average Marginal tax ra tes, and the Money supply during the 
lnterwar period are exaalned. In addition to evaluating the e f fe c ts  of 
fin ancia l c r i s i s  on the Macroeconosy in chapter VI, the re su lts  hased 
on the e igh t variable Model sp ecified  there are cospared to  that 
derived in the seven variable sod el. F inally , chapter VII suaaarizes  
the aaln conclusions of the d isser ta tio n  and a tten p ts to  Identify  
avenues for future research.
CHAPTEB II
THE XACBOBCOIOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL AID MOIBTAIT 1MPULSBS:
THEORY AID BVIDBVCB 
1. In troduction
The prim ary ob jec tiv e  of th i s  ch ap te r Is  to  review the  th e o re tic a l 
and e a p lr lc a l  l i te r a tu r e  on the  Importance of f i s c a l  and monetary 
im pulses fo r th e  de term ina tion  of agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty .  In th i s  
regard , a tte n tio n  w ill be focused on th e  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s ,  government 
expend itu res, m arginal tax  r a te s ,  and money supply  changes on Im portant 
macroeconomic v a ria b le s  such a s  the  In te re s t  ra te , p r ic e s , and output. 
V hlle the  d iscu ss io n  to  follow  w ill focus on th e  more recen t 
developm ents In th i s  a rea , a b r ie f  look a t  the  e a r ly  l i te r a tu r e  should 
markedly enhance our a b i l i ty  to  p lace  the  more c u rre n t l i te r a tu r e  In 
p roper p e rsp ec tiv e . In p u rsu it  o f t h i s  ob jec tiv e , s ec tio n  II below Is  
devoted to  a b r ie f  d iscu ss io n  of th i s  l i te ra tu re .
II . The Early  Debate 
V rltln g  a g a in s t the  hackdrop o f th e  severe  economic downturn of 
th e  1930's, Keynes a ttem pted  to  show th a t  c o n tra ry  to  the  then dom inant 
c la s s ic a l  p o s itio n  I t  was p o ss ib le  and perhaps lik e ly  th a t  the  
macroeconomy would achieve equ ilib rium  a t  a level of ou tput 
s u b s ta n tia l ly  below fu ll  employment output. In o rder to  dem onstrate  
th le ,  Keynes argued th a t  m arket fa i lu re s  In the  bond and labor m arkets 
Im pair the  co o rd in a tio n  of economic a c t iv i t i e s  and e lim in a te  the
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f le x ib i l i ty  a f  p r ic e s  end In te re s t  r a te s  th a t  the  c la s s ic a l  a c o n o s le ts  
re lie d  on to  d e n o n stra te  th a t  the  aacroeconoay Is  In h eren tly  s ta b le .
Given th ese  a a rk e t fa ilu re s , Keynes argued th a t  governaen t 
In te rv en tio n  was necessary  to  d ire c t ly  Increase  agg regate  deaand and 
thereby  Increase  output and eap lo y aen t. F u rth er, he p o stu la ted  th a t  
the  governaen t could achieve th is  by In creasing  i t s  spending o r c u ttin g  
tax es . A dd itionally , he noted th a t  Increased  p r ic e  f l e x ib i l i ty  or 
aan lp u la tlo n  of the  aoney supply would a t  b ee t r e s u l t  In te ap o ra ry  
output s h i f t s .  V hlle th i s  Keynesian view caae  to  be th e  d o a ln an t view 
In aac roeconoalcs , sev e ra l au th o rs  refused  to  accep t the  Keynesian 
a a rk e t fa i lu re  approach and Instead  p o s tu la ted  th e  dominance of 
Monetary po licy . This led to  a p ro trac te d  debate  a s  to  th e  r e la t iv e  
lap o rtan ce  o f Monetary and f is c a l  po licy . The essence of the  
th e o re tic a l  s id e  of t h i s  debate  was la rg e ly  cap tured  w ith in  the  
fraaew ork o f d if f e r in g  views a s  to  the  in te r e s t  e l a s t i c i ty  of the  
in v e s ta e n t and aoney deaand and supply fu n c tio n s . S p e c if ic a lly , the  
th e  f l s c a l l s t s  considered  th e  In te re s t  e l a s t i c i ty  of In v e s tae n t to  be 
c lo se  to  zero Baking the  IS curve n early  v e r t ic a l  so  th a t  an Increase  
In the supply of aoney s h i f t s  the  LM curve along the  v e r t ic a l  IS curve 
decreasing  In te re s t  r a te s  but leaving agggregate  deaand unchanged. On 
the  o th e r hand, the  a o n e ta r l s t s  argued th a t  th e  In te r e s t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  of 
the  deaand fo r and th e  supply of aoney were c lo se  to  zero. This a ea n t 
th a t  Monetary e q u lllb r lu a  a s  captured  by th e  LN curve was la rg e ly  
Independent of changes in  th e  r a te  of In te re s t ,  thereby  ask in g  th e  LN 
curve n early  v e r t ic a l .  Therefore, f i s c a l  po licy  I n i t ia t iv e s  would s h i f t
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the  IS curve along the  v e r t ic a l  LM curve leading  to  changes In In te re s t  
r a te s  but no change In aggregate  deu ind  and output.
I t  should be noted th a t  the  foregoing d iscu ss io n  o u tlin e s  extrem e 
v e rs io n s  of the  f l s c a l l s t  and M onetarist hypotheses. However, I t  i s  
g en era lly  tru e  th a t  the  f l s c a l i s t s  a t t r ib u te d  a d o s ln an t ro le  to  f is c a l  
po licy  w hile the  s o n e ta r l s t  assigned  an equally  d o e in an t ro le  to  
changes In the  soney supply . S ince the  th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  was 
c le a r ly  unable to  co nclusive ly  s e t t l e  t h i s  issu e , a  s u b s ta n tia l  body of 
e a p lr lc a l  evidence was generated  In an a ttem p t to  do so . Barly au th o rs  
such a s  Friedman and Xelselman (1903) and Andersen and Jordon (1906) 
p resen ted  s in g le  equation reduced fo ra  evidence in  su p p o rt of th e  
s o n e ta r l s t  p o s itio n . However, o th e r au th o rs  such a s  Ando and 
M odigliani (1965) and De Prano and Mayer (1905) were very c r i t i c a l  of 
the  methods used by Friedman and Melselman. Also de Leeuw and 
K alcbbrenner (1969) o u tlin ed  sev e ra l c r i t ic is m s  of th e  procedures in  
Andersen and Jordon which according to  these  au th o rs  makes th e  s tro n g  
support found fo r the  m o n e ta ris t hy p o th esis  — th a t  monetary po licy  i s  
much more s ig n if ic a n t  than  f i s c a l  po licy  — u n re liab le .
In ad d itio n  to  th e  above debate , th e re  was a s u b s ta n tia l  amount o f 
d isagreem ent about th e  e f fe c ts  of a  band financed in c rease  in  
governaen t ex pend itu res  on th e  macroeconoay. Several au th o rs  includ ing  
B linder and Salow (1974) and Brunner and M eltzer (1972 , 1976) argued 
th a t  f i s c a l  po licy  in i t i a t iv e s  which req u ire  th a t  the  f is c a l  a u th o rity  
issu e  o r purchase bonds w ill have a s s e t  a a rk e t e f fe c ts . S p e c if ic a lly , 
th ese  au th o rs  argued th a t  an in c rease  in  governaen t spending financed
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by Issu in g  bonds loads to  an ln c rsasa  In households' n s t w ealth 
p o s itio n s . T herefore, In ad d itio n  to  the  usual expansionary  e f fe c t  
a sso c ia te d  w ith an Increase  in  governaen t spending, th e  Increase  in  
wealth leads to  an outward s h i f t  in th e  IS curve due to  increased  
consunptlon  spending and to  an inward s h i f t  in th e  LK curve due to  th e  
in c rease  In the  desand fo r soney a sso c ia ted  w ith th e  w ealth  in crease . 
Under th i s  scen a rio , th e re  Is  an unasbiguous in c rease  in  th e  r a te  of 
In te re s t  w hile th e  change in aggregate  desand depends on the  r e la t iv e  
s iz e s  o f the  s h i f t s  In the  IS and LX curves. F urther, B linder and 
Solow (1974) showed th a t  a f i s c a l  policy  of the  type described  w ill be 
expansionary i f  the  nacroecononlc sy s te n  is  s ta b le .
Xore re c en tly , s u b s ta n tia l  a tte n tio n  has been devoted to  analyzing 
the  e f fe c ts  of n an e ta ry  and f is c a l  p o lic ie s  under ra t io n a l  ex p ec ta tio n s . 
At the  th e o re tic a l  lev e l sev e ra l au th o rs  inc lud ing  Lucas (1961), fiarro
(1976), S argen t (1973), XcCallun and V hltaker (1979), and XcCallun 
(1960) have developed nacroecononlc no d e ls  th a t  in co rp o ra te  the  
ra t io n a l  ex p ec ta tio n s  h y p o th esis . These au th o rs  have shown th a t  in  a 
re g ln e  where econonlc ag en ts  behave purposefu lly  w ith re sp ec t to  th e i r  
fo rn a tlo n  of ex p ec ta tio n s , both monetary and f i s c a l  p o lic ie s  a re  unable 
to  s y s te n a t lc a l ly  in fluence  th e  level of output. However, o th e r au th o rs  
such a s  F ish e r (1977) have shown th a t  monetary p o licy  nay be e ffe c t iv e  
In th e  presence of p ric e  level s t lc k ln e s s  Induced by lo n g - te rn  labor 
c o n tra c ts . At the  e n p ir lc a l  level the r e s u l ts  have bean n ixed . Barro
(1977) p re se n ts  s u b s ta n tia l  evidence In sup p o rt of th e  n e u tra li ty  
hy p o th esis  w hile K lshkin (1979) d e n o n s tra te s  the  opposite . S ince the
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em p irica l r e s u l ts  appear to  be s e n s i t iv e  to  th e  e s p l r lc a l  methodology, 
the  e s p l r lc a l  v a lid i ty  o f the  n e u tra l i ty  h y p o thesis  rem ains an open 
question . I t  should be noted, however, th a t  th e  prom ulgation of the  
ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  hypo thesis  has had a s u b s ta n tia l  Impact on the  
manner in  which s ta b i l iz a t io n  po licy  In g enera l and f i s c a l  po licy  in  
p a r t ic u la r  Is  viewed. S p e c if ic a lly , the  Idea th a t  ag en ts  a re  ra tio n a l 
and th e re fo re  make use of a l l  a v a ila b le  in form ation  has permeated 
d iscu ss io n s  o f th e  e f f e c ts  of f is c a l  v a r ia b le s  on the  sacroeconony.
In sec tio n  II I , an a ttem p t i s  made to  s e le c tiv e ly  review the  more 
re c en t th e o re tic a l  and em pirica l l i te r a tu r e  on th e  macroeconomic e f fe c ts  
of d e f ic i t s .  In sec tio n  IV, 1 summarize the  main r e s u l t s  w ith re sp ec t 
to  the  ro le  of government expend itu res and ta x e s  w hile in  sec tio n  V a 
s e le c tiv e  d iscu ss io n  of the  e f fe c ts  of changes in the  money supply i s  
p resen ted . In a l l  caaeo th e  em p irica l d iscu ss io n  focuses on the  
in te rw ar period . F u rther, and In o rder to  ensure  the  co n sis ten cy  of 
argum ents to  follow  In th i s  and o th e r c h a p te rs , the  b a sic  Keynes Ian IS~ 
LX model of aggregate  demand which allow s fa r  feedback from I t s  
corresponding  A Eh AS framework Is  taken to  be re p re se n ta tiv e  of 
t r a d i t io n a l  (Keynesian) macroeconomic models.
III. D e fic its  and th e  Xacroeconomy: Theory and Em piricism 
A. R icardian Equivalence
Tn analyzing  the  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on th e  macroeconomy, conoern 
u sually  c en te rs  on th e  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on In te re s t  r a te s ,  p r ic e s , 
and output on th e  one hand, and on I t s  e f fe c ts  on th e  supply of money 
on th e  o th e r. As In d ica ted  In s e c tio n  II , In th e  t r a d i t io n a l  view, a
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s u b s t i tu t io n  of debt fo r tax  finance, holding government spending
c o n s ta n t, induces households to  perceive  an in c rease  in  th e i r  w ealth 
which leads to  an in c rease  in  consumption and an outward s h i f t  in  the 
IS curve. The in c rease  in  w ealth a lso  leads to  an in c rease  in the 
desand fo r money which s h i f t s  th e  LX curve inw ards. Therefore, th e  n e t 
e f fe c t  of a s u b s ti tu tio n  of deb t fo r tax  finance i s  an unambiguous 
in c rease  in  in te r e s t  r a te s  w hile th e  change In aggregate  demand and
thereby  output depends on the  re la t iv e  s iz e  of th e  s h i f t s  In th e  IS and
LX curves. In genera l, Keynesians argue th a t  th e  s h i f t  In th e  IS is
g re a te r  so th a t  output in c reases  w hile X o n e ta r ls ts  view the
co n tra c tio n a ry  LX s h i f t  a s  e i th e r  com pletely o ffse tln g  or swamping the  
expansionary  IS s h i f t .  Therefore, In the  M onetarist view the
su b s ti tu tio n  of d eb t fo r tax  financ ing  i s  e ith e r  c o n tra c tio n a ry  or
n eu tra l. In both of th ese  approaches th e  c ru c ia l lin k  in th e  an aly ses
Is  th e  assum ption th a t  households p e rce ive  the  ln c rsa se  in  th e i r  
ho ld ings of bonds a s  an Improvement In th e i r  n e t w ealth p o s itio n s .
The view th a t  so c ie ty  can in c rease  i t s  c o lle c tiv e  w ealth by 
Incu rring  a debt to  I t s e l f  has been questioned  by Tobin (1071) and 
Bailey (1902). These au th o rs  have argued th a t  the  n e ce ss ity  to  make 
in te r e s t  and p o ssib ly  p rin c ip a l payments In the  fu tu re  re q u ire s  h igher 
fu tu re  tax es . Therefore, in o rder fo r the  w ealth e f fe c ts  d iscu ssed  In 
the  previous paragraph  to  be o p e ra tiv e  i t  seems necessary  to  assume 
th a t  households a re  sh o rts ig h te d  and thereby do not fo resee  th e  h igher 
fu tu re  ta x es  im plied. R eflec ting  the  Influence o f the  ra tio n a l 
ex p ec ta tio n s  l i te r a tu r e ,  B arro (1974) has argued th a t  In a  world where
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agen ts  a re  ra t io n a l  In th e  sense th a t  they  sake  use of a l l  p e r tin e n t 
ln fa r s a t lo n  a v a ilab le  to  th en , households w ill p e rcslv e  the  h ig h er 
fu tu re  ta x e s  la p  lie d  by a c u rre n t s u b s t i tu t io n  of deb t f a r  ta x  finance. 
Therefore, a  te sp o ra ry  reduction  in  tax  r a te s  financed by a bend Issue  
while hold ing  governaen t spending co n s ta n t w ill have no re a l e f fe c ts  
s in ce  households w ill Increase  th e i r  c u rre n t sav in g s  by an aaount th a t  
ex ac tly  o f f s e ts  th e  h igher fu tu re  tax es  la p l le d . Under t h i s  scen a rio , 
households do not perceive th a t  the  In c rease  in  th e i r  ho ld ings of 
governaen t bonds isp ro v es  th e i r  net w ealth  p o s itio n s . Therefore, the  
c ru c ia l link  which leads to  a nonneutral ro le  fo r d e f ic i t s  Is  severed . 
A c le a r  la p llc a t lo n  of the  foregoing d iscu ss io n  Is  th a t  ag en ts  view a 
given c u rre n t d e f ic i t  a s  equ ivalen t to  a c u rre n t tax  burden of equal 
s ize . Since th i s  equivalence was o r ig in a lly  alluded  to  in  B icardo 's  
w ritin g s , th e  foregoing h y p o thesis  i s  frequen tly  re fe rre d  to  a s  
B lcard lan  equivalence.
In h is  s e a ln a l a t te a p t  to  g ive fo ra a l  co n ten t to  the  B lcardlan 
equivalence hypo thesis , Barro (1974) re lie d  on sev e ra l key 
c o n sid e ra tio n s . Most p ro a ln e n tly , he co n stru c ted  in te r  te a  p o ra l budget 
c o n s tr a in ts  fa r  both governaen t and households. The governaen t budget 
c o n s tra in t  requ ired  th a t  th e  d iscounted  value of fu tu re  governaen t 
expend itu res p lus any governaen t deb t o u ts tan d in g  f ro  a  prev ious 
p e rio d s  be equal to  the  p re sen t value o f fu tu re  tax es . A dd itiona lly , 
th e  household budget c o n s tr a in t  requ ired  th a t  th e  su a  o f th e  p re sen t 
values of expected fu tu re  cansuap tlon  and tax es  be equal to  th e  p re sen t 
value o f expected fu tu re  lncoae and any In h e rited  a s s e ts .  The
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governaen t budget c o n s tr a in t  la p  l ie s  th a t  any s u b s t i tu t io n  of fu tu re  
fo r c u rre n t tax es  bolding governaen t spending c o n s ta n t lead s  to  an 
eq u a lity  between c u rre n t governaen t expend itu res  financed  f ro a  non-tax  
sources and th e  p re sen t value o f fu tu re  tax es . This la p llc a t lo n  
to g e th e r w ith the  household budget c o n s tra in t  su g g es ts  th a t  household 's 
opportun ity  s e ts  a re  unaffected  by d e f ic i t s  and th e re fo re  leads to  no 
change In th e i r  o p tla a l  ln te r te a p o ra l consumption d ec is io n s . The 
v a lid ity  of th i s  approach hinges on the  a ssu a p tio n  th a t  the  
re p re se n ta tiv e  household 's p lanning  horizon i s  a t  le a s t  a s  long a s  the  
period over which th e  debt w ill be rep a id . In th i s  regard , Barro 
assuaed  th a t  the  re p re se n ta tiv e  household has an In f in i te  p lanning 
horizon. F urther, in  o rd e r to  c lrc u av e n t the  obvious d iscrepancy  
between th i s  a ssu a p tio n  and the  observed f a c ts ,  Barro assuaed  th a t  
g en era tio n s  of the  re p re se n ta tiv e  household a re  linked  by a l t r u i s t i c a l ly  
m otivated ln te rg e n e ra tlo n a l t r a n s f e r s  and proceeded to  show th a t  under 
th i s  assum ption the  re p re se n ta tiv e  household can be ch a rac te rized  a s  an 
In f in i te ly  lived  d ec is io n  making u n it. In ad d itio n  to  th e  above 
c o n s id e ra tio n s , B arro 's  fo rm ulation  re lie d  on the  follow ing assum ptions: 
(a) a l l  tax es  a re  lump sum; (b) p r iv a te  c a p ita l  m arkets a re  p e rfec t; and 
(c> no u n certa in ty  o r r is k  e x is t s  w ith re sp e c t to  th e  ln te r te a p o ra l and 
c ro s s -s e c t io n a l  Incidence o f postponed tax es .
Several au th o rs  have questioned th e  v a lid ity  of the  B lcardlan view 
th a t  t r a n s fe r s  between su ccess iv e  g en era tio n s  o f f a a l l l a s  a re  both 
w idespread and m otivated  only by a ltru ism . In th e i r  1987 paper, 
B ernheia and Bagwell observe th a t  given the  w idespread occurrence of
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t r a n s f e r s  between su ccessiv e  g en era tio n s , a  o a t In d iv id u a ls  would be 
embedded In a s in g le  in terconnected  network. T his would asan  th a t  
to ta l  w ealth would be th e  so le  determ inan t of each In d iv id u a l's  
consuap tlon  and th a t  a a rg ln a l in c rease s  in  w ealth would be shared  by 
the  e n t i r e  population . P u rth er, they note th a t  any a d d itio n a l bequest 
would be d iv ided  between the  re c ip ie n t and h is  c a n te a p a ra r ie s  so  th a t  
the  re s u lt in g  ln c re a e n t to  h is  consuap tlon  would be i a  M ateria l Under 
th i s  scen a rio , i t  1b reasonab le  to  suggest th a t  donors would choose to  
aake no bequest. A dd itiona lly , o th e r au th o rs  inc lud ing  P e ld s te in  (1986) 
and L altner (1979) have argued th a t  under reasonab le  assum ptions w ith 
re sp ec t to  p ro d u c tiv ity , p re fe ren ces , and income d is t r ib u t io n ,  many 
p a ren ts  w ill choose to  aake no bequest and t r a n s f e r s  from th e  young to  
the  old aay occur. However, a s  noted by B ernhela <19671, R icardian 
equivalence would con tinue to  hold fo r  p o lic ie s  th a t  do no t change the  
p a tte rn  of linkages between g en era tio n s . Therefore, re b u tta l  o f the  
R icard ian  p o s itio n  re q u ire s  th e  absence of both bequests and t r a n s f e r s  
from th e  young to  the  old.
In ad d itio n  to  c r i t i c i s e  of the  R icard ian  p o s itio n  w ith  re sp e c t to  
th e  ub iqu ity  of t r a n s f e r s ,  aany au th o rs  o b jec t to  a l t r u i s a  a s  th e  so le  
m otivation  fo r t r a n s fe r s .  In th i s  reg ard , Brunner (1966) has noted 
th a t  s in ce  the  l i f e  cycle  hy p o th esis  o f consuap tlon  im plies th a t  the  
a a rg ln a l p ro p en sity  to  consume in c rease s  w ith age, combining th a t  
h y p o thesis  w ith in te rg e n e ra tio n a l s e lf is h n e s s  a s  opposed to  a l t r u i s a  
causes t r a n s f e r s  between g en era tio n s  to  a l t e r  aggregate  re a l  
consuap tlon . Therefore, s in c e  a s u b s ti tu tio n  of deb t fa r  ta x  financ ing
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e f fe c ts  a t r a n s fe r  f ro a  the  young to  the  old , such a p o licy  would be 
nonneutral under ln te rg e n a ra tlo n a l s e lf ish n e s s . However, s in ce  w ealth 
t r a n s f e r s  a re  freq u en tly  observed th e re  appears to  be a b e t te r  f i t  
between ln te rg e n e ra tlo n a l a l t r u i s a  and the  da ta .
V ltb ln  the B arro framework, the  re lia n ce  on a l t r u i s a  a s  th e  so le  
a o tlv a tlo n  fo r ln te rg e n e ra tlo n a l t r a n s fe r s  Is  c ru c ia l to  d e a o n s tra tln g  
the  n e u tra li ty  of d e f ic i t s .  However, I t  s e a a s  reasonab le  to  argue, a s  
does Brunner (1966), th a t  bequest could be observed in  th e  absence of 
a l t r u i s a .  S p e c if ic a lly , s in ce  ag en ts  a re  un certa in  about th e  leng th  of 
th e ir  l iv e s , th e re  i s  so ae  p ro b a b ility  th a t  they aay  liv e  beyond th e i r  
expected l i f e  sp an s . Therefore, In o rd e r to  avoid using a l l  th e i r
re so u rces  before death , ag en ts  w ill hold on to  so ae  q u an tity  of
re so u rces  above th a t  requ ired  fo r th e i r  expected l i f e  spans In o rd e r to  
hedge a g a in s t the  r i s k  of running out of resou rces before they  d ie . I t  
fo llow s fro a  th i s  a n a ly s is  th a t  a s u b s ta n tia l  aaoun t of re so u rces  w ill 
be tra n s fe re d  to  the  next generation  even In th e  absence of a l t r u i s a .  
A c le a r  la p llc a t lo n  of the  foregoing d iscu ss io n  Is  th a t  th e  presence of 
s u b s ta n tia l  ln te rg e n e ra tlo n a l tran sm iss io n  of w ealth does not 
n e c e ssa r ily  ia p ly  R icard ian  equivalence.
In o rder to  I s o la te  th e  pure e f fe c ts  o f d e f ic i t s ,  B arro 's
form ulation of th e  equivalence hy p o th esis  requ ired  th a t  he aake the  
co u n te rfac tu a l a ssu a p tio n  th a t  ta x es  a re  luap  s u b . However, in the
presence of d ls to r t lo n a ry  tax es , budget d e f ic i t s  a l t e r  th e  te a  par a 1 
Incidence of th ese  ta x e s , and, thereby , a g en ts ' In cen tiv es  to  work and 
produce a re  d i f f e r e n t ia l ly  Influenced f ro a  one period  to  the  next. For
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example, In a two period world a c u rran t reduction  in  a a rg ln a l t u  
r a te s  financed by bond issu e  w ill be o f f s e t  by h igher tax  ra te s  in the  
f in a l period . In th e  f i r s t  period  ag en ts  have g re a te r  In cen tiv es  to  
work and produce; th e re fo re , output in c rease s . However, in  th e  f in a l  
period the  in c rease  in  m arginal tax  r a te s  p rov ides a d is in c e n tiv e  fo r  
ag en ts  to  work and produce; th e re fo re , output decreases . i s  Barro 
(1979; 1989) has noted, th i s  ia p l le s  th a t  the  choice between d eb t and 
tax  finance  m a tte rs  and th a t  an optim al tim e path  fa r  m arginal tax  
r a te s  e x is ts .
A dd itionally , and, a s  i s  well known, th e  K lcardlan framework 
assumes th a t  c a p ita l  m arkets a re  p e rfec t. However, in  the  presence of 
c a p ita l  market Im perfections households may face liq u id ity  c o n s tra in ts .  
In such a s e t t in g , one o f the  b y -p roducts  of a deb t financed tax  cu t 
may be th a t  i t  a llow s l iq u id i ty  co n stra in ed  households to  a l le v ia te  
th e i r  l iq u id ity  problem by (in e f fe c t)  borrowing v ia  th e  government. 
Therefore, th e ir  m arginal p ro p en s ity  to  consume out of a tem porary tax  
cu t w ill be c lo se  to  one w hile th a t  of households w ith no liq u id ity  
c o n s tr a in ts  w ill be zero . To th e  ex ten t th a t  a s u b s ta n tia l  f r a c tio n  of 
households a re  co n stra in ed  in t h i s  manner, th e  su b e tltu io n  of deb t fa r  
tax  financ ing  w ill Increase  aggregate  consum ption such th a t  d e f ic i t s  
have re a l e f fe c ts .
S ince r is k  and u n ce rta in ty  continue to  e x is t  even under the  
assum ption of p e rfe c t c a p ita l  m arkets and s in c e  th e  R icard ian  argument 
e s s e n tia l ly  ignores these  fa c to rs ,  i t  i s  u sefu l to  In v e s tig a te  the  
Im p lica tions o f th ese  f a c to r s  fo r R icardian equivalence. In the
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presence of u n certa in ty  households face  so ae  r i s k  a sso c ia te d  w ith 
u n ce rta in ty  about the  c ro s s -s e c t io n a l  Incidence of th e  fu tu re  tax es  
Im plied by a s u b s ti tu t io n  of deb t fo r  tax  financ ing . Various au th o rs  
Including Barro <19Bla) and Chan (19B3) have argued th a t  households 
a ttem p t to  hedge th i s  r is k  by In creasing  th e i r  c u rre n t sav in g s  by an 
anount th a t  exceeds th a t  requ ired  to  ex ac tly  o f f s e t  th e  fu tu re  tax es  
la p lle d . Under th i s  scen a rio , c u rre n t aggregate  consuap tlon  f a l l s  a s  
do aggregate  deaand and output. Along s i a l l a r  l in e s , Barsky, Hanklw, 
and Zeldes <1984) argue th a t  ag en ts  face u n c e rta in ty  w ith re sp ec t to  
th e i r  fu tu re  lncoaes. F u rth e r, they d e a o n s tra te  a n a ly t ic a lly  th a t  a 
postponem ent of tax es  by a s u b s ti tu tio n  of debt fo r tax  financ ing  
low ers the  r is k  of adverse  f lu c tu a tio n s  In fu tu re  income so th a t  ag en ts  
reduce th e i r  c u rre n t p recau tionary  demand fo r  sav in g s  and In crease  re a l 
consum ption. Under th i s  scen a rio , d e f ic i t s  have expansionary  re a l 
e f fe c ts .
As Ind icated  e a r l ie r ,  perhaps th e  most b a sic  assum ption underlying 
the  B lcard lan  argument I s  th a t  th e  government faces  an In f in i te  
ln te r te a p o ra l budget c o n s tr a in t  which re q u ire s  th a t  th e  p resen t values 
of governaen t expend itu res and tax es  be equal. In o rd e r fo r  th i s  
c o n s tr a in t  to  hold, I t  Is  necessary  fo r ag en ts  to  know w ith c e r ta in ty  
th a t  any debt Incurred to  finance c u rre n t expend itu res w ill u ltim ate ly  
be rep a id . However, In a framework where u n ce rta in ty  Is  taken In to  
co n sid e ra tio n , I t  i s  reasonab le  to  expect th a t  ra t io n a l  ag en ts  would 
re v ise  th e i r  ex p ec ta tio n s  w ith re sp e c t to  the  u ltim a te  repayment of the  
deb t I f  p e r s is te n t  d e f ic i t s  a re  Incurred over a s u b s ta n tia l  period of
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t in e . So, fo r e x u p l* ,  I f  th e  f is c a l  a u th o rity  Issu es  new bonds to
finance  the  pay sen t of p r in c ip a l and In te r e s t  on th e  e x is t in g  deb t, 
ag en ts  say  cose  to  be lieve  th a t  tax es  w ill never be increased  to  pay 
fo r th i s  deb t. Under such a scen a rio , B lcard lan  equivalence would not
hold.
As Is  c le a r  f ro a  th e  proceeding d iscu ss io n , the  co n troversy  over
the  e f f e c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  p r ic e s , and output cannot be
s e t t le d  a t  the  th e o re tic a l lev e l. Therefore, I t  i s  la p e ra tiv e  th a t  we 
focus a tte n tio n  on the  e s p l r lc a l  l i te r a tu r e  in  the  hope th a t  I t  w ill 
shed fu r th e r  l ig h t  on th is  Issue .
T rad itio n a l aacroeconoalc  a ad e ls  re ly  on the  p re su ap tlo n  th a t  
governaen t bonds a re  net w ealth In o rder to  d e a o n s tra te  th a t  an
Increase  In d e f ic i t s  w ill lead to  h igher In te re s t  r a te s  and aablguous 
but lik e ly  expansionary  e f f e c ts  on output and the  general lev e l of 
p r ic e s . However, s in ce  R icardian equivalence denies th a t  households 
perceive an in c rease  In th e i r  ho ld ings of governaen t bonds as  
enhancing th e i r  ne t w ealth p o s itio n s , I t  sev e res  th e  c ru c ia l lin k  In the  
t r a d i t io n a l  ao d e ls . At th e  e a p lr lc a l  lev e l, th i s  Beans th a t  given a 
w ell co n stru c ted  aac ro  ao d e l, I t  I s  p o ss ib le  to  d is tin g u ish  aaong th ese  
can p e tln g  hypotheses by ex aa ln ln g  the  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on e i th e r  
in te r e s t  r a te s ,  consuap tlon , output o r p r ic e s  o r on so ae  co ab ln a tio n  of 
these . Most e a p lr lc a l  s tu d ie s  have co ncen tra ted  on th e  e f fe c ts  of 
d e f ic i t s  on consuaptlon  and on In te r s e t  ra te s .
In sp lte  of th e  s u b s ta n tia l  body of e a p lr lc a l  l i t e r a tu r e  on the  
aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s ,  th e re  Is  s t i l l  no concensus on th i s
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issu e . Several au th o rs  have In v es tig a ted  th e  e f fe c ts  o f d e f ic i t s  on 
consim ptlon w ith n ixed re s u l ts .  For exanple , Barro (1078), S ea ter 
(1982), Kornendl (1963), Aachauer (1985), and S ea te r and X&riano (1985) 
fin d  no evidence th a t  an Increase  In governaen t deb t lead s  to  an 
In c rease  In consuap tlon , In c o n tra s t  to  th e se  s tu d ie s , F e ld s te ln  (1978, 
1979, 1982), B linder and Deaton <1985), Boekln and K o tllk o ff (1965), 
and M odigliani and S te r l in g  (1966) find  evidence of a  p o s it iv e  response 
of consuap tlon  to  d e f ic i t s .  In reco g n itio n  of the  fa c t  th a t  the 
consuap tlon  fu n c tio n s  sp ec if ie d  In th e se  s tu d ie s  and o th e rs  lik e  th e a  
do not In co rpo ra te  both th e  K lcardlan equivalence and t r a d i t io n a l  
hypotheses, Bvans (1968) used a aodel developed In B lanchard (1985) 
th a t  In co rp o ra te s  both hypotheses. Evans' e a p lr lc a l  r e s u l t s  provide 
s tro n g  su p p o rt fo r th e  R icard ian  view.
V lth  re sp ec t to  the  e f f e c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  sev e ra l 
au th o rs  Including  P lo seer (1982, 1987), Bvans (1985, 1987, 1989), and 
McMlllln and Beard (1988) found no evidence th a t  fe d e ra l d e f ic i t s  
Increase  In te re s t  r a te s .  A dd itionally , McMlllln (1980) found th a t  
various a  ensures of d e f ic i t s  fa ile d  to  Granger cause sh o rt- te rm  
In te r e s t  r a te s .  F u rther, using  a  par value a  ass ure o f deb t, Dywar
(1982) found no support fo r  a causa l lin k  between deb t and the  r a te  of 
In f la tio n . L ater, Cox (1985) used a a a rk e t value aeasu re  of govem nent 
debt and showed th a t  In c reases  In deb t lead to  h igher r a te s  of 
In f la tio n . In a recen t paper, Hafer and Hein (1987) were ab le  to  
reco n cile  th e se  c o n f lic tin g  r e s u l t s  by d e a o n s tra tln g  th a t  th e  p o s itiv e
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e f fe c ts  found by Cox were due to  the  f a i lu re  to  cap tu re  th e  in te r e s t  
r a te  e f fe c ts  in h e ren t in  the  m arket value measure.
V lth th e  exception of Bvans (1065, 1087) and McMlllln and Beard 
(1966), a l l  of the  s tu d ie s  c ite d  above focus on the  p o s t war e ra . In 
h is  1985 paper Bvans examined th e  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s  
fo r  pe rio d s  in United S ta te s  h is to ry  when d e f ic i t s  were p a r tic u la r ly  
high. These p e rio d s  Include the  C iv il Var, World Wars I and II , and 
more re c en t poBt war experience. Bvans found no evidenoe of a  p o s itiv e  
re la tio n s h ip  between d e f ic i t s  and In te re s t  r a te s .  Moreover, th e  only 
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  were negative. As the  th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  
reviewed above in d ic a te s , th i s  I s  no t in c o n s is te n t w ith a B lcardlan 
world w ith u n certa in ty  about the  fu tu re  Incidence o f taxes. 
A dd itiona lly , Bvans (1987) in v e s tig a te d  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  previous 
s tu d ie s  have found no re la tio n s h ip  between d e f ic i t s  and in te r e s t  r a te s  
because in te r e s t  r a te s  a re  more c lo se ly  re la te d  to  ex p ec ta tio n s  of 
fu tu re  d e f ic i t s  than  to  cu rre n t and p a s t  d e f ic i t s .  Using monthly d a ta  
from June 1908 to  March 1984, he found no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  
p o s it iv e  e f fe c ts  of d e f lc te  on in te r e s t  r a te s .  Moreover, the  only 
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  were negative.
In ad d itio n  to  EvanB (1985, 1987), McMlllln and Beard (1988) have 
in v e s tig a te d  th e  e f f e c ts  of d e f ic i t s  Dn in te r e s t  r a te s ,  p r ic e s , and 
output during the  ln te rw ar period. They employed vecto r a u to reg re ss iv e  
techn iques of th e  type proposed by Hsalo (1982) to  a model com prised 
o f d e f ic i t s ,  a sh o rt- te rm  in te r e s t  r a te ,  th e  money supply , in d u s tr ia l  
p roduction , and p ric e s . These au th o rs  found no evidence of p o s itiv e
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e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on s h o r t - te r a  in te r e s t  r a te s ,  In d u s tr ia l  production , 
and p ric e s .
In general, th e  e s p lr lc a l  l i t e r a tu r e  on the  sacroeconoB tc e f fe c ts  of 
d e f ic i t s  Is  sub jec t to  a number of c r i t i c i s e s .  S p e c if ic a lly , th e  papers 
c ite d  above a re  su b jec t to  a t  le a s t  two of four lim ita tio n s . These a re : 
(a) the  v a s t m ajority  of s tu d ie s  focus on the  p o s t war e ra  thereby 
paying In su ff ic ie n t a tte n tio n  to  o th e r  e ra s , p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  ln te rw ar 
period ; (b) alm ost a l l  o f th ese  s tu d ie s  a re  su b jec t to  c r i t ic is m  fo r 
om itted v a ria b le s  b ia s  because they  exclude e i th e r  government 
expend itu res or a measure of a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  o r both; (c> a la rg e  
number of au th o rs  use s t ru c tu ra l  models th a t  req u ire  use of the  
p o ssib ly  sp u rious r e s t r lc lo n s  th a t  Sims (1980a) has d esc rib ed  a s  
ln c red lb le j and <d) those au th o rs  who use a vecto r a u to reg re ss iv e  model 
have not p resen ted  s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  o r confidence In te rv a ls  fo r the  
v ariance  decom positions and impulse response  fu n c tio n s  on which they 
re ly  to  make In ferences.
B. D e fic its  and th e  Xoney Supply
In ad d itio n  to  the  p o ss ib le  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i ts  on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  
p r ic e s , and output, th e re  Is  an ongoing concern In the  l i te r a tu r e  th a t  
th e  monetary a u th o rity  m onetizes a t  le a s t  p a r t  of th e  d e f ic i t  such th a t  
Inc reases  In d e f ic i t s  Induce growth in  th e  money supply . Several 
a l te rn a t iv e  th e o r ie s  p o s tu la tin g  such a lin k  have been advanced In the 
l i te ra tu re .  One such view widely a sc rib ed  to  Buchanan and Vagner 
(1977) assumes th a t  the monetary a u th o r i ty 's  prim ary concern Is  w ith 
f in a n c ia l s t a b i l i t y  as  rep resen ted  by low and s ta b le  ln t s r e s t  r a te s .
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Therefore, th e  Fed usee monetary p o licy  to  coon t e r  a c t  fo rces  th a t  
Induce f in a n c ia l In s ta b i l i ty .  Under t h i s  sce n a rio  and th e  a ssu ap tio n  
th a t  R icardian equivalence does not hold , an Increase  In houeeholds' 
ho ld ings of governaen t bonds due to  a bond financed d e f ic i t  pu ts  
upward p re ssu re  on in te r e s t  r a te s  thereby  causing  th e  Fed — in  i t s  
o v e rrid in g  concern w ith f in a n c ia l s t a b i l t ly  — to  in c rease  the  aoney 
supply  In an e f f o r t  to  counter the  in c reas in g  in te r e s t  r a te s .
k second th e o re tic a l view of the  link  between d e f ic i t s  and the 
aoney supply argues th a t  In ad d itio n  to  i t s  concern w ith f in a n c ia l 
s t a b i l t ly ,  the  Fed has a a c ro e ta b ll lz a tlo n  g o a ls  such a s  p rlo e  level 
s t a b i l i ty .  S ince I t  Is  lik e ly  th a t  th e  s lau ltan eo u s  p u rsu it of both 
o b jec tiv es  w ill c o n f l ic t ,  Fed response to  an in c rease  In the  d e f ic i t  
w ill depend on which of I t s  concerns i s  do a ln an t. For example, 
I c X ll l in  and Beard <1980) argue th a t  In a  non-R icardian w orld, an
Increase  In d e f ic i t s  p laces  upward p ressu re  on both p r ic e s  and In te re s t
r a te s .  If the  Fed 's f in a n c ia l s t a b i l i t y  ob jec tiv e  Is  dom inant, I t  w ill 
Increase  th e  money supply to  counter r i s in g  In te re s t  r a te s .  On the
o th e r hand, I f  i t s  m a c ro s ta b lllz a tla n  concerns a re  dom inant, I t  w ill 
decrease  th e  money supply in  an a ttem p t to  co n tro l r i s in g  p rloes. 
Therefore, th e  e f fe c t  o f d e f ic i t s  on aoney growth Is  ambiguous In th i s  
framework.
Barro (1977) has co n structed  a model In which fed e ra l governaent 
expend itu res a rc  financed by a com bination of tax es  and aoney Issue. 
He a rgues th a t  th e se  methods of finance a re  ch a rac te riz ed  by 
a d m in is tra tiv e  and o ther deadweight c o s ts  th a t  in c rease , cmrtmris
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paribus, a t  an in c reas in g  r a te  w ith th e  to ta l  aaoun t of revenue ra is e d  
w ith a p a r t ic u la r  aethod . A dd itionally , Barro p o s i ts  an Inverse  
r e la tio n s h ip  between the  c o s ts  of ra is in g  revenue v ia  ta x e s  and the  
aaau n t of c a p ita l  invested  In th e  tax  co lle c tio n  technology. In th is  
fraaew ork, the  f i s c a l  a u th o rity  chooses a co ab ln a tlo n  of tax es  and 
aoney c re a tio n  th a t  a ln la lz e s  th e  to ta l  c o s ts  of ra is in g  revenue. 
Therefore, any Increase  In governaen t expenditu res w ill ty p ic a lly  
Involve In c reases  in both tax es  and aoney c re a tio n . A c le a r  lin k  Is  
thereby  e s ta b lish e d  between governaen t budget a c tio n s  and the  supply 
of aoney.
In a t te a p tln g  to  d e a o n s tra te  th e  p o ss ib le  In a b il i ty  of th e  ao n e ta ry  
a u th o rity  to  su ccess fu lly  conduct a lo n g - te ra  a n ti- In f la t io n a ry  po licy  
In the  presence of p e r s is te n t  d e f ic i t s ,  Sargent and V allace (1081) 
argue th a t  fed e ra l governaen t d e f ic i t s  a re  financed by a co ab ln a tlo n  of 
bond s a le  proceeds and seignorage  (I.e . revenue f ro a  aoney c re a tio n ) . 
Given th a t  the  f i s c a l  a u th o rity  d o a ln a te s  the  ao n eta ry  a u th o rity  In the  
sense th a t  I t  independently  s e ts  ltB  budget and a l l  c u rre n t and fu tu re  
d e f ic i t s  and /o r su rp lu ses , i t  d ic ta te s  the  to ta l  aaount of revenue 
requ ired  f ro a  bond s a le s  and seignorage. Therefore, to  the  e x ten t th a t  
th e  f i s c a l  a u th o r i ty 's  a b i l i ty  to  r a is e  revenue fro a  bond is su e s  Is  
co n stra in ed  by public  deaand fo r governaen t bonds, th e  p ass iv e  
ao n e ta ry  a u th o rity  haft no choice but to  Increase  i t s  supply of 
seignorage to  the  f is c a l  a u th o rity  by In c reasin g  the  supply of aoney. 
V hlle th i s  view of the  re la tio n s h ip  between d e f ic i t s  and aoney supply 
growth c le a r ly  la p l ie s  soae  degree of debt ao n e tlza tlo n , I t  ad d resses
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what 1b prim arily a long run concern which i s  outside the scope of the 
short run considerations of th is  d isser ta tio n .
At th e  em pirica l lev e l, th e re  Is  no c le a r  consensus on th e  deb t 
m onetization h y po thesis . Several au th o rs  includ ing  M cKillln and Beard 
<1980), Hamburger and Zwlck (1981), Levy (1981), Allen and Smith
(1983), and McMlllln (1988) fin d  evidence of m onetization w hile Barro 
(1977), llsk an en  (1978), Dywer (1982), and McMlllln and Beard (1982)
find  no evidence of monetary accommodation In post war da ta . This 
l i te r a tu r e  Is  in genera l su b jec t to  th e  same lim ita tio n s  a s  the  
e a p lr lc a l  work on R icardian equivalence. In p a r tic u la r  I t  co n cen tra te s  
on the  poet war e ra  w hile Ignoring o th e r tim e periods during which
d if fe r in g  In s t i tu t io n a l  frameworks and modus operand1 m ight have 
Influenced the  r e s u l ts .  This I s  an im portan t co n sid e ra tio n  s in ce  In 
v ir tu a lly  a l l  th e o r ie s  of deb t m onetization a c ru c ia l ro le  la  a sc rib ed  
to  th e  m onetary a u th o rity .
In p a r t ia l  s e n s i t iv i ty  to  the  above c o n sid e ra tio n s , Jo inas (1965) 
in v e s tig a te d  the  re la tio n s h ip  between the  growth of the  monetary base 
and d e f ic i t s  using y early  o b serv a tio n s  from 1672-1963. S p e c if ic a lly , 
he sp e c if ie d  a reac tio n  func tion  w ith measures of th e  contem poraneous 
and lagged values of normal and abnormal d e f ic i t s  a s  Independent 
v a r ia b le s . A dd itionally , he Included a measure o f gold Inflow s in to  th e  
United S ta te s  fo r  those years  In which such flow s were Im portant In 
o rder to  cap tu re  the  e f fe c ts  of th ese  flow s on the  monetary base. 
Jo in es  fin d s  th a t  the  s tro n g e s t e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on money growth
appear during  the  period  1915-53. However, when he adds lagged values
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of the  th e  r a te  of uneaployaent a s  Independent v a ria b le s , th ese  e f fe c ts  
d isap p ear. F u rth e r, he argues th a t  th i s  re v e rsa l su g g es ts  th a t  the  
■onetary  a u th o rity  responds to  f lu c tu a tio n s  In econonlc a c t iv i ty  which 
a re  h igh ly  c o rre la te d  w ith governaen t d e f ic i ts .
A dd itionally , and perhaps ao re  p e r tin e n tly , K cX lllln  and Beard 
(1988) use vecto r a u to reg re ss iv e  techn iques to  ev a lu a te  th e  ro le  of 
d e f ic i t s  during th e  in te rw ar period . Their r e s u l t s  w ith re sp e c t to  the  
re la tio n s h ip  between d e f ic i t s  and the  ra te  of growth of XI In d ica te  
th a t  th e re  was no ao n e ta ry  accomodation during th a t  period . S ince th e  
e a p lr lc a l  technique used by K cX lllln  and Beard was ra d ic a lly  d if fe re n t  
fro a  th a t  used by Jo ines, the  s l a l l a r l t y  of th e i r  r e s u l ts  i s  of soae 
s ig n ific a n ce .
IV. Xacroeconoalc E ffe c ts  of Governaent Spending and Taxes
A. G overnaent Spending
V lth ln  the  s tan d a rd  IS-LX framework, an In c rease  in  governaen t 
ex pend itu res  causes an outward s h i f t  In th e  IS curve a ttended  by an 
Increase  In In te r e s t  r a te s  and agg regate  deaand. A dd itiona lly , th e  
Increase  in agg regate  deaand leads to  an Increase  In the  genera l level 
of p r ic e s . However, the  aodel oakes no p re d ic tio n s  about th e  r a te  of 
In f la tio n . This s tan d a rd  Keynesian view has been c r i t ic iz e d  fo r  fa l l in g  
to  tak e  th e  b e n e f its  derived  by households f ro a  governaen t purchases 
In to  account.
The emergence of the  ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  hypothaalB a s  the  
d o a ln an t aacroeconoalc  h y p o th esis  on the  fo ra a tio n  of ex p ec ta tio n s  
brought w ith I t  a re v is io n  of the  b a s ic  Keynesian approach to  analyzing
29
the  aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  of governaen t spending. In p a r t ic u la r , 
various au th o rs  Including B ailey (1971), Koraendl (1983), and Barro 
(1981b) have argued th a t  s in ce  the  Influence of governaen t purchases 
on p r iv a te  consuap tlon  and production d ec is io n s  are  ignored in  th e  
Keynesian aodel, i t  l a p l l c l t l y  a ssu a e s  th a t  econoalc ag en ts  a re  ayoplc 
In th a t  they do not perceive  the  flow of b e n e f its  th a t  accrue to  then  
fro a  governaen t purchases. A dd itionally , Barro (1981b; 1987) has
docuaented the  d i f f e r e n t ia l  e f fe c ts  of changes In ten p o ra ry  and 
peraan en t governaen t purchases. S ince governaen t purchases a re  
tre a te d  a s  a hoaogeneous q u an tity  In the  Keynesian fraaew ork , th e re  
appeared to  be a  need to  re v ise  t r a d i t io n a l  textbook ex p lan a tio n s  of 
the  e f fe c ts  of governaen t purchases on aacroeconoalc  a c t iv i ty .
Barro (1981b; 1987) has a t te a p te d  to  g ive th e o re tic a l body to  th ese  
ob jec tio n s  to  th e  s tan d a rd  approach In h is  a a rk e t c le a r in g  approach to  
aac roeconoalcs. In h is  approach, to ta l  governaen t purchases a re  
considered  to  be c o ap rised  of two concep tually  d i s t in c t  coaponents, 
naae ly , ten p o ra ry  and peraan en t purchases. Peraanen t governaen t 
purchases a re  defined  a s  " the  c o n s ta n t flow th a t  has the  sa a e  p re sen t 
value a s  the  a c tu a l flow of purchases". Therefore, we can so lve  fo r  
pe raan en t purchases in the follow ing fa sh io n ;1
GP + G p ll+ rl-1 + , . . = Gi + G a tl+ r)- ' + . . . (2.1)
where GR re p re se n ts  peraanen t purchases, r  i s  the  re le v an t in te r e s t  
ra te , G* re p re se n ts  a c tu a l governaen t purchases in  the i**1 period  fo r 1 
= 1 , 2 ..........  B earranglng equation 2Tl and so lv in g  fo r  Gp we g e t
GP = r l l + r l - ’ CG, + G ad + r ) - ’ + . . .1 (2.2)
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Fran equation 22, an in c rease  In ten p o ra ry  governaen t purchases leaves 
p e raan en t expend itu res  unchanged. Therefore, a c u rre n t in c rease  In Gi 
which Is  la te r  o f f s e t  by a decrease  in purchases in  san e  fu tu re  period  
would be c la s s i f ie d  a s  an Increase  In te ap o ra ry  purchases. The usual 
exaap le  of an in c rease  In te ap o ra ry  purchases Is  th e  Increase  In 
governaen t o u tlay s  on defense expend itu res during  wars. Given the  
above d lch o to n lza tlo n  of governaen t p u rch ases , any a t t e a p t  a t  
exp lain ing  the  aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  of changes In governaen t spending 
req u ire s  sep a ra te  co n sid e ra tio n  of the  e f fe c ts  of pe raan en t and 
te ap o ra ry  changes.
A ccordingly, In h is  a a rk e t c le a r in g  approach, Barro recognizes th a t  
pub lic  s e rv ic e s  nay s u b s t i tu te  fo r so ae  a sp e c ts  of p r iv a te  consuap tlon  
such th a t  an In c rease  in th e se  public  s e rv ic e s  induces households to  
reduce th e i r  p r iv a te  spending. So, fo r exaap le , a one u n it Increase  in  
Gi which leaves G„ unchanged (i.e . an Increase  in  te a p o ra ry  p u rch ases) 
leads to  a reduction  In p r iv a te  aggregate  consuap tlon  o f o u n its , where 
a I s  assuaed  to  be g re a te r  than  zero  bu t le s s  than one. S ince the  one 
u n it in c rease  In Gt d ire c t ly  Inc reases  aggregate  deaand by one u n it and 
d ecreases  aggregate  consuap tlon  by a u n its , th e  n e t change in aggregate  
deaand i s  equal to  (1 -a) u n its . S ince 0 < a  < 1, aggregate  deaand 
In creases. On the  supply s id e , so ae  public  s e rv ic e s  say  se rv e  a s  an 
Input In to  p r iv a te  production o r Bay enhance the  a a rg ln a l
’Bquations (2.1), (2 .2), (2.3), and (2.4) a re  equ ivalen t to  and based on 
B arro 's  (1987, pp. 314, 328, and 334) equations (12.5), (12.8), and
(12.9), re sp ec tiv e ly .
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p ro d u c tiv itie s  of labor and c a p ita l .  Therefore, I t  Is  reasonab le  to  
argue th a t  a one u n it Increase  In Gi leads to  an Increase  In  aggregate 
supply of 0 u n its , where 0 i s  assu sed  to  be g re a te r  than  zero  and le s s  
than one. Under th e  a ssu a p tio n  th a t  or+0 < 1, Barro no tes th a t  the  
Increase  In aggregate  deaand given by (1 -a) w ill exceed the  In c rease  In 
aggregate  supply so  th a t  the  re su ltin g  aggregate  excess deaand equal to  
( l - a - 0 ) ,  w ill be p o s itiv e .
In th i s  fraaew ork, the  in te r e s t  r a te  a d ju s ts  to  c le a r  th e  co aao d lty  
n a rk e t whose c lea rin g  cond ition  Is  given by;
Cd ( r i , G ,, GPI ...) + I ^ t r i ,  ...) + G, = Y - ( r , , G ,, ...) (2.3)
-  -  -  -  +  +
where C*3, I13, and Y" re p re se n t aggregate  consuap tlon  deaand, aggregate  
p r iv a te  In v es tn en t desand , and aggregate  supply , re sp ec tiv e ly . The 
s ig n s  In d ica te  th e  d ire c tio n  of the  e f fe c ts  of th e  a rg u aen ts  and ... 
re p re se n t o a i t te d  a rg u a en ts  such a s  the  s t a t e  of technology and th e  
i n i t i a l  s tock  of c a p ita l .  Equation (2.3) la p l le s  th a t  the  I n te r e s t  r a te  
In c reases  to  e l ln ln a te  th e  p o s itiv e  excess deaand c rea ted  by the  
Increase  In te ap o ra ry  purchases. In sun , a ten p o ra ry  in c rease  In 
governaen t purchases lead s  to  In c reases  in output and th e  r a te  of 
In te re s t .
In B arra 's  n a rk e t c lea rin g  fraaew ork th e  p ric e  level I s  d e tern ined  
In th e  aoney n a rk e t. The n a rk e t c le a r in g  co nd ition  fo r t h i s  n a rk e t Is  
given by
Hi = PiL( Yi, S i , Gi , . . . )  (2.4)
+  — —
where Hi re p re se n ts  the  non lnal supply of noney, L(.) Is  th e  deaand fo r 
re a l noney, Pi i s  th e  general p rice  level, Yt Is  to ta l  output, Bt I s  the
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nonInal r a te  of in te r e s t ,  and Gi i s  a s  dsflnad  s a r l i s r .  The s ig n s  
a sso c ia te d  w ith th e  a rg u a en ts  in L(.) In d ica te  th e  d ire c tio n  o f th e i r  
e f fe c ts  on th e  deaand fo r re a l  aoney. As shown e a r l ie r ,  an in c rease  In 
te ap o ra ry  purchases In c reases  output and the  re a l in te r e s t  r a te .  Sinoe 
the  In c rease  In the  re a l In te re s t  r a te  leads to  an In c rease  In noalnal 
In te re s t  r a te s ,  L(.) d ec reases  and, o th e r th in g s  being equal, an Increase  
In Pt Is  requ ired  to  keep the  aoney a a rk e t In e q u lllb r lu a . A s l a l l a r  
a n a ly s is  In d ica te s  th a t  the  Increase  in  Ti re q u ire s  a f a l l  In Pi. 
A dd itiona lly , the  Increase  In Gi leads to  a decrease  In LI.) s in ce  the  
Increase  In public  s e rv ic e s  low ers to ta l  ao n etary  tra n s a c tio n s . 
T herefore, Pi a u s t  in c rease . In gen era l, th e  net e f fe c t  on the  p rice  
level depends on the  s tre n g th s  of the  Gt and Rt e f fe c ts  re la t iv e  to  the 
Ti e f fe c t .
A c u rre n t in c rease  In pe raan en t governaen t purchases can be 
thought of a s  an Increase  In c u rre n t purchases Gi w ithout any 
o f f s e t t in g  decrease  In fu tu re  p e riods. This aeans th a t  a c o rre c t 
a n a ly s is  of an Increase  In pe raan en t purchases re q u ire s  analyzing  the  
e f f e c ts  of the  Increase  in  Gi and of the  re s u lt in g  in c re a se  in  GP 
Unlike an Increase  In te ap o ra ry  purchases, every one u n it Increase  In 
pe raan en t purchases aeans th a t  to ta l  lncoae  a v a ilab le  to  households 
throughout th e i r  In f in i te  p lanning horizons i s  reduced by one u n it; 
th e re fo re , permanent lncoae decreases  by one u n it, however, s in ce  the  
flow of public s e rv ic e s  f ro a  the  In c rease  In governaen t purchases 
y ie ld s  b e n e f its  to  the  p r iv a te  s e c to r  equal to  <a+0), th e  n e t decrease  
in pe raan en t lncoae is  equal to  ( l - a - 0 ) .  F u rther, s in ce  th e  a a rg ln a l
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p ro p en sity  to  cousin*  out of permanent Incase  Is  c lo se  to  one,
agg regate  p r iv a te  consumption decreases  by < l-a -0 ) . At th e  same tim e, 
th e  In c rease  In Gi lead s  to  a s u b s ti tu tio n  o f pub lic  s e rv ic e s  fo r  
p r iv a te  consumption ex pend itu res such th a t  consum ption expend itu res 
decrease  by a u n its . Therefore, th e  n e t e f fe c t  on agg regate  p r iv a te  
consuap tlon  demand i s  given by o + <l-cr-0> = (1-0). S ince th e
Increase  In Gi e n te rs  d ire c t ly  in to  aggregate  demand on a  one-to -one  
b a s is , the  net e f fe c t  on aggregate  demand i s  1-C1-0) = 0. A dd itiona lly , 
s in c e  agg regate  supply Is  Increased  by 0 u n its , agg regate  excess demand 
i s  zero . Therefore, ou tput In c reases  and th e  in te r e s t  r a te  rem ains
unchanged. The e f fe c t  of a p e raan en t Increase  In government purchases 
on the  p ric e  level d i f f e r s  f r o s  th e  e f fe c ts  of a tem porary Increase  In 
th a t  th e re  Is  no change In nominal In te re s t  r a te s .  T h is means th a t  a 
permanent Increase  a f fe c ts  the  p r ic e  level only v ia  i t s  e f fe c ts  on Ti 
and Gt . Therefore, th e  net e f f e c t  i s  s t i l l  ambiguous although th e re  i s  
a g re a te r  llk llh o o d  of a n e t p o s itiv e  e f fe c t  fo r  tem porary changes. 
A dd itionally , th e  model makes no p re d ic tio n s  about th e  ra te  o f 
In f la tio n .
The prim ary em pirica l evidence on th e  th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e
reviewed In th i s  sec tio n  Is  con tained  In Barro (1001b). There, Barro
d iv ided  government expend itu res In to  defense and nondefense 
expend itu res. F u rth e r, he decomposed defense ex pend itu res  in to  
perm anent and tem porary components. Bowever, h is  a ttem p ts  to  I so la te  
tem porary changes in  nondefenee expend itu res were unsuccessfu l. This 
led h is  to  conclude th a t  nondefense expend itu res  were la rg e ly  p e raan en t
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I d  natu re . Using a s in g le  equation  fraaew ork , Barro reg re ssed  the  log 
of output on a c o n s ta n t, a t l e e  tren d , the  contemporaneous and f i r s t  
lag of u n an tic ip ated  soney grow th, c u rre n t values o f tem porary and 
pernanent defense purchases, and on nondefense purchases. The r e s u l ts  
In d ica te  th a t  a one u n it Increase  In tem porary defense purchases
In creases  output by .99 w hile a s im ila r  Increase In p e raan en t defense
purchases In c reases  output by .55. For both of th ese  e s tim a te s  the 
asso c ia ted  t - s t a t l s t l c s  Ind icated  s ig n if ic a n c e  a t  the  5 percen t lev e l. 
F u rther, the c o e ff ic ie n t on nondefense purchases was .52 but I t s
s tan d a rd  e r ro r  of .45 Ind ica ted  th a t  I t  was Im precisely  estim ated . 
Barro argues th a t  th e se  r e s u l t s  In d ica te  th a t  we a re  unable to  re je c t  
the  hypo thesis  th a t  the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on peraan en t defense and on 
nondefense purchases a re  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  from each o ther.
As Is  well known, the  ty p ic a l Keynesian a n a ly s is  p re d ic ts  th a t  an 
Increase  In governaen t purchases has a p o s itiv e  m u ltip lie r  e f fe c t  on
aggregate  expend itu res . To the  c o n tra ry , the market c le a r in g  approach 
p re d ic ts  no such m u ltip lie r  e f fe c t . The em pirica l r e s u l t s  p resen ted  by 
Barro In d ica te  the  absence of a m u ltip lie r  e f fe c t . A dd itiona lly , s in ce  
a permanent Increase  in government purchases reduces permanent income 
while a tem porary in c rease  does no t, I t  i s  reasonab le  to  expect th a t  a 
tem porary Increase  w ill have a s tro n g e r  e f fe c t  on output than  w ill a 
permanent Increase. Here, too , the  em p irica l r e s u l t s  a re  c o n s is te n t 
w ith the  market c lea rin g  approach.
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B. Macroeconomic Role o f M arginal Tax Rates
In the t r a d i t io n a l  Keynesian nodal, an Incraasa  In a a rg ln a l tax  
ra te s  lowers d isp o sab le  lncoae, and thereby, p r iv a te  consuaptloD  
expend itu res. T his leads to  an Inward s h i f t  In the  IS curve which Is  
a sso c ia te d  w ith f a l l6  in the  le v e ls  of In te re s t  r a te s  and aggregate  
demand. S ince the IS-LM fraaew ork Is  e s s e n tia l ly  an aggregate  deaand 
■odel, i t  does no t cap tu re  the  supply s id e  e f fe c ts  of a tax  Increase. 
For t h i s  we tu rn  to  an aggregate  supply - aggregate  deaand <AS~AD> 
fraaew ork.
As Is  well known, the  in tro d u c tio n  of tax  ra ta s  has d ls to r t io n a ry
e f fe c ts  on econoaic a g en ts ' d ec is io n  making p rocesses. S p e c if ic a lly , 
s in ce  the  presence of d ls to r tio n a ry  tax es  a l t e r s  the  a f te r  tax  a a rg ln a l
p roducts of both labor and c a p ita l ,  h igher a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  w ill
Induce red u c tio n s  In work e f f o r t  and in v e e tae n t, and u ltim a te ly , in
aggregate  supply . This aeans th a t  In an AS-AD fraaew ork, an Increase
In a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  w ill lead to  Inward s h i f t s  In both supply and
deaand so th a t  we g e t an unambiguous f a l l  In equilibrium  output and
ambiguous p rice  e f fe c ts  th a t  depend on the  r e la t iv e  s iz e s  of the s h i f t s
In aggregate  deaand and supply. In su a a a ry , the  t r a d i t io n a l  model
p re d ic ts  th a t  an Increase  in a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  leads to  lower lev e ls
of output and ambiguous e f fe c ts  on In te re s t  r a te s  and the general level
of p ric e s ; however, I t  makes no p red ic tio n  about the  ra te  of in f la tio n .
Underlying the  t r a d i t io n a l  model d iscu ssed  above i s  th e  a ssu a p tio n  
th a t  th e  a p p ro p ria te  sca le  v a ria b le  to  be used In sp ec ify in g  th e  aoney 
demand equation is  an lncoae measure such a s  GVP or p eraanen t Income.
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However, Xankiw and S u aaers  (1980) have presen ted  s tro n g  evidence 
su p p ortive  of the  view th a t  consuaer expenditu res a re  th e  ap p ro p ria te  
sca le  v a riab le . A ccordingly, th ese  au th o rs  c o n s tru c t a sod  i f  led IS-LX 
■□del in which the  sc a le  v a ria b le  In the  liq u id ity  preference  function  
is  consuaer expend itu res. V lthln  th a t  fraaew ork, they d e a o n s tra te  th a t  
an in c rease  in tax es  leads to  a f a l l  in d isp o sab le  lncoae, and thereby , 
consuap tlon . Therefore, the  IS curve s h i f t s  Inwards a s  i t  would In th e  
t r a d i t io n a l  aodel. However, in  c o n tra s t  to  the  t r a d i t io n a l  fraaew ork, 
the  f a l l  in  consuap tlon  expend itu res leads to  a decrease in  the  deaand 
fo r aoney and an expansionary s h i f t  in  the  LX curve. S ince the  IS and 
LX curves s h i f t  in opposite  d ire c tio n s , in te r e s t  r a te s  w ill f a l l  
I n i t ia l ly ;  however, the  u l t la a te  e f fe c t  on in te r e s t  r a te s  depends on the  
e f fe c t  on aggregate  deaand which is  aabiguous, and depends on the  
r e la t iv e  s ize  of th e  s h i f t s  and the  In te re s t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f th e  deaands 
fo r aoney and ln v e s tn en t. In t h i s  reg a rd , Xankiw and S u aaers  p resen t 
evidence d e a o n s tra tln g  th a t  e a p lr lc a l  e s t l a a te s  o f th ese  param eters for 
th e  U.S. f a l l  w ith in  the  range of values fo r which a tax  in c rease  would 
have an expansionary  e f fe c t  on aggregate  deaand.
Since Xankiw and S u a a e rs 1 modified IS-LX aodel speaks only to  the  
deaand s id e  e f fe c ts  of a tax  change, i t  is  useful to  tr a n s fe r  the  
argument to  an AS-AD fraaew ork . As in th e  t r a d i t io n a l  aodel, the  
d is in c e n tiv e  e f fe c ts  of the  Increase  in a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  lead s  to  an 
inward s h i f t  in th e  aggregate  supply curve. However, s in ce  the  e f fe c t  
on aggregate  deaand 16 ambiguous, the  e f fe c t  on equilibrium  ou tpu t,
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In te re s t  r a te s ,  and p r ic e s  I s  aabiguous. Once again , we have no 
p re d ic tio n  w ith re sp e c t to  the  r a te  of In f la tio n .
In B arra 's  n a rk e t c lea rin g  approach, a p e raan en t in c rease  in  th e  
average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te  lead s  to  a reduction  In th e  a f t e r t a x  
a a rg ln a l product of labor which causes a reduction  In work e f f o r t  and 
an acconpanylng decrease  In the  supply of goods. However, th i s  e f fe c t  
Is  m itiga ted  s in ce  the  h igher m arginal ta x  r a te  causes a w ealth 
reduc tion  th a t  e l i c i t s  g re a te r  work e f f o r t .3 On the  deaand s id e , th e  
h igher a a rg ln a l tax  r a te  causes a decrease  in  pe raan en t d isp o sab le  
lncoae which leads to  an a la o s t  equal reduction  In consuap tlon  s in ce  
th e  a a rg ln a l p ro p en sity  to  consume out of p e raan en t lncoae Is  c lo se  to  
one.3 The reduction  In aggregate  deaand Is  re in fo rced  by a f a l l  In 
Investm ent spending In response  to  the  lower a f te r - ta x  r a te  of re tu rn  
to  Investm ent. This a n a ly s is  im plies th a t  th e  decrease  In th e  supply  
of goods w ill be le s s  than  th a t  in  aggregate  demand so  th a t  a t  the  
I n i t ia l  a f te r - ta x  re a l  ra te  of In te re s t  th e re  i s  an excess supply  which 
Is  e lim inated  a s  the  economy moves to  a lower a f te r - ta x  re a l  r a te  of 
In te re s t  and lower output and p ric e s .
The e f fe c t  on the  p ric e  level can be analyzed by rep lac in g  the
nominal in te r e s t  r a te  <R*) in <2.4) w ith the  a f te r - ta x  nominal In te re s t
ra te . The f a l l  In output low ers the  tra n s a c tio n s  deaand fo r aoney so
th a t  an Increase  In the  p ric e  level i s  requ ired  to  keep the  aoney
a a rk e t in equilibrium . However, the  f a l l  in th e  a f te r - ta x  re a l r a te  of
In te re s t  leads to  a decrease In the  a f te r - ta x  n o a ln a l r a te  of In te re s t
aSee Barro <1967, pp,4 3 -4 0  fo r a  d iscu ss io n  of t h i s  e f fe c t .
3See Barro <1967, pp. 67-68) fo r soae  e a p lr lc a l  evidence an th is .
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which leads to  an Increase  In the  re a l  deaand fo r  aoney and
n e c e s s ita te s  a decrease  In the  p ric e  lev e l. S ince th e  r e s u l t s  ou tlined  
p lace c o n f lic tin g  p re ssu re s  on th e  p r ic e  le v e l, the  n e t e f fe c t  i s  
aablguoue. Moreover, th e  model makes no p re d ic tio n s  w ith re sp e c t to  
the  r a te  of in f la tio n .
The foregoing a n a ly s is  i s  Incomplete In th a t  i t  f a l l s  to  e r p l lc l t ly  
in d ic a te  the  e f fe c t  of the  in c rease  in  a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  on th e  
b e fo re -tax  r a te  of In te re s t .  This i s  of so ae  concern s in c e  th e
em pirica l r e s u l ts  tD be generated  in la te r  c h ap te rs  a re  expressed  In 
te r n s  of the  e f fe c ts  of h igher a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  on the before  tax
ra te  of In te re s t .  If we take  the  view th a t  th e  determ ina tion  o f th e  
r a te  of In te re s t  can be summarized by the  in te ra c tio n  of the  deaand
and supply fo r money, i t  i s  p a s s ib le  to  c la r i f y  th i s  issue . Under th e  
assum ption th a t  th e  nominal money supply i s  held co n stan t, a  decrease 
In aggregate  deaand d ecreases  the  tra n s a c tio n s  deaand fo r  noney. 
A dd itiona lly , a decrease  in  the  a f te r - ta x  re a l  r a te  of in te r e s t  w ill 
Induce households to  s u b s t i tu te  noney balances fo r in te r e s t  earn ing  
a s s e ts  in  th e ir  optim al p o r tfo lio s  and thereby  in c rease  th e  a s s e t  
demand fo r money. I t  i s  th e re fo re  c le a r  th a t  n e t e f fe c t  on th e  deaand 
fo r  money Is  ambiguous and so  a lso  i s  the  e f fe c t  on the p re - ta x  r a te  
of in te re s t .
V, The Macroeconomic E ffe c ts  of Changes in th e  Supply of Money
It is  well recognized th a t  th e  th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  on the  
macroeconomic e f fe c ts  of changes in  the  money supply has been and 
con tinues to  be very  c o n tro v e rs ia l. Approaches in th e  l i te r a tu r e  vary
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iro n  the  e a r ly  q u an tity  theory  approach to  th e  a o re  re c an t re a l 
bu sin ess  cy c les  approach. Both the  voluainous th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  
and an equally  expansive e n p lr lc a l  l i te r a tu r e  do not allow  fo r any 
concensus on the ro le  of aoney In th e  aacroeconoay . S ince the
p rln a ry  purpose of th is  sec tio n  Is  to  provide a b a s is  fo r the  e a p ir lc a l  
a n a ly s is  of the  ro le  of aoney during the  ln te rw ar period , the
th e o re tic a l d iscu ss io n  a t t e a p t s  to  b r ie f ly  cap tu re  th e  s t a t e  o f th e  
th e o re tic a l l i te r a tu r e  w hile the e a p ir lc a l  d iscu ss io n  co n cen tra te s  on 
the ln te rw ar period.
The ea rly  Keynesian and M onetarist approaches to  the  e f f e c ts  of 
aoney supply changes Bay be adequately captured  w ith in  the  fraaew ork 
of the  t r a d i t io n a l  IS-LM aodel. In th is  aodel an Increase  In th e  aoney 
supply  s h i f t s  the  LM curve outwards leading to  lower In te re s t  r a te s  and
h igher lev e ls  of aggregate  deaand. As is  well known, both K eynesians
and M o netaris ts  agreed th a t  aoney supply changes a f fe c t  e q u lllb r lu a  
output, p r ic e s , and In te re s t  r a te s  w hile no ting  th a t  th e  e f fe c t  on 
output I s  re leg ated  to  the  sh o r t- ru n . However, proponents of th ese  
views d isag ree  about the potency of ao n eta ry  po licy . In p a r t ic u la r ,  
Keynesians argue th a t  the  deaand fo r aoney Is  h igh ly  In te re s t  e la s t ic  
thereby  y ie ld in g  a ra th e r  f l a t  LM curve. On th e  o th e r hand M onetaris ts  
propose ra th e r  s a a l l  e s tim a te s  of the  In te re s t  e la s t i c i ty  of the  deaand 
fo r aoney thereby  arguing  for a re la t iv e ly  v e r t ic a l  LM curve. In th e  
Keynesian view ao n eta ry  policy  Is  one of sev e ra l fa c to rs  th a t  a f fe c t  
aggregate  deaand w hile in  the  M onetarist view aoney supply
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sa n lp u la tlo n  Is  the  dominant i f  not only way to  influence aggregate  
deaand.
The d iscovery  of the P h il l ip s  curve re la tio n s h ip  by P h il l ip s  (1958)
and the  subsequently  s u b s ta n tia l  l i te r a tu r e  on th e  su b jec t helped to
s o lid ify  the  view th a t the  ao n e ta ry  a u th o rity  could e y s te a a tlc a l ly  
influence re a l  econaalc  a c t iv i ty  in the  s h o r t- ru n  by a an lp u la tln g  the  
aoney supply. L ater, P rledaan  (1968) and Phelps (1967) developed the  
n a tu ra l r a te  hy p o th esis  which led to  acceptance of the  e a p ir lc a l
d is t in c t io n  between the  s h o r t  and long-run  P h il l ip s  curve re la tio n sh ip s . 
The c e n tra l th e s is  of th e i r  a rg u aen t was th a t  while an id e n tif ia b le  
P h il l ip s  curve re la tio n s h ip  ex is ted  In the  s h o r t- ru n , in the  long-run 
the r a te  of uneap loyaen t tended tow ards the  n a tu ra l r a te  which was 
Independent of the  ra te  of in f la tio n . This d is t in c t io n  between th e  
s h o r t  and lon g -ru n s  was based on the  view th a t  In the  s h o r t- ru n
changes In th e  p ric e  lev e l lowered w orkers ' re a l wages. V hlle 
eap lo y e rs  know the  new re a l wage w ith c e r ta in ty , w orkers o v e re e tin a te  
the  re a l wage and a t  p re v a ilin g  wages they  o ffe r  a supply of labo r 
se rv ic e s  th a t  i s  g re a te r  than what they  would supply i f  they knew the  
tru e  value of the  rea l wage. Therefore, an in c rease  In th e  soney supply 
in c re a se s  p r ic e s  which lead s  to  a sh o r t- ru n  in c rease  In output. 
However, given enough t l s e ,  workers becose aware of the  tru e  re a l  wage 
and reduce th e ir  supply o f labor to  th e  "correct*  lev e ls . F u rther, if  
the  so n e ta ry  a u th o rity  p e r s is te n t ly  pursues such a po licy , In the  long- 
run, I t  leads to  h igher and h igher r a te s  of in f la t io n  w ith no f a l l  in
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tbe  ra te  o f unemployment. This view of the  P h il l ip s  curve re la tio n sh ip  
c a se  to  be known a s  the  a c c e le r a t io n is t  hyp o th esis .
The dem onstration  of th e  sh o r t- ru n  n o n -n e u tra lity  of soney by
Friedman and Phelp6 was c ru c ia lly  dependent on th e  assum ption th a t  
agen ts  form th e ir  ex p ec ta tio n s  ad ap tiv e ly . However, i t  Is  widely 
recognized th a t  under ad ap tive  ex p ec ta tio n s  ag en ts  a re  presumed to  sake 
c o s tly  sy s tem a tic  e r ro rs . This Im plies th a t  ag en ts  do not sake  fu ll  
use of the  ln fo ra a tlo n  a v a ila b le  to  them and th e re fo re  su b o p tls lze . 
A ccordingly, sev e ra l au th o rs  Including Lucas (1973), S argen t and 
V allace (1975), and B arro (1970) have argued th a t  economic a g en ts  use 
a l l  p e r tin e n t Inform ation a v a ilab le  to  them in the  form ation of 
ex p ec ta tio n s  about economic v a ria b le s . Along th ese  lin e s  I t  Is  p o ssib le  
to  c o n s tru c t a P h il l ip s  curve model given by
T* = a + b (P t -  Bt _ ,P t ) + e t b>0 .... (2.5)
where a and b a re  param eters, Y* re p re se n ts  the  level of ou tput, P*. is  
the  log of the p ric e  lev e l, and E t-i denotes the  expecta tion  formed a t  
the  end of t -1 .  In th i s  framework, monetary policy  can influence
output only by causing  Pt  to  d iverge  from B t- iP t. In a world of
com plete ln fo ra a tlo n  where p r iv a te  ag en ts  have the  same Inform ation 
s e t  ae th e  monetary a u th o rity , a l l  th e  p re d ic tab le  e f fe c ts  of aoney
supply changes would be captured  In B t-tP t.. Therefore, th e re  i s  no 
opportun ity  fo r th e  Fed to  sy s te m a tic a lly  Influence output. However, i f  
I t  does the  unexpected, a wedge may be d riven  between P*. and Bt-iPt.- 
In o rder to  dem onstrate the  sh o r t- ru n  n o n -n e u tra lity  of money, 
proponents of ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  p o stu la ted  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the
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Monetary a u th o r i ty 's  inform ation Is  su p e rio r to  th a t  of p r iv a te  agen ts . 
In p a r tic u la r , I t  may be argued th a t  th e  Fed receiv es  Inform ation in  a
so re  t ln e ly  fash io n  than  p r iv a te  ag en ts .
In response to  the  ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  ln co n p le te  Inform ation 
argunen t, F ischer (1977) has argued th a t  I t  Is  un like ly  th a t  usefu l 
Inform ation w ill be av a ilab le  to  the  m onetary a u th o rity  but not to  
p r iv a te  ag en ts  fo r  any period  of t in e  long enough to  allow  the  Fad to  
a f fe c t  output. This, he a rgues, Is  because In d iv id u a ls  a re  lik e ly  to  
In fe r  such inform ation  from Fed behavior. As an a l te rn a t iv e  to  the  
Incom plete Inform ation exp lanation , F isch er (1977) has dem onstrated 
th a t  th e  presence of long-term  c o n tra c ts  In labor m arkets c re a te  wage 
and p ric e  r ig i d i t i e s  th a t  allow aoney to  be n o n -neu tra l even when 
ex p ec ta tio n s  a re  formed ra t io n a lly . S p e c if ic a lly , he argues th a t  
monetary policy  Is  fu lly  a n tic ip a te d  In the  cu rre n t period ; however,
s in ce  I t  Is  based on inform ation  th a t  becomes a v a ila b le  subsequent to  
the  form ation of long-term  c o n tra c ts , ag en ts  a re  unable to  ad ju s t th e i r  
ex p ec ta tio n s .
Friedman and Schw artz 's (1963) docum entation of th e  em pirica l 
re la tio n s h ip  between aoney and income fo r  the  period  1667 -  1960 Is  
the  d e f in it iv e  work on th i s  re la tio n s h ip . Both Keynesian and 
X o n e ta r ls t th e o r ie s  sug g est th a t  aoney supply changes a re  cau sa lly
p r io r  to  changes In output. A dd itionally , the  more recen t ra tio n a l 
ex p ec ta tions-Incom ple te  inform ation  h y p o th esis  and im perfec t m arket 
argum ents Df the  type advanced by F ischer (1977) a ls o  imply th a t  
changes In aoney supply growth cause changes in re a l economic a c t iv i ty .
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From an o b serv a tio n a l s ta n d p o in t, th e re  la  no question  th a t  money 
supply changes a re  c o rre la te d  w ith changes In Income. However, 
s u b s ta n tia l  debate  a s  to  the  tru e  natu re  of t h i s  re la tio n s h ip  p e r s is ts ,  
□f p a r t ic u la r  im portance i s  th e  recen t resurgence  of com petitive  
equilibrium  b u siness cycle  theory  a s  a r t ic u la te d  by au th o rs  such a s  
Black <1982), Kyland and P re sc o tt (1982) and Long and P loeser (1983). 
These au th o rs  argue th a t  f lu c tu a tio n s  In macroeconomic a c t iv i ty  a re  the  
r e s u l t  of re a l d is tu rb an ces  such as changes In technology, government 
purchases, and a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s .  F u rther, they p o s tu la te  th a t  nominal 
shocks such a s  changes In the  aoney supply have no e f fe c ts  on re a l 
economic a c t iv i ty .  In a ttem pting  to  reco n c ile  th ese  re a l business  cycle  
models w ith th e  observed aoney - output c o rre la tio n , Bobert King and 
C harles P loeser (1984) have argued th a t  th e  aoney supply responds 
endogenously to  changes In c u rre n t and /o r expected fu tu re  output. 
Therefore, th e re  Is  no c le a r  consensus on the  p rec ise  ro le  of money In 
macroeconomic f lu c tu a tio n s .
Sims (1972) used a b lv a r la te  aodel of GIP and money to  dem onstrate  
u n id ire c tio n a l c a u sa lity  fron  noney to  GIP In p o s t war da ta . L ater 
(see S in s  (1980b)) he used a  th re e  v a ria b le  v ec to r au to reg ress io n  
com prised of Ml, w holesale p r ic e s , and In d u s tr ia l  p roduction  to  show 
th a t  s im ila r  r e s u l ts  held fo r both th e  ln te rw ar and p o st war e ra s . 
However, when he added a sh o rt- te rm  In te re s t  r a te  to  th e  ao d e l, aoney 
ceased to  be Granger cau sa lly  p r io r  In th e  p o s t war period . Koreover, 
th e  in te r e s t  ra te  explained s u b s ta n tia l ly  more of th e  v a r ia tio n  In 
output than  did aoney. For th e  ln te rw ar period , aoney explained
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s u b s ta n tia l ly  le e s  of th e  v a ria tio n  In output than i t  d id  in  th e  th ree  
v a ria b le  aodel; however, i t  explained a s u f f ic ie n tly  la rg e  f r a c tio n  of 
the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  in  output to  sake  I t  G ranger cau sa lly  p r io r
to  output.
S in s  explained th i s  d ra a a tlc  change In th e  r e s u l t s  fo r th e  poet 
war period by arguing  th a t  shocks to  the  In te re s t  r a te  a re  p rim arily  
r e f le c t iv e  of new in form ation  about fu tu re  p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  Therefore, 
given p r o f i ta b i l i ty  in the  c u rre n t period , a f a l l  in  expected fu tu re  
p r o f i t s  lowers c a p ita l  a s s e t  p r ic e s  and r a is e s  c u rre n t in te r e s t  r a te s .  
If a g en ts ' expectalons a re  on average c o rre c t, an Increase  in  in te r e s t  
r a te s  w ill be followed by a decline  In aggregate  economic a c t iv i ty .  In 
th i s  framework, th e  observed money - output c o rre la tio n  r e f le c ts  a f a l l  
In the  deaand fo r money due to  the  a n tic ip a te d  worsening of aggregate  
economic co n d itio n s . A dd itionally , Sims argues th a t  th e  continued 
im portance of noney In the  ln te rw ar period nay r e f le c t  th e  im portance 
of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  during  th a t  period . In t h i s  reg a rd , i t  i s  
In s tru c tiv e  to  examine th e  ro le  of money in a model where th ese  
ad d itio n a l f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  a re  accounted fo r.
Burbldge and H arrison  <1985) d e fin e  th e  ln te rw ar period  a s  January 
1920 -  December 1941 and c o n s tru c t a four v a r ia b le  v ecto r
au to reg ress io n  com prised of XI, w holesale p r ic e s , in d u s tr ia l  p roduction , 
and a sh o rt- te rm  in te r e s t  ra te . F u rther, they use h is to r ic a l  
decom positions of output, in te r e s t  r a te s ,  and p r ic e s  to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  
macroeconomic ro le  of money during th e  G reat D epression. These au th o rs  
conclude th a t  w hile monetary fa c to rs  were of some im portance, o ther
♦5
nonaonetary  fa c to rs  seeaed to  c o n trib u te  s u b s ta n tia l ly  to  th e  ev en ts  of 
tb a t  period . T his conclusion appears  to  be c o n s is te n t w ith S la s  
(1980b, pp. 256) who In a t te a p tin g  to  exp lain  th e  d is p a r i ty  between the  
e f fe c ts  of aoney in  the  ln te rw ar and p a s t  war e ra s  — when a s h o r t­
term  In te re s t  ra te  was added to  the  aodel — asked " Is  th i s  because 
ao n e ta ry  s u rp r is e s  were re a l ly  a  ore im portan t In th a t  period , or would 
th e  r e s u l t  evaporate  In a aodel which tre a te d  ao n eta ry  s u rp r is e s  
s y a a e t r lc a l ly  w ith a w ider a rra y  of f in a n c ia l su rp rise s? "  In chap ter 
III we p re sen t an extended d iscu ss io n  of the  p o te n tia l ro le  of the 
f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  a lluded  to  by S la s .
CHAPTER I I I
FIIAICIAL FACTORS AID AGGREGATE BCOVOMIC ACT IT ITT
I. In troduction
The purpose o f th i s  ch ap te r I s  to  provide a  concise  review o f th e  
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  such a s  the  q u a lity  and 
q u an tity  of f in a n c ia l In term ed ia tion  and p r iv a te  balance sh ee t 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  on nacroeconoa lc  a c t iv i ty .  While s o e t  of t h i s  
l i t e r a tu r e  focuses on the  Im portance of accounting fo r changes in  th e  
level of bank a s s e ts  (p rim arily  loans) when analyzing f lu c tu a tio n s  In 
aggregate  a c t iv i ty ,  many of the  r e s u l t s  derived  a lso  bold fo r nonbank 
f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia rie s . T his p o in t i s  of s u b s ta n tia l  im port to  
s tu d e n ts  of th e  c u rre n t e ra  s in ce  Innovations In f in a n c ia l m arkets have 
led to  an in c re a s in g ly  im portan t ro le  fo r  nonbank f in a n c ia l 
in te rm ed ia rie s . However, s in c e  th e  prim ary em pirica l focus of t h i s  
d is s e r ta t io n  Is  th e  ln te rw ar period during  which banks overwhelmingly 
dominated the  f in a n c ia l s e rv ic e s  in d u stry , th e  term f in a n c ia l 
In te rm ed ia rie s  w ill be loosely  In te rp re te d  to  mean banks. In l ig h t  o f 
the  above d e sc rip tio n , f in a n c ia l In term ed ia tion  may be ch arac te rized  a s  
encompassing th o se  a c t i v i t i e s  of banks which f a c i l i t a t e  the  t r a n s fe r  of 
funds from su rp lu s  spending u n its  (u ltim ate  len d ers) to  d e f ic i t  
spending u n its  (u ltim ate  borrow ers). A dd itionally , f in a n c ia l
d is in te rm ed ia tio n  occurs when a d e te r io ra tio n  In th e  level a t  which, o r 
the  e ffic ien cy  w ith which, banks f a c i l i t a t e  th ese  t r a n s f e r s  leads to  
(a) im perfect s u b s t i tu t io n  o f open market c r e d i t  fo r  bank c r e d i t ,
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and /o r (b) an In a b il i ty  on th e  p a r t  of e a se  bank cue to e  e re  who do not 
have access  to  open market so u rces  of c re d i t  to  o b ta in  loans f r a s  th e i r  
banks.
T ra d itio n a lly , s ac ro e co n o s la te  have re fra in e d  f r o s  g iv in g  e x p l ic i t  
co n sid e ra tio n  to  f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  of the  type s sn tlo n sd  In the  
previous paragraph  because th ese  f a c to rs  were assuaed  to  be Im p lic it In 
households' and f ire s *  consumption -  sav ing  and Investm ent d ec is io n s . 
Therefore, fo r  example, a household 's deaand fo r and supply of f in a n c ia l 
a s s e ts  would be Im p lic itly  determ ined a s  the  household determ ined I t s  
deaand and supply of goods and s e rv ic e s . In a general equ ilibrium  
s e t t in g , V aIras ' law a p p lie s  and i t  I s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  look a t  only one of 
th ese  m arkets. Like the  M odigliani -  M iller theorem which p o s tu la te s  
th a t  economic d ec is io n s  a re  no t dependent on f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re , the  
t r a d i t io n a l  view assumes th a t  c a p ita l  m arkets a re  p e rfe c t. However, In 
the  absence of p e rfe c t c a p ita l  m arkets, a firm  o r household 's a b i l i ty  to  
execute th e  borrowing and lending p lan s  im plied by I t s  consumption -  
sav ing  d ec is io n  nay be im paired. The ex ten t o f th i s  im pairm ent w ill 
depend on th e  q u a lity  and q u an tity  of f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tion  and on 
the  q u a lity  of p r iv a te  balance sh ee ts . Therefore, f lu c tu a tio n s  in  the  
r e la t iv e  a v a i la b i l i ty  and c a s t  of securing  bank c re d it  would have re a l  
e f fe c ts  on th e  macroeconony.
Some ea rly  au th o rs , no tab ly  F is h e r (1933), Gurley and Shaw(1955), 
and Tobin and B ra lnard (1963), a ttem pted  to  d i r e c t  a tte n tio n  to  the  
a s s e t  s id e  of f in a n c ia l in te rm e d ia rie s ' balance sh e e ts . However, the  
w idespread prom ulgation and acceptance of Keynes' l iq u id ity  p reference
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theo ry , which ass ig n ed  a  p ro a 1nant ro le  to  ao n e ta ry  fa c to rs  In the  
d e te r s 1nation  of In te re s t  r a te s  and thereby th e  In te ra c tio n  o f the  
f in a n c ia l and re a l s e c to rs ,  tended to  d o a in a te  th e  p ro fe s s io n 's  
a tte n tio n . A dd itio n a lly , th e  apparen t e a p ir lc a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  of aoney 
In exp lain ing  re a l  s e c to r  f lu c tu a tio n s  (e sp ec ia lly  a s  aduabrated  In the  
d e f in i t iv e  work of F rledaan  and Schwartz (1983)) served to  fu r th e r  
enhance the  view th a t  fa i lu re  to  e x p lic i t ly  co n sid e r th e  a fo reaen tlo n ed  
f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  was a t  b ee t a t r i v i a l  o a lss io n .
A nuaber of developaen te  in th e  l i te r a tu r e  have rek ind led  concern 
about th e  nonaonetary  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l in te rn ed  1st Ion. These 
developaen te  include: (a) growth in the  l i te r a tu r e  on ln fo ra a tio n a l
a s y a a e tr le s ,  which provided an a p p ro p ria te  th e o re tic a l  fraaew ork w ith in  
which I t  could be d a a a n s tra te d  th a t  th e re  a re  no s u b s t i tu te s  fo r  so ae  
bank loans; <b> th e  d a aa n s tra ted  in a b i l i ty  of aoney to  exp la in  both the  
s e v e r ity  and leng th  of the  G reat D epression and th e  e a p ir lc a l  
ob serv a tio n  by S ia s  (1980b) th a t  aoney explained a  lo t  a a re  o f the  
v a r ia tio n  in  output in  a aodel th a t  d id  no t include the  In te re s t  r a te  
than  in  a aodel th a t  d id ; and (c) the  ap p aren t breakdown of th e  
re la tio n s h ip  between aoney and incoae in  th e  1980's, which led aany In 
the  p ro fess io n  to  seek a l te rn a t iv e  o r a d d itio n a l f in a n c ia l q u an tity  
v a r ia b le s  to  which ao n e ta ry  po licy  could be tie d . A ll o f th e se  
developaen te  caused g re a te r  a tte n tio n  to  be focused on the  
aacroeconoalc  ro le  of ln te ra e d la r le s  w ith sp e c ia l focus on th e  e f f e c ts  
of shocks to  th e  f in a n c ia l ln te ra e d la tlo n  p rocess  a s  they a f f e c t  bank 
a s s e ts .  At th e  Baae t i a e ,  Increased  a tte n tio n  was a lso  focused on the
i d
aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  o f f l r a  f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  and household balance 
sh ee ts .
In what fo llow s an a t t e a p t  la  Bade to  p rovide an annotated  survey 
of th e  th e o re tic a l  and e a p ir lc a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  surrounding  th e se  
Issu es . In se c tio n s  II and II I , 1 review the  th e o re tic a l  l i t e r a tu r e  
while l r  s ec tio n  IV an a t te a p t  Is  nade to  p re sen t so ae  o f th e  e x is tin g  
e a p ir lc a l  evidence on the  u sefu ln ess  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  a s  
ex plana to r s  of agg regate  econoaic  f lu c tu a tio n s .
II. The Bole of Bank A sse ts  In Macroeconoaic B q u lllb rlu a
The Idea th a t  the  level and q u a lity  o f f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tio n  Bay 
have aacroeconoalc  e f f e c ts  se p a ra te  f ro a  th e i r  e f fe c ts  v ia  the  aoney 
supply has been advanced in the  l i te r a tu r e  by e a r ly  au th o rs  such a s  
F ish er (1933) and Keynes (193ft). For exaap le , In h is  General Thanry. 
Keynes (193ft pp. 156) noted th a t  " th e  weakening of c r e d i t  la  
s u f f ic ie n t  to  b rin g  about a c o llap se , I t s  s tren g th en in g , though a 
n ecessary  co nd ition  o f recovery , I s  no t a s u f f ic ie n t  c o n d itio n .” In a 
v a r ia n t of F is h e r 's  deb t d e fla tio n  theory  — which argued th a t  during  
the  G reat D epression fa l l in g  p r ic e s  Increased  the  r e a l  value of 
household and f l r a  deb t, eroded th e i r  f in a n c ia l c ap ac ity , and thereby , 
th e i r  a b i l i ty  to  Bake purchases— Gurley and Shaw (1955) argued th a t  
f in a n c ia l ln te ra e d la r la s  p lay  an ia p o r ta n t  ro le  In the  d e te ra ln a tlo n  of 
the  f in a n c ia l cap ac ity  o f the  p r iv a te  s e c to r , and a s  such, have re a l  
e f fe c ts  on aggregate  a c t iv i ty .  In a d d itio n  to  th e  s tu d ie s  re fe rre d  to  
above, o th e r s tu d ie s  Including those  of B ra inard  and Tobin (1963) and 
Tobin (1975) espoused a  s t e l l a r  v iew point. However, th e  d o a ln an t
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p o s itio n  accorded Keynes1 l iq u id ity  p reference  th so ry  and th e  sem inal 
tim e s e r ie s  a n a ly s is  of Friedman and Schw artz (1003) tended to  sway 
the  p ro fess io n  away fro n  the  p o s itio n  taken by Ourley and Shaw and
o th e rs .
V hlle the  f a c to rs  alluded  to  In th e  p rev ious paragraph were Indeed 
Im portant In U n it in g  th e  a t te n tio n  given to  th e  nonnonetary ro le  of 
f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia rie s , th e  s in g le  b ig g e s t c o n tr ib u to r  to  th e  fa ilu re  
o f th i s  view to  ga in  a ore w idespread acceptance and a t te n tio n  In the  
l i te r a tu r e  was the  absence of a c le a r  th e o re tic a l  dem onstration  o f the 
uniqueness of bank a s s e ts .  S p e c if ic a lly , what was requ ired  was a 
theo ry  th a t  explained why open m arket debt in strum en ts  ware, a t  b a s t, 
only Im perfect s u b s t i tu te s  fa r  bank loans. Such a  theory  would Ju s tify  
g iv ing  sp e c ia l a t te n tio n  to  bank a s s e ts  In th e  co n stru c tio n  of 
macroeconomic models and g ive credence to  the  view th a t  th e  q u an tity  
and q u a lity  of f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia tion  has nonnonetary e f fe c ts  on the  
nacroeconony. The recen t development of th e o re tic a l  models analyzing 
the  e f fe c ts  of asym m etric Inform ation  problem s on f in a n c ia l market 
e q u ilib r ia  has allowed fo r  th e  development of models th a t  m otivate 
f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia rie s  from f i r s t  p r in c ip le s  and fo r  the  
Id e n tif ic a tio n  of a sp e c ia l ro le  fo r bank a s s e ts  in  the  de term ina tion  
of aggregate  economic a c t iv i ty .  This l i t e r a tu r e  may be placed In to  two 
broad c a te g o r is e . F i r s t ly ,  a  la rg e  number of s tu d ie s  approach the  
problem from banks* s tan d p o in t and a ttem p t to  Id e n tify  fa c to rs  th a t  
in fluence a bank’s  a b i l i ty  and or w illin g n ess  to  supply c re d it .  Another 
s e t  of s tu d ie s  focus on th e  Influence o f borrow er balance sh e e ts  on
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Investm ent and o th e r spending d ec is io n s , and a ttem p t to  Id e n tify  th ose  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  th a t  enhance o r h u rt a borrow er1# a b i l i ty  to  secure  
c re d i t .  In both c w b s s  i t  Is  dem onstrated th a t  f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  i s  
im portan t In exp lain ing  f lu c tu a tio n s  in  economic a c t iv i ty .  The 
rem ainder of th i s  s ec tio n  review s models o f the  f i r s t  type w hile a 
d iscu ss io n  of borrower based models i s  p resen ted  In s ec tio n  111.
A. Asymmetric Inform ation and F in an c ia l In te rm ed ia ries
In h is  sem inal c o n trib u tio n  on the  economics of asym m etric 
in fo rm ation , Aker 1 of <1970) dem onstrated  th a t  in fo rm ational asym m etries 
about product q u a lity  between buyers and s e l l e r s  may load to  market 
f a ilu re . More s p e c if ic a l ly ,  he argued th a t  s e l l e r s  know the  tru e  
q u a lity  of th e i r  product; however, due to  la rg e  v a r ia tio n s  in  product 
q u a lity , buyers a re  u n certa in  about q u a lity . In such a framework 
product p ric e  w ill r e f le c t  average p roduct q u a lity . Therefore, s e l l e r s  
who supply  high q u a lity  product rece iv e  an in fe r io r  p ric e , while 
su p p lie rs  of low q u a lity  product s e l l  th e i r  goods a t  a premium. In the 
absence of in s t i tu t io n s  o r  m arket mechanisms th a t  a l le v ia te  the  
In form ational asymmetry, adverse  s e le c tio n  r e s u l t s  such th a t  su p p lie rs  
of h igh  q u a lity  product e x i t  th e  m arket w hile more and more su p p lie rs  
of low q u a lity  product e n te r . U ltim ately , the  m arket may cease to  
e x is t .
Among the  f i r s t  s tu d ie s  to  fo rm ally  ev a lu a te  th e  e f fe c ts  of 
asym m etric Inform ation  on f in a n c ia l m arkets was a paper by La land and 
Pyle <1977) in  which they  examined th e  e f f e c ts  o f In form ational 
asym m etries between en trep ren eu rs  — who have p ro je c ts  th a t  req u ire
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ou ts id e  financing  — and p o te n tia l len d ers. S p e c if ic a lly , en trep ren eu rs  
know th e  q u a lity  o f th e i r  p ro je c ts  w hile p o te n tia l len d ers  a re  unable to  
d is t in g u is h  between high and low q u a lity  p ro je c ts . i s  ou tlined  in 
A kerlof <1070), len d ers  observe th e  average p ro je c t q u a lity ; th e re fo re , 
the  m arket value of p ro je c ts  w ill r e f le c t  average q u a lity . Onder th i s  
scen a rio , i f  average p ro je c t c o s t I s  exceeded by average m arket value, a 
d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly  la rg e  number o f low q u a lity  p ro je c ts  w ill be 
a t t r a c te d  w hile high q u a lity  p ro je c ts  w ill leave th e  m arket. Over tim e, 
average p ro jec t q u a lity  w ill p ro g ress iv e ly  d e te r io ra te , u n ti l  u ltim a te ly  
only en trep ren eu rs  w ith poor q u a lity  p ro je c ts  came to  m arket. In th e  
absence of in s t i tu t io n s  o r  m arket mechanisms th a t  a l le v ia te  th e  
In form ational problem s in d ica ted , com plete m arket fa i lu re  ensues.
In l ig h t  of th e  above, i t  seems reasonab le  to  argue th a t  an 
en trep ren eu r w ith an above average q u a lity  p ro jec t w ill find  i t  
d e s ira b le  to  communicate th i s  in form ation  to  p o te n tia l  lenders. 
However, because o f th e  in h eren t moral hazard problem Involved here, 
d ir e c t  communication Is  In e ffec tiv e . Leland and Pyle argue th a t  w hile 
th i s  problem may be so lved  I f  en trep ren eu rs  can find  a mechanism to  
s ig n a l th e  tru e  q u a lity  of th e ir  p ro je c ts , any a p p ro p ria te  mechanism 
w ill be c o s tly . F u rth er, th ese  au th o rs  suggest th a t  an en trep reneur 
may s ig n a l personal confidence in h is  p ro jec t by in v e s tin g  a 
s ig n if ic a n t  f ra c tio n  of h is  wealth in  i t .  Such a  s ig n a l Is  c o s tly  
because i t  fo rces  en trep ren eu rs  to  devote a la rg e r  f ra c tio n  o f th e i r  
p o r tfo l io s  to  th e i r  f irm s equ ity  than they would in  th e  absence of the  
aforem entioned In form ational asym m etries. The foregoing d iscu ss io n
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im plies th a t  c e r ta in  l i r a s  w ith a cc e ss  to  an ln fo ra a tlo n  p rocessing  
technology th a t  a llow s than  to  g a th e r and ev a lu a te  ln fo ra a tlo n  on th e  
v ia b i l i ty  of p ro je c ts  aay serv e  a s  In te rm ed ia rie s  between en trep ren eu rs  
and th e i r  u ltim ate  len d ers  by repackaging e n trep ren eu rs ' ln fo ra a tlo n  a s  
to  p ro je c t q u a lity  In a aanner th a t  e f fe c tiv e ly  e l la ln a te e  or a t  w orst 
a l le v ia te s  the  In fo rm ational asymmetry. S p e c if ic a lly , th e  s a le  of 
ln fo ra a tlo n  acquired  by the  In term ediary  Is  hampered by th e  a b i l i ty  of 
a pu rchaser of t h i s  Inform ation to  r e s e l l  i t  w ithout any lo s s  in  the  
flow o f s e rv ic e s  he d e riv es  from such Inform ation. A dd itionally , s in ce  
p o te n tia l lenders  a re  unable to  v e rify  th e  r e l i a b i l i ty  o f the  
Inform ation generated , In te rm ed ia rie s  face  a moral hazard problem, 
which could lead to  the  type of a a rk e t  f a i lu re  d esc rib ed  by A kerlof 
<1970).
Leland and Pyle sug g est th a t  the  In term ediary  can so lv e  the  
a p p ro p r ia b il i ty  and moral hazard problem s by buying and holding a s s e ts  
o ffe red  by en trep ren eu rs  on th e  b a s is  of the  Inform ation I t  w ishes to  
earn  a re tu rn  on. Onder th i s  scen a rio , the  a p p ro p r ia b il i ty  problem i s  
solved because th e  sp ec ia liz ed  in form ation  Is  embedded In the  
in te rm ed ia ry 's  p o r tfo lio . A dd itionally , th e  in term ediary*s owners can 
so lve  the  moral hazard problem by holding a f r a c tio n  o f the  
e n tre p re n eu r 's  eq u ity  th a t  la  g re a te r  than  what they would have held in  
th e  absence of th e  moral hazard problem. T his would c o n s t i tu te  a 
c o s tly  s ig n a l and would in d ic a te  th e  ow ners' confidence in  the  p ro jec t 
and in  th e  r e l i a b i l i ty  of th e i r  In te rm ed ia ry 's  ln fo ra a tlo n .
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The key Im plica tion  of th e  forego ing  a n a ly s is  i s  th a t  the  
w illin g n ess  of th e  In term ediary  to  hold a s a e ts  issued  by any firm  or 
en trep reneu r c e r t i f i e s  i t s  confidence in  th e  q u a lity  of th e  p ro je c t to  
be undertaken. Moreover, because of economies o f s c a le  in  in f  o r mat ion 
p ro cess in g  i t  may be cheaper fo r a firm  /en trep ren eu r w ith a  high 
q u a lity  p ro jec t to  subm it I t s e l f  to  c e r t i f ic a t io n  by o ffe r in g  to  s e l l  
i t s  a s s e ts  to  f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia rie s  (i.e . app ly  fo r  bank loans) 
In s tead  o f a ttem p tin g  to  send c o s tly  s ig n a ls  to  in d iv id u a l len d ers . In 
gen era l, th e re  w ill be a  d i r e c t  re la tio n s h ip  between th e  q u a lity  o f the  
f irm 's  p ro je c t and I t s  w illin g n ess  to  subm it to  c e r t i f ic a t io n .  At the  
l im it , firm s w ith high q u a lity  p ro je c ts  w ill use fin a n c ia l 
In te rm ed ia rie s  to  a l le v ia te  in fo rm atio n al asym m etries, w hile those  with 
low q u a lity  p ro je c ts  w ill re ly  on more expensive c o s tly  s ig n a ls  to  
ind iv id u a l len d ers . Under th i s  scen a rio , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th i s  
c e r t i f ic a t io n  p ro cess  evolves In to  a s o r tin g  mechanism.
In a ttem p tin g  to  exp la in  th e  e x is ten ce  of f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia rie s , 
Diamond (1964) co n sid e rs  a model where th e  in form ation  s tru c tu re  i s  
such th a t  I t  i s  necessary  fo r len d ers  to  undertake c o s tly  m onitoring of 
bo rrow ers ' p ro je c ts  In o rder to  observe the  re tu rn  on th e se  p ro je c ts . 
Sin-?* I t  is  in e f f ic ie n t  fo r len d ers  to  in cu r m onitoring c o s ts  In a l l  
s t a t e s  o f na tu re , m onitoring occurs only when borrowe rs  d e fa u lt on the  
r is k y  deb t c o n tra c ts  th a t  a re  the  optim al f in a n c ia l arrangem ent in  th i s  
framework. A dd itiona lly , s in c e  most p ro je c ts  a re  lik e ly  to  be too  la rg e  
fo r a s in g le  lender (d ep o sito r) to  finance , in  th e  abeenoe of f in a n c ia l 
In te rm ed ia rie s  th e  ty p ic a l borrower may e n te r  in to  r is k y  d eb t c o n tra c ts
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w ith sev e ra l lan d ers . Under th i s  scen a rio , two u n s a tis fa c to ry  outcomes 
o re  p o ssib le . These are: (a) w astefu l d u p lica tio n  occurs I f  a l l
len d ers  m onitor; and (b) a f re e  r id e r  problem ensues.
Diamond argues th a t  an optim al so lu tio n  to  th i s  m onitoring problem 
re q u ire s  th a t  len d ers  (d ep o sito rs ) d e leg a te  th ese  m onitoring c o s ts  to  
f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia rie s  who have a com parative advantage In such 
a c t iv i t i e s .  Lenders do th i s  by d ep o sitin g  th e i r  funds w ith f in a n c ia l 
In te rm ed ia rie s  who use th e se  funds to  make loans and pay d e p o s ito rs  a 
" fa ir"  re tu rn . However, t h i s  c re a te s  an ad d itio n a l problem In th a t  i t  
Is  now necessary  to  m onitor th e  m onitor. Diamond dem onstrates th a t  
the  f in a n c ia l In term ediary  w ill hold a heav ily  d iv e rs if ie d  p o r tfo l io  
th a t  a llow s I t  to  pay d e p o s ito rs  (len d ers) a re tu rn  th a t  I s  immune from 
any independent r i s k s  faced by Ind iv idual borrow ers.
In a v a r ia n t of th e  models d iscussed  above, Boyd and P re sc o tt
(1986) develop a  aodel In which each Ind iv idual i s  endowed w ith  a 
f in i t e  amount of w ealth  and a p ro jec t whose q u a lity  I s  a ssu ssd  to  be 
e i th e r  good or bad. However, the  tru e  q u a lity  of an in d iv id u a l 's  
p ro je c t i s  p r iv a te  in fo rm ation . In t h i s  framework, Boyd and P re sc o tt 
show th a t  the  e x is ten ce  of In fo rm ational asym m etries leads to  th e  
emergence of f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia rie s  th a t  use p ro je c t ev a lu a tio n s  and 
f in a n c ia l c o n tra c t  s tru c tu re  to  c o n s tru c t Incen tive  schemes th a t  
encourage In d iv id u a ls  w ith bad p ro je c ts  to  became sa v e rs  w hile th o se  
w ith good p ro je c ts  pursue funding. F u rth er, th e se  au tho re  show th a t  
d iv e r s if ic a t io n  i s  usefu l s lnoe  I t  a llow s th e  In term ediary  to  p e rfe c tly  
Implement th e  optim al Incen tive  scheme.
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The un ify ing  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of th e  ao d a la  d iscu ssed  abova i s  th a t  
they a l l  Im p lic itly  o r e x p lic i t ly  d e eo n a tra te  how fin a n c ia l 
in te rn e d ia r le e  aay  emerge. Moreover, th eee  models l s p ly  th a t  th e  
ln fo ra a tlo n  p rocessing  a c t iv i t i e s  o f these  ln te ra e d la r la a  l a  prove the  
a llo c a tiv e  e ff ic ie n cy  of f in a n c ia l m arkets, and thereby , th a t  of the  
o v e ra ll economy. T his la p l ie s  th a t  any e x te rn a l shocks th a t  haaper the  
a b i l i ty  o f banks to  d e liv e r  th e i r  in term ed iary  s e rv ic e s  I s  lik e ly  to  
have re a l  e f fe c ts .
B. C red it R ationing and i t s  Macroeconomic Im plica tions
In ad d itio n  to  the  a llo c a tiv e  in e ff ic ie n c ie s  a t t r ib u te d  to  
in fo rm ational a s y a a e tr ie s  in th e  previous sec tio n , sev e ra l au th o rs  have 
argued th a t  c re d i t  ra tio n in g  In  losn  m arkets Is  a  market response to  
in fo rm ational problem s In f in a n c ia l m arkets. In most m arkets, p ric e  
movements ensure the  e q u ilib ra tio n  of demand and supply . However, th e  
m arket fo r bank loans Is  freq u en tly  c h a ra c te r ise d  by ra tio n in g  
e q u ilib r ia .
The t r a d i t io n a l  approach to  c re d it  ra tio n in g  d e fin es  I t  a s  a 
s i tu a t io n  In which th e re  Is  excess deaand f a r  c r e d i t  a t  th e  going 
In te re s t  ra te . However, a more recen t d e f in it io n  proposed by S t lg l i tz  
and V elss (1981) recogn izes th a t  c r e d i t  ra tio n in g  occurs whan 
borrow ers w ith o b jec tiv e  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  Id e n tic a l to  th o se  who receive  
c re d i t  a re  denied loans a t  p rev a ilin g  in te r e s t  r a te s  and any h igher 
r a te s  they  aay o ffe r . A dd itionally , theee  au th o rs  argue th a t  c re d i t  Is  
ra tio n ed  i f  th e re  a re  groups of in d iv id u a ls  who, fo r a  given supply of 
c re d i t ,  f a i l  to  secure  loans a t  any In te re s t  r a te ,  although they  would
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with an Increased  supply  of c r s d l t .  The d is tin g u ish in g  fe a tu re  o f tb s  
S t lg l l t z  and V slss d s f ln l t to n  Is  th a t  I t  recogn izes th a t  tha  In a b il i ty  
of s o se  In d iv id u a ls  to  s sc u rs  loans Is  due to  th s l r  unw orth lnass fo r  
c re d i t  and not because c re d it  I s  ra tio n ed . Later I t  w ill be ap p aren t 
th a t  t h i s  reco g n itio n  Is  l s p o r ta n t  In exp lain ing  why in te r e s t  r a te s  say  
not a d ju s t to  e l la ln a te  excess desand.
The p r ls a ry  purpose o f th e  c re d i t  ra tio n in g  l i te r a tu r e  Is  to  
exp lain  th e  eaaa ln g ly  anomalous behavior of th e  loan m arket. The e a r ly  
textbook ex p lana tion  su g g es ts  th a t  In p e rio d s  o f t ig h t  c re d i t  banks' r 
prime custom ers receive  p re fe re n tia l  trea tm en t w hile o th e r  'Less 
p re fe rre d  custom ers a re  ra tio n e d . As noted by Santamero <1984), t h i s  
approach re q u ire s  th e  dem onstration  th a t  banks earn h igher re tu rn s  
from loans made to  th e i r  prim e custom ers. However, th i s  Is  u n lik e ly  to  
he t ru e  s in c e  th e se  prim e custom ers a re  lik e ly  to  have e la s t i c  deaand 
curves fo r bank c re d i t  due to  th e i r  a b i l i ty  to  ta p  open m arket sources.
Another approach to  c re d i t  ra tio n in g  focuses on th e  e f f e c ts  of 
asym m etric Inform ation Dn bank lending po licy . Ja ffee  and B ussell 
<1970) c o n s tru c t a aodel In which they  assume th a t  borrow ers can be 
lumped in to  honest and d ish o n es t c a te g o rie s . Honest borrow ers accep t 
only th o se  loan c o n tra c ts  th a t  they  reasonably  expect to  conform w ith, 
while d ish o n es t borrow ers w ill d e fa u lt on loans whenever the  c o s ts  of 
doing so  le  such th a t  they experience an Increase  in  u t i l i t y .  Because 
len d ers  a re  unable to  d is tin g u ish  between honest and d ish o n es t 
borrow ers on an a  p r io r i  b a s is ,  Ja ffee  and B ussell argue th a t  the  
equilibrium  In te re s t  r a te  which p re v a ils  w ill r e f le c t  the  p ro b a b ility  of
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default by di&honaat borrowers. Further, thase authors suggest that 
lenders (banks) can attract sore honest borrowers and thereby reduoe 
losses due to bad loans by reducing the fraction of Investment projects 
that they finance.
In a p rovocative  and h igh ly  in f lu e n tia l  paper, S t i g l l t z  and Veles 
(1061) argue th a t  in  p u rsu it of th e i r  p r o f i t  m ax ia lza tian  ob jective , 
banks a re  concerned about th e  r a te  o f in te r e s t  a loan pays and about 
i t s  r is k in e s s . However, the  r a te  o f in te r e s t  th a t  a bank chargee on 
loans eay a f f e c t  the  r is k in e s s  o f th e  loan in  one o f two ways. 
F i r s t ly ,  a s  banks in c rease  th e  In te re s t  r a te  on loans th e  borrow ers who 
a re  w illin g  to  pay high ra te s  of in te r e s t  a re  lik e ly  to  have a  high 
p ro b a b ility  of d e fa u lt. Therefore, expected repayment on th e  bank 's 
loan p o r tfo lio  f a l l s  and w ith i t  expected re tu rn . Secondly, a h igher 
in te r e s t  ra te  on loans induces borrow ers to  undertake r i s k ie r  p ro je c ts  
s in c e  a t  h igher in te r e s t  r a te s  th e  re tu rn  on su ccessfu l p ro je c ts  Is  
lower. Under th i s  scen a rio , banks fin d  th a t  th e  p ro je c ts  they  finance  
a re  g en era lly  so re  r is k y  and s in ce  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f repayment i s  
c lo se ly  linked  to  p ro jec t su ccess  they sa y  experience g re a te r  loan 
loopoo. The foregoing e f f e c ts  of in te r e s t  r a te s  on borrower behavior 
ln p ly  th a t  th e re  i s  a nonsonotonlc r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  In te re s t  
r a te  and th e  expected re tu rn  on loans. S p e c if ic a lly , th e re  i s  e a se  
o p t l s a l  in te r e s t  r a te  a t  which expected re tu rn  Is  s a x ls lz e d  and beyond 
which expected re tu rn  f a l l s .  Since th i s  o p t l s a l  in te r e s t  r a te  w ill in 
genera l n o t co incide  w ith the  r a te  a t  which desand Is  equal to  supply, 
i t  I s  e n t i r e ly  p o ss ib le  fo r a ra tio n in g  aq u lllb rlu B  to  p re v a il.
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In summary, the  preceding d iscu ss io n  o f th e  Ja ffee  end Buses11 end 
th e  S t ig l l t z  and V else e tu d lee  le p l le e  th a t  ra tio n in g  e q u ilib r ia  aay  
eaerge  a s  a m arket response  to  th e  e x is ten ce  of In form ational 
asym m etries between borrow ers and len d ers  a s  to  th e  d e fau lt 
p ro b a b il i t ie s  of borrow ers. Vhen c r e d i t  ra tio n in g  a s  defined  in  
S t ig l l t z  and V elss occurs, an unavoidable by-product i s  th a t  
b o rro w ers/en trep ren eu rs  w ith good p ro je c ts  a re  ra tio n ed  and a re  thereby  
unable to  undertake p ro f i ta b le  investm en ts. T his im p lies  th a t  adverse  
shocks to  c re d i t  supply o r any shock th a t  exacerb a tes  in fo rm ational 
problem s o f th e  type  alluded  to  above w ill lead to  more severe  
ra tio n in g  and lower le v e ls  o f investm ent expenditu re. B ffec ts  o f th i s  
type appear to  have taken hold during  the  G reat D epression when 
m assive b u siness fa i lu re s  Increased  th e  in fo rm ational gap between 
borrow ers and banks which led to  th e  severe  c r e d i t  ra tio n in g  
documented in Bernanke (1983)
The s tu d ie s  by Leland and Pyle, Diamond, Ja ffee  and B ussell, and 
S t ig l l t z  and V elss c le a r ly  dem onstrate  th a t  th e  ex is ten ce  o f asym m etric 
inform ation  in f in a n c ia l  m arkets ad v erse ly  a f fe c ts  th e  economy's 
a l lo c a tiv e  e ff ic ien cy . However, th ese  s tu d ie s  and o th e rs  lik e  them a re  
e s s e n t ia l ly  microeconomic in na tu re  and do no t e x p lic i t ly  develop th e  
lin k  between the  level and q u a lity  of f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tio n  and 
agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty .  In s ec tio n  II. C below a  b r ie f  review  o f 
s tu d ie s  th a t  a t t e a p t  to  more e x p l ic i t ly  develop th i s  lin k  i s  p resen ted .
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C. XacroecGDon lc  Linkages
In a recen t paper, Barnanke and G a rtla r (BAG) <1067) develop a 
aodel th a t  a t te a p te  to  in co rp o ra te  th e  e e e e n tia l faa tu ree  o f th e  
banking s e c to r  in  a aacroeconoalc  s e t t in g  In o rd er to  d e a o n s tra te  how 
shocks to  th e  banking s e c to r 's  a b i l i ty  to  p a r lo r s  i t s  in te rm ed ia tion  
function  nay Influence agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty .  S p e c if ic a lly , th ese  
a u th o rs  envisage a world w ith two ty p es  of investm ent techno log ies 
th a t  convert an endowment good <lnput) in to  a  consumption good 
(output). The f i r s t  of th ese  techno log ies Is  a  liq u id  investm ent th a t  
c o n v erts  one u n it of Input In period  t  In to  one u n it of th e  consumption 
good In period t+1. The o th er technology i s  an i l l iq u id  investm ent 
th a t  y ie ld s  a random q u an tity  of th e  consumption good per u n it of input 
two p e rio d s  la te r .  F u rth er, BAG p o s tu la te  th a t  fin d in g  an i l l iq u id  
p ro je c t re q u ire s  p o ssess io n  of an in form ation  g a th erin g  technology th a t  
a llow s fo r  ex an te  evalua tion  o f th e  p ro jec t and ax p o s t m onitoring of 
i t s  re tu rn s . Because th eee  evalua tion  and m onitoring a c t iv i t i e s  a re  
c o s tly , and p ro h ib itiv e ly  so  fo r  in d iv id u a ls , they  a re  unable to  
d ire c t ly  in v e s t In i l l iq u id  p ro je c ts . This framework allow s an 
op p o rtu n ity  fo r firm s (i.e . banks) who have access  to  the  inform ation  
g a th erin g  technology to  se rv e  a s  In te rm ed ia rie s  through which 
In d iv id u a ls  may In d ire c tly  In v es t in  I l l iq u id  p ro je c ts . One o f th e  key 
is su e s  to  be reso lved  before  Individuals*  funds can be made av a ilab le  
to  In te rm ed ia rie s  Is  the  c o n stru c tio n  of an In cen tive  com patible 
c o n tra c t  between In d iv id u a ls  and In te rm ed ia rie s . T his i s  necessary  
because the  re tu rn  th a t  banks earn  on i l l iq u id  investm ents i s  p r iv a te
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Inform ation th a t  In d iv id u a ls  ar*  unable to  obsarva. Therefore, a moral 
hazard p ro b laa  amargas a ln ca  banks w ill hava every ln c aa tlv a  to
u n d e rs ta te  ra tu rn s .
Several au th o rs  Including  Diamond (1664), Vllllammon (1067) and 
B6G argue th a t  banks re ly  on noncontlngant deb t (I.e. demand d e p o sits )  
because o th e r c o n tra c tu a l form s a re  co n tin g en t on unobservable re tu rn s  
to  I l l iq u id  p ro je c ts  and a re  thereby  in cen tiv e  incom patible. In a 
framework where bank l i a b i l i t i e s  a re  e s s e n t ia l ly  r i s k  fre e , th e re  a re  no 
a d d itio n a l Incen tive  problem s. However, i f  th e re  Is  eome p ro b a b ility  
th a t  banks aay d e fa u lt on th ese  noncontingent deb t c o n tra c ts , i t  Is  
useful to  co n sid er how bank l i a b i l i t i e s  aay  be made Incen tive-
com patible. S ince BAG assume th a t  I l l iq u id  p ro je c ts  a re  la rg e  and th a t  
th e  in form ation  g a th e rin g  technology le  such th a t  the  number of 
p ro je c ts  the  bank I s  ab le  to  handle Is  too sm all to  allow  fo r p e rfe c t 
d iv e r s if ic a t io n , bank l i a b i l i t i e s  a re  p o te n tia lly  r isk y . T his Im plies 
th a t  fa c to rs  which a f f e c t  the  r is k in e s s  of bank l i a b i l i t i e s ,  such a s  
bank c a p ita l  and the  q u a lity  of bank a s s e ts ,  w ill l im it the  s iz e  of the
banking Industry  and u ltim a te ly  w ill have macroeconomic e f fe c ts .
The foregoing h ig h lig h ts  the  need fa r  some mechanism v ia  which 
banks aay secure  th e i r  l i a b i l i t i e s .  As noted by BAG, a  p o te n tia lly  
useful arrangem ent th a t  o b v ia te s  th e  need to  observe th e  re tu rn  on bank 
p o r tfo lio s  I s  one th a t  re q u ire s  ob serv a tio n  of th e  a c tu a l payments made 
by banks. S p e c if ic a lly , th ese  payments may be made co n tin g en t on one 
of two s ta t e s .  If th e  hank makes the  c o n tra c tu a lly  sp ec if ie d  payment, 
then I t  Is  considered  to  be In a nondefau lt s ta te ;  however, I f  I t  f a l l s
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to  Make theee  payments I t  le  considered  to  be in  d e fa u lt. Diamond 
(1984) proposes some form o f punishment fo r  banks who f a l l  In to  th e  
d e fa u lt s t a t e  w hile Townsend (1979) su g g es ts  having d e fau ltin g  banks 
undertake c o s tly  au d itin g . However, BAG argue th a t  th e  so lu tio n s  
proposed by Diamond and Townsend a re  u n sa tis fa c to ry  because they 
req u ire  th a t  d e p o s ito rs  have an im plausib le  amount o f Inform ation  about 
bank a s s e ts  and because they a t t r ib u te  l i t t l e  o r no ro le  to  c o l la te r a l  
such a s  bank c a p ita l  ln s p lte  of I t s  em p irica l re levance.
In a ttem pting  to  cone up w ith an a l te rn a t iv e  to  th e  in cen tive  
schemes suggested  by Diamond and Townsend, BAG assume th a t  th e  
minimum p o ss ib le  re tu rn  from an I l l iq u id  p ro je c t p lu s I t s  s c rap  value 
Is  observab le  and can be thought of a s  I t s  c o l la te r a l  value. F u r th e r , 
they argue th a t  banks may use In s id e r bank c a p ita l  (I.e. equ ity  obtained  
fro n  th e  owner/manager o r from re ta in ed  ea rn in g s) to  secu re  deb t 
c o n tra c ts . In th i s  framework th e re  Is  a d ire c t  re la tio n s h ip  between 
the  amount of In s id e r c a p ita l  th a t  a bank ho lds and th e  noncontingent 
deb t th a t  I t  can Issue . BAG propose an arrangem ent where banks re ly  
on th e i r  supply of In s id e r  c a p i ta l  to  p e rfe c t ly  c o lla te r a l iz e  th e i r  
deb t. Under th i s  scen a rio , the  optim al c o n tra c t re q u ire s  th a t  th e  bank 
p lan  i t s  i l l iq u id  and liq u id  investm en ts such th a t  I t  Is  ab le  to  s e rv ic e  
I t s  d e p o sit l i a b i l i t i e s  on a period  by period  b a s is  even when i t s  r is k y  
p ro je c ts  y ie ld  th e  minimum p o ss ib le  re tu rn . O perationally , t h i s  
re q u ire s  th a t  th e  bank s h i f t  re so u rces  between liq u id  and I l l iq u id  
investm en ts a s  c ircum stances In I t s  o p era tin g  environm ent change. 
F u rth er, In o rd er to  sak e  t h i s  scheme Incen tive-com patib le , BAG assume
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th a t  th e  c o l la te r a l  value of I l l iq u id  p ro je c ts  and th e  q u a n ti t ie s  of 
bank d e p o s its , I l l iq u id  ln v e s ts e n ts  and s to ra g e  a re  observab le .
The c ru c ia l a sp e c t of th e  BAG model Is  I t s  dem onstration  th a t  
fa c to rs  which ad v erse ly  a f fe c t  th e  q u a li ty  and q u a n tity  of bank c a p ita l 
w ill lead to  a c o n tra c tio n  In th e  level of d e p o s its  banks a re  ab le  to  
a t t r a c t .  T herefore, the  volume of funds they a re  ab le  to  In term edia te  
f a l l s  such th a t  p ro je c ts  which a re  e n tire ly  dependent on bank c re d it  
may not be financed . F urther, a  s ig n if ic a n t ly  d e le te r io u s  change in the  
c o l la te r a l  value of I ll iq u id  bank a s s e ts  would se r io u s ly  Im pair the 
banks a b i l i ty  to  finance  I l l iq u id  p ro je c ts , s in c e  i t  would now be 
necessary  to  s h i f t  re so u rces  from i l l iq u id  to  liq u id  a s s e ts  In o rder to  
m ain tain  p e rfe c t c o l la te r a l iz a t io n  of I t s  debt c o n tra c ts . V hile I t  Is  
d i f f i c u l t  to  th in k  of an exogenous unfavorable shock to  bank c a p ita l , 
endogenous shocks such a s  d e te r io ra tio n  In b u sin ess  c o n d itio n s  may 
erode both bank c a p ita l  and the  value of I t s  I l l iq u id  a s s e ts  (loans) 
and lead to  fu r th e r  d e te r io ra tio n  of b u siness co n d itio n s . I t  seems 
reasonab le  to  argue th a t such a mechanism may well exp la in  the  
p e rs is te n c e  and s e v e r ity  of th e  economic f lu c tu a tio n s  of th e  t h i r t i e s .  
A dd itionally , BAG argue th a t  th e i r  model I s  su p p o rtiv e  of the  view th a t  
c e r ta in  government re g u la tio n s  — which were Introduced fo r 
microeconomic reaso n s — such as d e p o s it Insurance, minimum c a p ita l  
requ irem ents and public  au d itin g  th a t  seek to  ensure  the  q u a lity  of 
bank c a p i ta l ,  may be J u s tif ia b le  on macroeconomic grounds.
Vhlle the foregoing a n a ly s is  has focused on th e  macroeconomic 
e f fe c ts  of bank behavior In a llo c a tin g  c re d it ,  i t  i s  In s tru c tiv e  to
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In v e s tig a te  th e  Im p lica tio n s  of th a t  l i te r a tu r e  fo r  th e  manner in  which 
bank p a r t ic ip a tio n  in the  c r e d i t  supply p ro cess  say  a f f e c t  th e  channels 
v ia  which th e  changes in  th e  supply o f money a f fe c t  th e  macroecanomy. 
The t r a d i t io n a l  view o f th i s  tran sm iss io n  mechanism holds th a t  an 
in c rease  in  bank re se rv e s  in i t ia te d  by th e  Fed allow s banks to  in c rease  
th e ir  money c re a tio n  a c t iv i t i e s  which in c re a se s  o v e ra ll l iq u id ity  and 
lowers m arket in te r e s t  r a te s .  Subsequently, th e  Increased  liq u id ity  and 
lower in te r e s t  r a te s  lead to  Inc reases  in  p r iv a te  spending. In t h i s
view banks a re  s in g led  out fo r sp ec ia l a tte n tio n  because of the  ro le  of 
th e ir  l i a b i l i t i e s  (i.e . demand d e p o s its )  in th e  money supply  p ro cess
while the  ro le  played by bank a s s e ts  (p rim arily  loans) i s  la rg e ly
ignored on the  presum ption th a t  open m arket s e c u r i t ie s  a re  near p e rfe c t 
s u b s t i tu te s  fo r bank loans.
Recently, sev e ra l au th o rs  includ ing  B linder and S t lg l l t z  (1983), 
Bernanke <1986;1988) and Bernanke and B linder (1988) have advocated a 
" c re d it  view" of the  monetary tra n sm iss io n  mechanism. S p e c if ic a lly , 
th ese  au th o rs  (p a r tic u la r ly  B linder and S t lg l l t z )  ob ject to  the
presum ption on the  p a r t  of proponents of the  t r a d i t io n a l  view th a t  open 
market s e c u r i t ie s  a re  p e rfe c t s u b s t i tu te s  fa r bank loans. In stead , they 
argue th a t  recen t f in a n c ia l innovations have c rea ted  many s u b s t i tu te s  
fo r money and th a t  th e  uniqueness a t t r ib u te d  to  demand d e p o s its  by the 
t r a d i t io n a l  view is  unw arranted. F u rther, they re ly  on th e  burgeoning 
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  e f fe c ts  of im perfec t in form ation  on c a p i ta l  m arkets 
to  dem onstrate th a t  bank a s s e ts  deserve  sp e c ia l a tte n tio n  because of 
th e  unique ro le  they play in th e  c re d i t  supply p rocess.
65
As im plied by the  d iscu ss io n  in precaeding M o tio n s, Im perfect
Inform ation  about d e fau lt p ro b a b il i t ie s  g iv e s  r i s e  to  fin a n c ia l
ln te r s e d la r le s  who a re  ab le  to  evalua te  and s o n l to r  c e r ta in  borrow ers ' 
p ro je c ts  a t  c o s ts  s u b s ta n tia l ly  lower than what in d iv id u a ls  would incur 
i f  they a ttem pted  to  lend d ire c t ly . This i s  p l ie s  th a t  fo r e a se
borrow ers (p rim arily  sm all f irm s and in d iv id u a ls ) the  Inform ational 
c o s ts  a sso c ia te d  w ith secu ring  open m arket c re d i t  a re  p ro h ib itiv e ly  
high, thereby  fo rc in g  th ese  firm s to  re ly  a lm ost ex c lu siv e ly  on bank 
c re d i t .  Also, fo r la rge  well e s ta b lish e d  firm s, the  evalua tion  and 
m onitoring c o s ts  may be such th a t  i t  is  more e f f ic ie n t  fo r In d iv id u a ls  
to  lend d ire c t ly  to  th e se  firm s by purchasing  th e i r  open market 
s e c u r i t ie s .  As noted by S t lg l l t z  and V elss (1961) and B linder and 
S t lg l l t z  (1933), im perfect Inform ation In c a p ita l  m arkets leads to  a 
c l ie n te le  e f fe c t  such th a t  very low r is k  borrow ers (or firm s fo r which 
the  in fo rm ational asymmetry i s  minimal) depend on open m arket c r e d i t  
while h ig h e r r i s k  firm s (or firm 6 fo r which the  in fo rm ational 
asymmetry i s  s u b s ta n tia l)  depend on banks fo r  th e i r  c re d i t  needs.
Therefore, i t  i s  reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  bank a s s e ts  deserve 
sp e c ia l mention s in c e  open m arket s e c u r i t ie s  a re  a t  b e s t im perfect 
s u b s t i tu te s  fo r bank loans.
In l ig h t  of th e  above, Bernanke and B linder (19B&) develop an 
augmented IS- LM model of aggregate  demand th a t  a ttem p ts  to  cap tu re  th e  
e f fe c ts  of both  money and c re d it .  In c o n tr a s t  to  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
framework, In th e i r  augmented model In d iv id u a ls  achieve p o r tfo lio  
balance among money, bonds, and loans. A sim ple bank resource
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c o n s tra in t  th a t  lgnoraa n e t worth re q u ire s  th a t  bank a s s e t  hold ings
(I.e. the  aua of excess re se rv e s , loans, and band h o ld ings) equal to ta l
d e p o s its  le s s  requ ired  re se rv es . F u rther, bank p o r tfo lio  p ro p o rtio n s
a re  assu sed  to  depend on th e  r a te s  of re tu rn  on th e  a s s e ts  held . This
allow s s p e c if ic a tio n  of a loan supply function  where loan supply
depends p o s itiv e ly  on th e  r a te  of re tu rn  on loans and to ta l  d e p o s its
net of requ ired  re se rv e s  and n egative ly  on th e  in te r e s t  r a t s  on bonds.
More fo rm ally , L" = x(p, I )D (I-t ) where p and 1 a re  th e  in te r e s t  r a te s
+  -
on loans and bonds re sp e c tiv e ly  w hile D re p re se n ts  to ta l  demand
d e p o s its  and tD i s  requ ired  re se rv e s . A dd itiona lly , th e  demand fo r
loans depends p o s itiv e ly  on th e  r a te  of in te r e s t  on bonds and on output
and n egative ly  on the  in te r e s t  r a te  on loans and i s  given by L* = L(p,
1, y) w ith y denoting GIF. Dnder t h i s  sce n a rio , equ ilibrium  in  the  loan 
+ +
m arket is  given by
L( p ,  i ,  y> = X(p,  I ) D ( I - t ) .  ( 3 . 1 )
Bernanke and B linder Ignore cash  ho ld ings and sp ec ify  th e  LX curve a s
the  locus o f p o in ts  fo r which th e  demand fo r money given by to ta l
d e p o s its  i s  equal to  the  supply of d e p o s its . This m arket c lea rin g
co n d itio n  Is  given by
D(i, y) = m(l)B (3.2)
-  +  +
where m(l> i s  th e  money m u ltip lie r  and R denotes bank re se rv e s . By 
V a lra s ' law, <3.1) and (3.2) im p lic itly  d e fin e  equilibrium  in  th e  bond 
m arket. Bquilibrlum  In the  goods m arket may be summarized a s
y = y<l, p) (3.3)
w ith both elem ents o f T e n te r in g  negative ly .
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Id o rder to  In te g ra te  th e  equilibrium  co n d itio n  In th e  loan market 
w ith th e  t r a d i t io n a l  IS curve given by (3.3), th e se  au th o rs  use th e  
m arket c lea rin g  co nd ition  in  (3.2) to  s u b s t i tu te  m(l)R fo r D in  (3.1). 
F u rth er, they note th a t  (3.1) can then be used to  so lve  fo r  p such th a t
p = f( 1, y, R), (3.4)
F in a lly , s u b s t i tu t io n  of (3.4) In to  (3.3) y ie ld s
y = Y<1, pa,  y, R)) (3.5)
which i s  a n egative ly  sloped CC curve (l.e  comm odities and c re d i t  In 
goods and market In te re s t  r a te  space) th a t  i s  s h if te d  by monetary 
po licy  and shocks to  the  loan demand and supply  fu n c tio n s . This CC 
curve Is  In te rp re te d  a s  a locus o f in te r e s t  r a te  and output 
com binations fo r which the  goods and c r e d i t  m arkets a re  In 
eq u ilib riu m .’
V hlle most shocks have s im ila r  e f fe c ts  in th e  IS-LX and CC-LX
models, the  su p e r io r  exp lanato ry  power of th e  CC-LX model may be
dem onstrated  by examining th e  e f fe c ts  o f m onetary po licy  and shocks to
th e  c r e d i t  supply curve In the  two models. F i r s t ly ,  an expansionary
monetary po licy  such a s  an Increase  in  bank re se rv e s  by the  Fed leads
to  an outward s h i f t  In th e  LX curve a ttended  by lower In te re s t  r a te s
and an in c rease  In output in both models. However, s in ce  th e  CC-LX
model g iv es  e x p l ic i t  co n sid e ra tio n  to  bank loans, to  th e  e x ten t th a t
banks devote th e i r  a d d itio n a l re se rv e s  to  loans a s  opposed to  bonds o r
excess re se rv e s , the  increased  supply o f bank c r e d i t  leads to  lower
ra te s  on bank loans, Increased  investm ent and o th e r spending and,
’ Equations (3.1) - (3.5) a re  ex ac tly  th e  same a s  Bernanke and B lin d e r 's  
equations (1) -  (5).
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th e re fo re , an outward s h i f t  In th e  CC curve. S ince both th e  CC end LM 
curves s h i f t  outw ards lu the  CC-LK so d e l, so n e ta ry  po licy  has a  b igger 
la p a c t on output and asb iguous e f fe c ts  on m arket in te r e s t  r a te s .  This, 
of course , is  in  c o n tra s t  to  th e  IS-LK framework where only th e  LN 
curve would s h i f t  outwards and we would g a t an unambiguous f a l l  In 
open m arket r a te s .  A dd itiona lly , i t  i s  In s tru c tiv e  to  note th a t  shocks 
to  th e  c re d i t  supply curve th a t  Induce banks to  sake  p o r tfo lio  
s u b s t i tu t io n s  in to  o r out of loans w ill s h i f t  the  CC curve and 
p o te n tia lly  a l t e r  open s a r k e t  in te r e s t  r a te s  and output. H is to r ic a l 
examples of th i s  k ind o f phenomena Include the  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  o f the  
1930's th a t  Induced banks to  make p o r tfo lio  ad justm ents out of loans 
in to  s a fe r  a s s e ts  and the  more recen t c r e d i t  c o n tro ls  imposed by the  
C arte r a d m in is tra tio n  in 1980. Both o f these  shocks to  c re d i t  supply 
led to  an inward s h i f t  in th e  CC curve a ttended  by f a l l s  in  output and 
s a r k e t  in te r e s t  r a te s .
In ad d itio n  to  th e  models reviewed above, a growing l i te r a tu r e  
a ttem p ts  to  in te g ra te  f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  of the  type  d iscussed  
p rev iously  in to  b u sin ess  cycle  models. For example, Shelnkman and 
V eiss (1986) c o n s tru c t a model In which in d iv id u a ls  face n eg a tiv e ly  
c o rre la te d  p ro d u c tiv ity  r i s k  but a re  unable to  in su re  or d iv e rs ify  t h i s  
r i s k  due to  incom plete o r im perfect f in a n c ia l  m arkets. These au th o rs  
go on to  dem onstrate  th a t  under th e se  c ircum stances in d iv id u a ls  w ill 
a ttem p t to  s e l f  in su re  by vary ing  th e ir  consumption, sav in g , and labor 
supply. At the  aggregate  level th e se  a l te r a t io n s  in in d iv idua l behavior 
w ill cause f lu c tu a tio n s  in agg regate  a c t iv i ty .  A dd itiona lly , V llliam eon
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(1987) a ttem p ts  to  m otivate  f in a n c ia l In te rm ed ia tion  and c re d it  
ra tio n in g  w ith in  a b u s in ess  cy c le  framework and proceeds  to  
dem onstrate  th a t  p ro d u c tiv ity  shocks say  a l t e r  d e fa u lt p ro b a b il i t ie s ,  
thereby a ffe c tin g  the  amount of c r e d i t  ra tio n in g  and u ltim a te ly  th e  
le v e ls  of investm ent and output.
H I. Borrower Balance S heets, Investm ent, and Aggregate A c tiv ity
Using a th e o re tic a l  framework very s im ila r  to  re a l  bu sin ess  cycle  
models such a s  th a t  In King and P lo sse r (1984), Bernanke and Gar t i e r  
(1989) show th a t  in the  absence of in fo rm atio n al asym m etries between 
borrow ers and len d ers  the  K o d lg lla n l-m ile r  theorem a t te s t in g  to  the  
Irre lev an ce  of f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  ho lds. T his r e s u l t  I s  c o n s is te n t 
w ith re a l bu sin ess  cy cle  models of th e  economy which g en era lly  assume 
th a t  f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  Is  I r re le v a n t. However, when BAG (1989) allow 
fo r asym m etric Inform ation between en trep ren eu rs  (who need e x te rn a l 
financing* and len d ers , they  find  th a t  f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  i s  re lev an t. 
S p e c if ic a lly , they dem onstrate  th a t  In the  presence of In fo rm ational 
asym m etries, the  optim al f in a n c ia l c o n tra c ts  th a t  emerge e n ta i l  agency 
c o s ts  whose a lze  i s  re f le c te d  In th e  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between th e  c o s ts  of 
In te rn a l and ex te rn a l financ ing . BAG (1989) argue th a t  In th i s  
framework borrower n e t worth Is  in v e rse ly  c o rre la te d  w ith  the 
aforem entlo ined agency c o s ts .  F u rther, t h i s  Inverse  re la tio n s h ip  
im plies th a t:  (a) s in c e  borrower n e t worth tends to  be p ro c y c lica l, 
agency c o s ts  a re  l ik e ly  to  be co u n te rcy c lic a l and lead to  p e r s is te n t  
f lu c tu a tio n s  in  Investm ent and output! and (b) Independent d is tu rb an ces  
to  borrower n e t worth may I n i t i a te  f lu c tu a tio n s  In re a l  a c t iv i ty .  A
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p o te n tia lly  Im portan t source o f Independent shocks to  borrow er net 
worth i s  id e n tif ie d  In F is h e r 's  deb t d e f la tio n  theory  where 
u n an tic ip a ted  p r ic e  d ec lin es  re su lte d  In a p ro g re ss iv e  worsening of 
borrower balance sh e e ts  a s  th e  re a l  value of th e i r  d eb t increased .
In a recen t paper G e rtle r and Hubbard (GAH) (1086) c o n s tru c t a 
e ln p le  p a r t ia l  equ ilib rium  so d e l of In v e s tsa n t th a t  In co rp o ra te s  the  
so re  s a l i e n t  fe a tu re s  of so d e ls  such a s  th a t  In BAG(1989) th a t  a t t e s p t  
to  cap tu re  in te ra c t io n s  between the  re a l  and f in a n c ia l s e c to rs .  The 
c e n tra l  fea tu re  of th e  GAH so d e l Is  the  ex is ten ce  of a s y s a e t r ic  
in form ation  between en trep ren eu rs  and len d ers . S p e c if ic a lly , th e  
en trep ren eu r knows s o re  about the  ln v e s ts e n t  p ro jec t than  doss th e  
lender f ro a  which be seeks to  o b ta in  c re d it .  T his poses a  moral 
hazard problem th a t  say  be re c t i f ie d  I f  th e  two p a r t ie s  s e t t l e  on an 
in cen tiv e  com patible c o n tra c tu a l fo ra .  S ince th e  c o n tra c tu a l 
arrangem ents th a t  eae rg e  w ill g en e ra lly  fo rce  th e  e n tre p re n eu r 's  
Investm ent behavior to  d i f f e r  f ro a  th a t  under s y a a e t r lc  in form ation , 
agency c o s t  a re  Incurred  and th e  N odlglla.nl-HI l l e r  theorem does not 
hold.
GAH sug g est a two period model where en trep ren eu rs  use mandatory 
hard  c a p ita l  and o p tio n a l s o f t  c a p i ta l  In period  zero  to  produce output 
which they s e l l  in period  one. S ince th e  technology used to  convert 
Input In to  output i s  r is k y , th e  outcome in period  one may be e ith e r  
good o r bad. Taking hard c a p ita l  to  r e f e r  to  m achinery and s o f t  
c a p i ta l  to  re p re se n t In p u ts  such a s  m aintenance and o rg an iza tio n a l 
ex pend itu res  th a t ,  cstaris paribus, improve the  p ro b a b ili ty  of a  good
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outcome, GAH argue th a t  1c th e  absence of in fo rm ational problems the  
en trep ren eu r w ill choose th e  optim al le v e ls  of both ty pes o f c a p ita l .  
However, i f  In form ational asym m etries e x is t ,  he has an in cen tiv e  to  
d iv e r t  funds Intended fo r  s o f t  c a p ita l  fo r  o th e r uses from which he 
b e n e f its . In response  to  th i s  in cen tiv e  p ro b lea , ra tio n a l lenders  
req u ire  th a t  deb t payments be co n tingen t upon th e  productive  outcome. 
F u rth er, an in cen tiv e  c o n s tra in t  ensu res th a t  the  expected gain to  th e  
en trep reneu r from honesty exceeds h is  gain  f ro a  d iv e r tin g  funds 
Intended fo r Investm ent In s o f t  c a p ita l .
Another way to  ensure in cen tiv e  c o m p a tib ility  i s  to  in c rease  th e  
payaen t th a t  the  en trep reneu r must make i f  the  productive outcome is  
bad. In th i s  case  the  h igher the  aaoun t the lower w ill be the  expected 
gain  f ro a  ch ea ting . However, th e  s iz e  of the  payaen t th a t  the  
en trep reneu r can c o n tra c t to  pay in the  event o f a  bad outcome is  
H a lte d  by h is  ne t worth where b is  n e t worth Is  defined  a s  th e  sum of 
h is  i n i t i a l  liq u id  a s s e t  p o s itio n  in period zero and th e  value of h is  
p r o f i t  stream  In period  one. In t h i s  framework h is  in cen tiv e  to  ch ea t 
w ill be n egative ly  c o rre la te d  w ith h is  ne t worth and th e re fo re  h is  
a b i l i ty  to  secure  c re d i t .  The foregoing c le a r ly  im plies th a t  fa c to rs  
which adverse ly  a f f e c t  borrow ers net worth p o s itio n s  w ill c ircum scribe  
th e ir  a b i l i ty  to  ob ta in  c re d i t  and thereby  lead to  a  c o n s tr ic t io n  in  
Investm ent. I f  f in a n c ia l co n d itio n s  a re  such th a t  a  s u b s ta n tia l  number 
of borrow ers experience s ig n if ic a n t  d e te r io ra tio n  in  th e i r  n e t worth 
p o s itio n s , aggregate  Investm ent and output a re  lik e ly  to  decline . As 
examples of t h i s  kind of phenomena, GAH c i te  re c en t d rops in  the  p rice
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of tarn p roducts  and o il  th a t  served  to  aroda the  n e t worth at
borrow ers in th ese  s e c to rs .
17. B ap lrlc a l Review
The e a p ir lc a l  evidence on th e  issu ee  d iscu ssed  in  t h i s  c h ap te r i s
a t  b e s t sketchy . Two types of evidence may be c ite d . F i r s t ly ,  th e re
a re  s tu d ie s  such a s  Bernanke (1963), Benjamin Friedman (I960), and 
Stephen King (1965) th a t  p re sen t tim e s e r ie s  evidence documenting the 
im portance or unim portance of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  in  exp la in ing  
f lu c tu a tio n s  In agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty .  Secondly, sev e ra l au th o rs  
inc lud ing  Fazzarl and Athey (1967), Fazzarl, Hubbard, and Fetarsan  
(1966), and G e rtle r  and Hubbard (1988) use c r a s s  s e c tio n a l d a ta  to
in v e s tig a te  the  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  on investm ent. In 
general both types of s tu d ie s  provide evidence in support of th e  view 
th a t  f in a n c ia l f a c to rs  of the  type addressed  in t h i s  ch ap te r have a 
s u b s ta n tia l  im pact on macroeconomic a c t iv i ty .
Perhaps th e  most poignant h is to r ic a l  example of the  ty p es  of 
f in a n c ia l shocks a lluded  to  throughout th i s  paper may be found during 
the  G reat D epression. In a r a th e r  in f lu e n tia l  paper, Bernanke (1983) 
c a re fu lly  o u tlin e s  the  s t a t e  of f in a n c ia l m arkets during  th a t  period . 
F i r s t ly ,  he compiled im pressive evidence o f th e  w idespread fe a r  o f runs 
th a t  led banks to  s h i f t  th e i r  re so u rces  out o f r isk y  a s s e ts  (loans) 
In to  sa fe  and more liq u id  a s s e ts  such a s  high g rade  bonds and excess 
re se rv e s . This a c tio n  led to  severe  c r e d i t  ra tio n in g  so  th a t  borrow ers 
who were ex c lu siv e ly  r e l ia n t  on bank c re d it  were unable to  finance  
th e i r  p ro je c ts . A dd itiona lly , w idespread Insolvency among n o a fln an c la l
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firm s fu r th e r  exacerbated  problem s of aay sm etrlc  Inform ation and made 
I t  more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  banks to  perform th e  ev alua tion  and m onitoring 
fu n c tio n s  a t t r ib u te d  to  them In th e  th e o re tic a l  d iscu ss io n  above. i t  
th e  san e  tim e, the  p ric e  d e f la tio n  increased  th e  re a l burden of an 
a lready  unusually high level of p r iv a te  deb t, thereby reducing th a t  
s e c to r 's  c ap ac ity  to  finance  new p ro je c ts .
V hlle i t  may be argued th a t  the  f in a n c ia l system  re a c ts  p ass iv e ly  
to  changes in  aggregate  output, th e  h is to r ic a l  record  In d ic a te s  th a t  
c r i s i s  In the  f in a n c ia l system  ten d s to  precede downturns In economic 
a c t iv i ty .  Friedman and Schw artz (1903) have suggested  two ways In 
which the  causal p r io r i ty  of the  h ea lth  of th e  f in a n c ia l system  may be 
explained . These a re : (a) changes In the  fo r tu n es  of banks a f fe c t  the  
w ealth of th e i r  sh a reh o ld e rs ; and (b> th e  now widely acknowledged 
e f fe c t  on th e  money supply. Using B arro 's  (1978) two s te p  procedure to  
e s tim ate  the  e f fe c t  of u n an tic ip a ted  shocks in  th e  money supply  on
output f ro a  1929 to  1933, Bernanke (1983) found th a t  money supply 
shocks tended to  influence output. However, dynamic s im u la tio n s  o f th e  
path o f output f a r  th e  period  between mid - 1930 and Kerch 1933
cap tured  only  h a lf  o f the  d ec lin e  In output du ring  th a t  period . On th e  
b a s is  of the  foregoing em piricism , Bernanke argues th a t  the  
ex p lan a tio n s  p resen ted  by Friedman and Schwartz should be supplemented 
by p o ss ib le  nonmonetary e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on output. The 
th e o re tic a l  b a s is  fo r  these  nonmonetary e f fe c ts  o p era tes  v ia  the  e f fe c t  
of the  h ea lth  of the  f in a n c ia l system  on th e  c o a t of c re d it
In term ed ia tion  (CCI), where adverse  c o n d itio n s  in  the  f in a n c ia l s e c to r
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Increase  the  CCI, which In tu rn  lead s  to  c re d it  c o n tra c tio n , th e  
re je c tio n  of o therw ise  p ro f ita b le  p ro je c ts , end subsequent f a l l s  In
output.
In o rder to  t e s t  the  h y p o thesis  th a t  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  causes 
red u c tio n s  in output sep a ra te  f ro a  i t s  e f fe c ts  v ia  the  soney supply, 
Bernanke Included c u rre n t and lagged f i r s t  d iffe ren c es  of th e  d e p o s its  
of fa i l in g  banks and the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of f a l l in g  b u sin esses  in  a Barro - 
type output equation th a t  Included un an tic ip a ted  soney. Both v a ria b le s  
en tered  w ith the  expected negative  s ig n , and, taken Jo in tly , were h igh ly  
s ig n if ic a n t .  A dd itiona lly , he reg ressed  the  r a te  of growth in bank 
loans a g a in s t the  d e p o s its  of suspended banks and the  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f 
fa l l in g  bu sin esses . Recognizing th ese  independent v a r ia b le s  as  
in d ic a tiv e  of the  degree of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s ,  he proceeded to  use th e  
f i t t e d  s e r ie s  f ro a  t h i s  re g re ss io n  a s  re p re se n ta tiv e  of the  independent 
nonaonetary  e f fe c t  o f f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on c r e d i t  c o n tra c tio n , and 
th e re fo re  a s  a proxy fo r  the  CCI. Subsequent in c lu sio n  of c u rre n t and 
lagged values of th e  f i t te d  s e r ie s  and u n an tic ip a ted  soney in  an output 
equation of the  B arro  - type re fe rre d  to  e a r l ie r ,  confirm ed th e  
s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  of th e  proxy. Moreover, dynamic s im u la tio n s  of 
the  pa th  o f output fo r  the  period  between mid -  1030 to  March 1033 
accounted fo r  s u b s ta n tia l ly  more of th e  a c tu a l decrease  in  ou tpu t than  
was cap tured  when only u n an tic ip a ted  money was Included In th e  output 
equation. In a d d itio n  to  th e  above proxy, Bernanke used th e  follow ing 
a l te rn a t iv e s :  (a) the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa co rp o ra te  bonds and 
U.S government bonds; and (b) the  f i t t e d  s e r ie s  from a re g re ss io n  of
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the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  on th e  d e p o sits  of suspended banks and th e  
l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  b u s in esses . In a l l  cas e s , e n try  o f th e  p rosy  fo r  
th e  c o s ts  of c r e d i t  in te rn ed  la tio n  s u b s ta n tia l ly  increased  th e  
percentage o f th e  dec lin e  In output th a t  was cap tured .
Bernanke's r e s u l ts  a re  la rg e ly  c o n s is te n t w ith the  p re d ic tio n s  of 
the  th e o re tic a l  l i te r a tu r e  reviewed In s e c tio n s  II and III above and 
should a le r t  us to  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  nacro eco n o n etrlc  so d e ls  which 
do not account fo r the  nonnonetary  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  nay be 
n ls sp e c lf le d . However, a t  le a s t  th re e  cav ea ts  should be noted. 
F i r s t ly ,  by using a s in g le  equation nodel th e  au thor a ssu n es  the  
exogeneity  of noney and h is  various p ro x ies  fo r the  CCI and th e re fo re  
r e s t r i c t s  th e  p a tte rn  of in te ra c t io n  anong th e  v a ria b le s . Secondly, and 
follow ing Lutkepohl (1932), I t  seen s  a p p ro p ria te  to  exan lne  t h i s  Issue 
In an expanded franew ark  th a t  Includes o th e r in  p o rte n t n acro  v a r ia b le s  
such a s  the  In te re s t  ra te , p r ic e s , e tc . F in a lly , s in c e  B ernanke's 
resea rch  was p r ln a r l ly  concerned w ith th e  Great D epression, i t  Is  
in s tru c tiv e  to  In v e s tig a te  th e  a p p lic a b il i ty  o f h is  r e s u l ts  to  longer 
periods and d if f e r e n t  e ra s . In ch ap te r VI an a ttem p t Is  sad e  to  
ad d re ss  th e se  Issu es .
Benjamin F rledaan  (1963) argues th a t  Including Monetary ag g reg a te s  
In so d e ls  th a t  a re  Intended to  cap tu re  agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty  to  
the  exclusion  of o th e r f in a n c ia l q u a n ti t ie s  such a s  c r e d i t  i s  
J u s tif ia b le  i f  i t  can be dem onstrated th a t  money increm entally  ex p la in s  
re a l economic a c t iv i ty  in  a manner th a t  a  c r e d i t  q u an tity  does n o t. In 
o rder to  in v e s t ig a te  th i s  Issue , he used q u a rte r ly  d a ta  from 1953 -
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197& to  conduct Granger c a u sa lity  ta e ta  of the  lsp o rta n c e  of soney and 
c re d i t  w ith in  th e  frasew ork  of two t r l v a r l a t e  v ec to r a u to reg re ss iv e  
(VAR) so d e ls . Output and p r ic e s  en tered  both so d e ls  w hile one Included 
c r e d i t  and the  o th e r Kl. F ried  sen  found th a t  n e ith e r  v a riab le  
ln c re se n ta lly  ex p la in s  re a l econoslc  a c t iv i ty .  However, in a four 
v a ria b le  VAR th a t  Included p r ic e s , output, soney and c re d i t  ha found 
th a t  both soney and c r e d i t  ln c re se n ta lly  exp lained  output. This r e s u l t  
su g g es ts  th a t  I t  i s  the  In te r re la t io n s h ip  between soney and c re d i t  th a t  
a f f e c ts  re a l  a c t iv i ty  and ra is e s  se r io u s  q u estio n s  about the  a b i l i ty  of 
sacroeconoalc  so d e ls  th a t  Ignore c re d it  ag g reg a tes  to  adequately 
account fo r the  t r a n a s ls s lo n  of so n e ta ry  l a  pu lses.
In an a t t e s p t  to  v e rify  the  e x is ten ce  o f e q u lllb r lu s  c r e d i t  
ra tio n in g  by U.S. banks In th e  p a s t war e ra , Stephen King (1966) te s te d  
th re e  observable Im p lica tio n s  o f th a t  h y p o th esis . These a re : (a) banka 
should behave a s  though they  a re  liq u id ity  co n stra in ed ; (b) the  loan 
a a rk e t should be ch a rac te rized  by excess desand; and (c) th e  response  
o f loan supply to  changes In the  loan r a te  should approach zero . King 
found evidence su p p o rtiv e  of (a) and <b) but b la  e s tim a te s  of the  
e l a s t i c i ty  of loan supply  w ith re sp e c t to  th e  loan r a te  were p o s itiv e  
and s u b s ta n tia l ly  so . Therefore, th e re  i s  some but not overwhelming 
evidence of equilibrium  c re d i t  ra tio n in g  In the  O.S.
A dditionally , King argues th a t  I f  th e  ex is ten ce  of equilibrium  
c re d i t  ra tio n in g  Is  an Im portant fa c to r  in th e  determ ination  of 
agg regate  economic a c t iv i ty ,  bank c r e d i t  ag g reg a tes  should have 
s ig n if ic a n t  p re d ic tiv e  power fo r  GKP. Using q u a r te r ly  d a ta  from the
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f i r s t  q u a rte r of 1950 to  th e  th ir d  q u a rte r  o f 1979, he conducted 
b lv a r la te  Granger c a u sa lity  t e s t s  of the  e f fe c ts  of demand d e p o sits  on 
GIP growth and of various c re d it  ag g regates such a s  th e  su s  of 
commercial and in d u s tr ia l  loans, the  sua of re a l a e ta ta  and consuaer 
c re d it ,  and to ta l  loans, on GIP grow th. In g en era l, h is  r e s u l ts  
In d ica te  th a t  the  p re d ic tiv e  co n ten t of deaand d e p o s its  fo r GIP Is  fa r  
g re a te r  than  the  re la t iv e ly  In s ig n if ic a n t e s tim a te s  fo r  th e  c re d it  
agg regates. These r e s u l ts  were fu r th e r  supported  by variance  
deco ap o sltlo n s  o f GIP growth In a aodel th a t  Included th e  
aforem entioned c re d it  ag g regates, th e  loan ra te , and the  three-m onth 
Treasury b i l l  ra te . Therefore, King (1986) concludes th a t  a s ig n if ic a n t  
sac roeconoslc  ro le  cannot be assigned  to  th ese  c re d i t  ag g regates and 
thereby to  c re d i t  ra tio n in g .
In ad d itio n  to  the  t l a e  s e r ie s  evidence p resen ted  above, Fazzarl, 
Hubbard and Petersen  (FHP) (1986) p re sen t c ro s s  s e c tio n a l evidence 
supportive  of the th e o re tic a l so d e ls  d iscu ssed  In sec tio n  III above. 
S p e c if ic a lly , FHP argue th a t  fo r  s o se  firm s asym m etric Inform ation In 
c a p ita l  m arkets causes the  c o s t of e x te rn a lly  ob tained  funds to  exceed 
the  opportun ity  c o s t  of In te rn a l funds. S ince th e i r  Investm ent 
expend itu res w ill depend ra th e r  heav ily  on the  a v a i la b i l i ty  of In te rn a l 
funds th e se  firm s w ill re ta in  a very la rg e  f ra c tio n  of th e i r  ea rn in g s. 
On the  o th er hand, the  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between th e  c o s ts  of In te rn a l and 
e x te rn a l funds fo r firm s who do not face severe  In fo rm ational problem s 
w ill approxim ate zero. Therefore, th ese  firm s w ill smooth th e i r  
Investm ent spending stream s with ex te rn a l funds.
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The foregoing im plies th a t  while th e o r ie s  of Investm ent th a t  Ignore 
f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  may be a reasonab le  approxim ation fo r  la rg e r  more 
e s ta b lish e d  f irm s, the  same w ill no t bold fo r firm s th a t  face 
s u b s ta n tia l  In form ational problem s. PHP p lace  firm s In to  c la s s e s  baaed 
on th e i r  re te n tio n  r a t io s  and em p irica lly  examine th e i r  investm ent 
spending to  see how I t  I s  a ffec ted  by cash  flow and liq u id ity  measures 
th a t  influence a v a i la b i l i ty  of In te rn a l finance. Their r e s u l t s  In d ica te  
th a t  the  investm ent of firm s w ith high re te n tio n  r a t io s  i s  more 
s e n s i t iv e  to  cash  flow flu c tu a tio n s  than th a t  of more mature low 
re te n tio n  firm s. A dd itionally , investm ent expenditu res of low re te n tio n  
r a t io  firm s show a lo t  le s s  s e n s i t iv i ty  to  changes in liq u id ity
measures. This evidence 1b c le a r ly  su p p o rtiv e  of th e  view th a t  
f in a n c ia l c o n s tr a in ts  should be accounted fo r in th e o r ie s  of Investm ent 
and u ltim a te ly  in  analyzing  macroeconomic f lu c tu a tio n s .
Belying on a th e o re tic a l  base s im ila r  to  th a t  d esc rib ed  In PHP, 
Fazzarl and Athey (1987) e s tim a te  Investm ent fu n c tio n s  fo r  a la rg e
sample of firm s. Included among the  re g re sso rs  were th e  f irm 's  
In te re s t  expense and a  measure of in te rn a l cash  flow. If in fo rm atio n al 
asym m etries make f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  re le v an t fo r investm ent d ec is io n s ,
an in c rease  in in te rn a l funding should lead to  h igher lev e ls  of
investm ent while h igher lev e ls  of In te re s t  expense should be a sso c ia ted  
w ith lower lev e ls  of new Investm ent. The em pirica l r e s u l t s  in d ic a te  
th a t  th ese  v a ria b le s  en tered  the  Investm ent equation w ith th e  expected 
s ig n  and were s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t .  Once again  th ese  r e s u l t s  a re  
s tro n g ly  su p p o rtiv e  of th e  view th a t  f in a n c ia l s tru c tu re  m a tte rs .
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G e rtle r and Hubbard <1988) e s tim a te  Investm ent fu n c tio n s  th a t  
Inco rpora te  Tobin'e q and Include ( I n  cash  flow a s  a  p ro ry  fo r  net 
worth fo r  high, sad  1 u s , and low re te n tio n  f i r s s .  They find  
econom ically and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe ren c es  In the 
c o e f f ic ie n ts  on the  cash  flow v a ria b le  a c ro ss  re te n tio n  c la s se s . 
A dd itiona lly , the  lin k  between In te rn a l finance  (as proxled by th e  cash 
flow v a riab le ) and ln v a s ts e n t becoses c lo se r  a s  re te n tio n  Increases. 
G e rtle r and Hubbard in te rp re t  th ese  r e s u l t s  a s  su p p o rtiv e  of the  
Im perfect in form ation  l i te r a tu r e  which su g g es ts  th a t  fo r  many firm s 
ex te rn a l finance  Is  an Im perfect s u b s t i tu te  fo r  in te rn a l finance. 
F u rth er, to  th e  e x ten t th a t  th e  accum ulation of deb t In th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  d e tra c ts  f ro a  I t s  a b i l i ty  to  secure  ad d itio n a l c re d i t  th a t  may 
be necessary  fo r new Investm ent o r o th e r spending, G ertle r and Hubbard 
show th a t  f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  of th e  type described  here  may be 
asym m etrically  im portan t during economic downturns.
In summary, I t  cocas reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  th e  sp a rse  
em pirica l evidence on th e  ro le  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  In th e  sacroecanany  
su g g es ts  th a t  m acroeconam lsts should pay g re a te r  a tte n tio n  to  th ese  
fa c to rs  when a ttem p tin g  to  exp la in  o r  fo re c a s t aggregate  economic 
f lu c tu a tio n s .
CHAPTER IV
VECTOR AOTORBGRBSSIDIS: TBCHJIQUE, HTBRPRBTATIOI AID USES
1. In troduction
As noted In ch ap te r I, the  purpose of t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n  Is  to  
In v e s tig a te  the  e a p lr lc a l  ro le  of f i s c a l  and Monetary po licy  v a ria b le s  
and of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  In th e  in te rw ar period, V hlle I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  
examine th e se  Issues w ith in  th e  f  r a s e  w ort of a s t ru c tu ra l  so d e l, I t  Is  
f i r s t l y  necessary  to  choose a p a r t ic u la r  macro so d e l among sev e ra l 
th a t  say  be considered . S ince th e re  i s  no consensus on which among 
many s tru c tu ra l  models i s  most a p p ro p ria te  and s in c e  choosing a 
p a r t ic u la r  s t ru c tu ra l  so d el over o th e rs  n e c e ssa r ily  Im plies a priori 
re je c tio n  of a t  le a s t  so se  a sp e c ts  a t  the  so d e ls  th a t  a re  not chosen, 
using a s t ru c tu ra l  so d el in  th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  would be co n ten tious and 
req u ire  adherence to  one among se v e ra l p la u s ib le  th e o re tic a l  v iew points.
In ad d itio n  to  th e  above c o n s id e ra tio n s , S in s  (1960a) has argued 
th a t  many of the  r e s t r i c t io n s  used in  th e  sp e c if ic a tio n  of s tn x  ',ural 
so d e ls  a re  "Incred ib le"  in  th a t  they a re  inadequately  supported  by 
th e o re tic a l an d /o r in s t i tu t io n a l  c o n sid e ra tio n s . Among th e  s a s t  widely 
used " in c red ib le"  r e s t r i c t io n s  Is  th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t  v a r ia b le s  a re  
exogenous when they say  a c tu a lly  be endogenous. In th i s  regard , Sims 
< 1980a) and Lucas and S argen t (1979) have suggested  th e  use at Granger 
c a u sa lity  t e s t s  to  d e te r s ln e  the  exogeneity  o r endogeneity of 
v a r ia b le s  before they a re  sp ec if ie d  a s  such In the  co n s tru c tio n  of 
s t ru c tu ra l  so d e ls . However, se v e ra l au th o rs  Including  Cooley and LeRoy
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e i
(1985), Leaser (1985), and Blchenbaum (1985) have questioned the 
a b i l i ty  of t e s t s  of Granger c a u sa lity  to  e s ta b l is h  exogeneity. 
Therefore, th e  f e a s ib i l i ty  o f avoid ing  Sim s' c r l t l c l e s  of s t ru c tu ra l  
so d e ls  by allow ing the  d a ta  to  d e te m ln e  what exogeneity  r e s t r ic t io n s  
a re  to  be esp loyed  does not appear to  be a v iab le  op tion . Given the 
absence of a g reesen t asong s a c ro e c o n o s le ts  a s  to  the  a p p ro p ria te  s a c ro  
so d e l, S in s ’ c r i t i c i s e s ,  and th e  d if f ic u l ty  surrounding  the  use of 
Granger c a u sa lity  t e s t s  a s  a  sean s  of fin d in g  a p p ro p ria te  exogeneity  
r e s t r ic t io n s ,  I e le c t  to  e sp lo y  v ec to r au to reg ress io n  (YAK) so d e ls  of 
the  type suggested  by S ls s  (1980a) to  in v e s tig a te  th e  Issu es  of 
concern In th i s  d is s e r ta t io n .
A VAR sodel Is  a s u l t lv a r la te  reduced fo ra  th a t  t r e a t s  a l l
v a ria b le s  a s  Jo in tly  d e te rs ln e d  and thereby  avoids th e  ls p o s l t lo n  of 
p o te n tia lly  sp u rious exogeneity  r e s t r i c t io n s  In the  e e t la a t lo n  o f the 
YAK. Of course, th e o re tic a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  e n te r  in to  th e  s e le c tio n  of 
the  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  VAR. As d iscu ssed  la te r  In t h i s  ch ap te r, the
reduced fo ra  n a tu re  of th e  YAK makes I t  d i f f i c u l t  to  In te rp re t  I t s  
param eters. Therefore, the  In te rp re ta tio n  o f th e  so d el i s  based on 
com plicated fu n c tio n s  of th e  VAK's param eters c a lled  i s  pulse response  
fu n c tio n s  (IKFs) and v ariance  decom positions (YDCs).
In accordance w ith our p rev iously  aen tloned  in te n tio n s , th e  purpose 
of t h i s  ch ap te r i s  to  provide a summary o f the  s t a t i s t i c a l  and 
th e o re tic a l Issu es  th a t  a re  p e r tin e n t to  th e  sp e c if ic a tio n , 
In te rp re ta tio n , and use of v ec to r au to reg re ss  lone (VARs). In s ec tio n  II
a d iscu ss io n  of th e  methodology Involved in  sp ec ify in g  a YAK Is
&2
undertaken. Section  III d e sc rib e s  the  procedures employed In 
In te rp re tin g  the  param eters of the  estim ated  model, w hile s ec tio n  IV Is  
devoted to  a d iscu ss io n  of th e  ap p ro p ria ten ess  of th e  VAB techn iques 
ou tlined  In s e c tio n s  II and III  to  the  purposes of th i s  s tudy .
II. S p e c if ic a tio n  of Vector A utoregression  Models
A. The Basic Xodel
As noted In sec tio n  I, th e  VAS models suggested  by Sims avoid the  
use of p o ssib ly  In c o rre c t Id en tify in g  r e s t r i c t io n s  by t r e a t in g  a l l  
v a r ia b le s  in  the  so d el a s  jo in t ly  dependent. This means th a t  the  
ty p ic a l VAB model Is  a  system  of equations w ith each equation 
d e sc rib in g  the  evo lu tion  of the  tim e s e r ie s  on one o f the  system s 
v a ria b le s  a s  a m u ltiv a r ia te  au to re g re ss iv e  p ro cess  where the  
Independent v a r ia b le s  a re  lagged values of th e  dependent v a ria b le  and 
th a t  of a l l  the  o th e r v a r ia b le s  In th e  model. Moreover, th e  lag  len g th s  
on the  Independent v a r ia b le s  a re  taken to  be Id e n tic a l In a l l  aquations 
fo r a l l  v a ria b le s . Im p lic it In th i s  form ulation  Is  th e  view th a t  th e  
da ta  generation  p ro cess  which y ie ld s  the  s e t  of tim e s e r ie s  under 
co n sid e ra tio n  can be rep resen ted  a s  a  v ec to r p ro cess  o f f in i t e  o rder.
For h e u r is t ic  purposes, co n sid e r a  b lv a r la te  v ecto r p ro cess  where 
the  system s v a ria b le s  a re  Tli and IT*. Given a common lag  leng th  of 
two, the  p ro cess  may be described  a s  a  second o rd e r v ec to r 
a u to reg re ss iv e  p ro cess  (VAfi<2>), and may be w ritte n  a s ;
IT) *  = C i  +  V i T . i l I i t . - i  +  V i i . a I I t t . - a  +  V i a . i I 1a t . - i  +  V i a ^ H a t - a  +  I I I  i  
H a t  = C a  +  V a i . i T I i t - i  +  V a i  . a l l i t — a  +  V a a . i T T a t — 1 +  V a a , a H a t - a  +  U a t
(4.1)
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where c» and c2 a re  c o n s ta n ts , the  Y's a re  param eters, and th e  u 'e a re  
white no ise  e r ro r  te r s e .
In o rder to  a r r iv e  a t  a  s o re  general form ulation  of th e  VAfi so d e l 
le t  II = [ IT), r 2(. . , nn]’ re p re se n t a column v ecto r of th e  sy stem 's  
v a r ia b le s . ' Assuming th a t  we have T o b serv a tio n s  on each tim e s e r ie s ,
then any of the  components of R, say TT> . can be expressed  a s  n , * [
TIii, TT>2 , . . , T IitI'. A dd itionally , l e t  u * t u , , ua, . . , u^l* re p re se n t 
an nxl v ec to r of w hite n o ise  e r ro r  v e c to rs  such th a t  the  l**' elem ent of 
u can be rep resen ted  a s  ui = f u t t , u»», . . , Ui-r)'. Given th e  above 
d e f in i t io n s  th e  model s ay  be expressed  as  
IT, = XT, + Ui 
Fla = IT a + Ua
Tin = ir r .  + Un ( 4 .2 )
where
i  = [ j ,  n , t _ , ......................................................  i w - p )
J i s  a Txl vecto r of ones, w hile p Is  th e  common lag leng th . F urther,
Ti fo r  1 -  1, 2 ,...,n  may be w ritten  as
r ,  *  [ C i ,  T n  ,1 i Vi i  • iT i i  p t . t . I i o p l
where c« i s  a c o n s ta n t and th e  y 'b  a re  in te rp re te d  such th a t  i n  ,i Is  
the  c o e ff ic ie n t on th e  f i r s t  of th e  f i r s t  v a r ia b le  in  the  1th
equation. The system  of equations in (4.2) may be co n so lid a ted  as 
V = (l»SX)r + u (4-3)
'Time s u b s c r ip ts  a re  om itted  wherever such om ission does no t a f fe c t  
the  c la r i ty  of th e  d iscu ss io n .
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where r  = ( Ti, P*  r n ), •  la  th e  Kronecker product, and In Is  an n-
dlm enslonal Id e n tity  m atrix .
B. S ta t lo n a r l ty
Before co n sid erin g  the  e s tim atio n  of th e  VAR model, I t  I s  la p o r ta n t 
to  note th a t  th e  e ff ic ie n c y  of th e  e a t la a to r  of P(L) and the  s t a b i l i ty  
of the  e y s te a  a re  c ru c ia lly  dependent on the assum ption th a t  the  vecto r 
p rocess  Is  s ta t io n a ry . S p e c if ic a lly , B* i s  s ta t io n a ry  If
(a) B[R«J = p fo r a l l  t ,  I .e ., the  aean of the  vecto r p ro cess  Is 
c o n sta n t over t la e ;
(b) Var<n,t ) < * fo r 1 = 1, 2, ...,n I.e. each of the  tim e s e r ie s
th a t  to g e th e r form the  v ec to r p ro cess  have f in i te  v a riances; and
(c) CovCTU, I!..-*,) = El <B*,-p) <B*-»,-p)*] = y*,, I.e ., th e  covariance
m atrices  of r e a l iz a t io n s  o f the  vecto r p ro cess  th a t  a re  k p e rio d s  a p a r t
do not depend on t l a e  t  but only on k. A dd itiona lly , th i s  Im plies th a t  
fo r k=0, Cov(B*, H*> = El <B«.-p> <B«.-p) ‘1 = I».
At a more in tu i t iv e  lev e l, se v e ra l au th o rs  Including Granger and 
■ewbold (1974), P lo sse r and SchwBrt <1978), and le ls o n  and P lo sse r
(1982) have documented the  d e le te r io u s  e f fe c ts  o f using  nons t a t  Iona ry  
d a ta  fo r s t a t i s t i c a l  In ference f ro a  re g re ss io n  equations. S p e c if ic a lly , 
th e se  au th o rs  a s s e r t  th a t  re g re ss io n s  estim ated  among n o n e ta tio n ary  
v a ria b le s  y ie ld  a u to co rre la tsd  re s id u a ls  a s  evidenced by low Durbin - 
Vatson s t a t i s t i c s .  F u rther, and a s  I s  well known and c a re fu lly  
documented by Granger and lew bold <1974), au to co rre la ted  re s id u a ls  lead 
to : <a) In e f f ic ie n t  e s tim a te s  of th e  re g re ss io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts ;  <b)
suboptlm al fo re c a s ts  based on th ese  c o e f f ic ie n ts ;  and <c) an increase
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In th e  llk llh o o d  of In c o rre c tly  re je c tin g  the  nu ll hypo thesis  th a t  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  zero (Type I e r ro r ) .
In o rder to  account fo r the  n o n s ta t lo n a r lty  th a t  I s  widely 
recognized to  e x is t  In > o st s a c ro  s e r ie s ,  I t  i s  c u sto aa ry  to  include a 
t in e  trend  In th e  re g re ss io n  nodel or to  use th e  f i r s t  d iffe ren c es  of 
the  s e r ie s .  The in c lu sion  of a t in e  tren d  Is  c o n s is te n t w ith th e  view 
th a t  th e  observed n o n s ta t lo n a r lty  Is  due to  a d e te rm in is tic  tre n d  while 
the  l a t t e r  r e f le c ts  the  view th a t  a  s to c h a s tic  tren d  i s  re sp o n sib le . 
Chan, Hayya, and Ord (1977) and le ls o n  and Kang (1981) have documented 
some of the  d e le te r io u s  e f fe c ts  of using the  In ap p ro p ria te  
tran sfo rm a tio n  to  detrend  th e  da ta . A dd itionally , le ls o n  and P lo sse r 
(1982) have shown th a t  th e  assum ption and use of a d e te rm in is tic  tren d  
g re a tly  r e s t r i c t s  th e  re levance of the  p a s t to  th e  fu tu re . I t  i s
th e re fo re  c le a r  th a t  the  method used to  detrend  th e  d a ta  I s  of
n o n tr iv ia l  Im portance.
In o rder to  determ ine whether a s e r ie s  fo llow s a d e te rm in is tic  or 
s to c h a s tic  tren d , le ls o n  and P losser have recommended o rd in a ry  le a s t  
sq u ares  (OLS) e s tim a tio n  of an equation of th e  form
Z* = a  + Bt + p iZ t-i + paVt-i + ....+ pvV«.-t. + e*. (4.4)
where Z* Is  the log of the  tim e s e r ie s  under co n s id e ra tio n , Vt i s  the  
f i r s t  d iffe ren c e  o f Z*,; e*. i s  a w hite no ise  e r ro r  term ; t  i s  tim e; and
a , fi, and p i ,  p* a re  param eters. These au th o rs  proceed to  show th a t
hypothesizing  pi =1 Is  eq u ivalen t to  p o s tu la tin g  th a t  th e  s e r ie s  under
co n sid e ra tio n  e x h ib its  s to c h a s tic  n o n s ta t lo n a r lty  and th a t  f i r s t  
d iffe ren c in g  Is  th e  a p p ro p ria te  tran sfo rm a tio n .3
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Dickey (1976), F u lle r (1976), and Dickey and F u lle r (1979) have 
noted th a t  under th e  nu ll h y p o thesis  th a t  p i* l ,  th e  usual t - r a t l o s  do 
not fo l io s  th e  t - d l s t r lb u t lo n .  In p a r t ic u la r ,  they  no te  th a t  the  
d is t r ib u t io n  of th e  le a s t  squ ares  e s tim a to r  of pt Is  b iased  tow ards 
zero and Is  skewed to  the  l e f t  when a»0. A ccordingly, Monte C arlo 
experim ents conducted by le ls o n  and P lo sse r (1982) In d ica te  th a t  
s tan d a rd  te s t in g  procedures a re  s tro n g ly  b iased  tow ards re je c tin g  
th en u ll h y p o thesis  th a t  p■« = 1. Therefore, Dickey and F u lle r provide 
ta b u la tio n s  of the  e s p l r lc a l  d is t r ib u t io n  of the  t - r a t l o  fo r  te s t in g  the  
h y p o th esis  th a t  pi = l (see F u l le r<1976, pp. 373, ta b le  6 .5 .1 )).
I t  i s  Im portant to  choose the  c o rre c t o rder k in equation  4.3 s in ce  
the  v a l id i ty  of th e  u n it  ro o t te a t  i s  dependent on th e  a ssu a p tlo n  th a t  
the  a u to re g re ss iv e  p rocess  d escribed  Is  a good approxim ation to  the  
tru e  d a ta  g en era tio n  p rocess . V hlle various procedurss may be used to  
s e le c t  k, I t  i s  im portan t to  t e s t  the s e n s i t iv i ty  of the  t e s t  to  
v a r ia t io n s  In k. A dd itio n a lly , I t  i s  in s tru c t iv e  to  co n sid er h igher a s  
opposed to  lower o rd e rs  s in ce  choosing an o rder th a t  Is  lower than  the
^ le lso n  and P lo sse r among o th e rs  have expressed  concern about the  
power of th e se  u n it ro o t t e s t s  when pi I s  c lo se  to  but not equal to  1. 
To th e  e x ten t th a t  th e  t e s t  lack s  power, I t  may In c o rre c tly  accep t the  
n u ll, In d ica tin g  f i r s t  d iffe ren c in g  when the  in c lu sion  of a t l a e  tren d  
I s  th e  a p p ro p ria te  tran sfo rm a tio n . V hlle t h i s  co n sid e ra tio n  should 
prompt cau tion  in  the  use of th e se  t e s t s ,  I t  need no t In d ica te  th a t  the  
model should be estim ated  using  a l te rn a t iv e  tran sfo rm a tio n s . This view 
stem s from the  work of P lo sse r and Schwart (1978), who dem onstrate 
th a t  the  d e le te rio u s  a f f e c ts  o f o v e rd iffe ren c in g  a re  f a r  la s s  severe  
than  th a t  of underd lfferen c ln g . A dd itiona lly , and In response  to  the 
c r i t ic is m  by some au th o rs  th a t  d iffe ren c in g  removes some of the 
re la tio n s h ip  between v a ria b le s , P lo sse r and Schwart show th a t  
d iffe re n c in g  a c o rre c t ly  sp ec if ie d  model doss not change th e  na tu re  of 
th e  r e s u l ts .  Therefore, they argue th a t  ra d ic a l changes In r e s u l ts  a re  
more lik e ly  due to  model m ls sp e c if lc a tio n .
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tru e  o rder w ill lead to  b ia s  w hile an o rd er th a t  la  h ig h e r than  the  
c o r re c t  o rder w ill only lead to  a  reduction  in th e  e ff ic ie n c y  o f the  
e s tim a te s . S ince our prim ary concern In equation  <4.4) la  w ith 
h y p o thesis  te s t in g , a lo s s  of e ffic ien cy  la  th e  le sa e r  o f the  two
e v ils .*
C. Choice of V ariab les and Lag Length D eterm ination
Two o f the  a o s t  c ru c ia l a sp e c ts  of sp ec ify in g  a VAS aodel a re  the  
choice  of v a r ia b le s  th a t  define  the  v ecto r p ro cess  and th e  
d e ta ra ln a tlo n  of th e  number of lag s  w ith which th e se  v a ria b le s  e n te r  
the  system . V hlle vecto r au to re g re ss iv e  models a re  g en era lly  
considered  to  be a th e o re tlc a l , the  choice of v a r ia b le s  th a t  d e fin e  th e  
v ec to r p rocess  Is  u sually  based on th e o re tic a l co n s id e ra tio n s . 
Lutkephol (1982) has dem onstrated th a t  om itted  v a ria b le s  problem s make 
I t  d i f f i c u l t  I f  no t Im possible to  accu ra te ly  draw conclusions about the  
re la tio n s h ip s  among a sm all number of v a ria b le s  on th e  b a s is  o f a tim e 
s e r ie s  model th a t  Includes only th e se  v a ria b le s . This i s  because many 
economic v a ria b le s  In te ra c t  so th a t  the  exclusion  of a v a r ia b le  from 
th e  system  Is  tantam ount to  assum ing on a  priori grounds th a t  i t  does 
no t a f fe c t  In te ra c tio n s  among the  v a ria b le s  o f In te re s t .  However, given 
the  c o n s tr a in ts  Imposed by the  m odelling technology, i t  I s  ad v isab le  to  
lim it th e  number of v a r ia b le s  en te r in g  th e  system  on th e  b a s is  of
* If th e  choice of k in  equation  <4.4) le  c o rre c t , I t  le  reasonab le  to  
expect e t  to  be a w hite no ise  e r ro r  term . Therefore, a usefu l check on 
model adequacy Is  to  c a lc u la te  th e  Ljuag -  Box Q - s ta t le t lc .  This 
s t a t i s t i c  i s  d is tr ib u te d  a s  a x* and re je c ts  the  n u ll h y p o th esis  th a t  
e t  I s  w hite no ise  and thereby  th a t  th e  model i s  adequate whan Q tak es  
on high values. <see Ljung and Box (1976) fo r  more d e ta i ls ) .
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economic theory .
The o rd e r of th e  v ec to r a u to re g re ss iv e  p rocess  Is  u sually  
d e te r s  Iced on the  b a s is  o f some c r i t e r i a  th a t  In genera l a t t e s p t s  to  
achieve a tra d e -o ff  between goodness of f i t  and p a rs lso n y . Judge e t. 
a l  (1986, pp. 762) have noted the  a v a i la b i l i ty  of a wide range of 
c r i t e r i a ,  each of which say  s e le c t  a d if f e r e n t  o rder fo r  the  e a se  
s a s p le . As i s  well An own, th e  exclusion  of re le v a n t re g re s so rs  Is  
l ik e ly  to  lead to  b iased  e s tim a te s  w hile th e  in c lu sio n  of ir re le v a n t 
re g re s so rs  r e s u l t s  In unbiased but le e s  e f f ic ie n t  e s tim a te s . This 
su g g es ts  th a t  th e  choice o f c r i te r io n  may be p a r t ia l ly  guided by the  
Intended use of the  estim ated  VAR model. S p e c if ic a lly , I f  the  key 
concern Is  w ith h y p o thesis  te s t in g  or Inference, I t  i s  c ru c ia lly
Im portant to  have unbiased e s tim a te s . However, I f  th e  prim ary 
o b jec tive  Is  fo re c a s tin g , e ff ic ie n cy  becomes more Im portant than the  
unbiased ness of the  e s tim a te s . In t h i s  reg a rd , th e  use o f a c r i te r io n  
th a t  tends to  s e le c t  generous lag s  and hence avo ids b ia s  due to
underestim ation  of th e  lag leng th  i s  w ell su ite d  to  th e  In fe re n tia l
purposes of th i s  study . On t h i s  b a s is , Akalke's Inform ation c r i te r io n  
(AIC) w ill be employed.
Akalke's inform ation  c r i te r io n  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  o rd e r chosen be 
the  one th a t  minimizes
AIC(J) = In d e t I ,  t  <2d*J> /  T fo r j = 1, 2,...,m (4.5)
where: d e t I* Is  determ inan t of X*; Zj Is  th e  estim ated  variance
covariance m atrix  of re s id u a ls  fo r  th e  J**' o rd er v ecto r au to reg re ss io n ; 
d i s  the  number of v a r ia b le s  In the  system ; m i s  th e  maximum lag
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leng th  considered ; and T i s  the  number of o b serv a tio n s . S ince the  
choice of an o rd er s e le c tio n  c r i te r io n  does not ensure th a t  th e  so d el 
sp ec if ie d  Is  th e  a p p ro p ria te  so d e l i t  I s  In s tru c t iv e  to  conduct checks 
on so d e l adequacy. In th i s  regard  th e  Q ~ s ta tls t lc  d iscussed  In 
foo tno te  3 above Is  suggested .
D. B s tls a tlo n  of VAH Models
Since the  X m atrix  In the  system  of equations In (4.2) doss not 
Include con tenporary  te r  a s ,  any contem poraneous e f fe c ts  a re  captured  
w ith in  the  e r ro r  t e r s e .  Therefore, I f  the  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  so d el a re  
contem poraneously c o rre la te d , the  c o s  po c en ts  of u w ill show 
conteaporaneous c o rre la tio n . The like lihood  of th i s  c o r re la tio n  would 
sug g est use of seea in g ly  un re la ted  re g re ss io n  (SOB) techn iques in  
estim atio n  of th e  system ; however, I t  i s  well known th a t  s in c e  the  X 
m atrix  Is  id e n tic a l fo r a l l  th e  a o d e ls  equations, the  le a s t  squares 
e s tim a to r i s  Id e n tic a l to  th e  genera lized  le a s t  sq u ares  e s tim a to r . 
Therefore, th e  system  any be c o n s is te n tly  estim ated  on an equation by 
equation b a s is  using OLS. In p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  param eter v ecto r fo r the  
1th  equation  Is  given by
f i  = (X U -'IT T i (4.6)
w hile fo r the  com plete system  given In equation  (4.3) the  e s tim a to r Is  
given by
f  = [ U * ( I ' X > - ’ I * ] i  ( 4 .7 )
Dnder the  assum ptions th a t  (a) u I s  d is tr ib u te d  a s  a m u ltiv a ria te  
normal given by 1 (0 ,Xu), (b) ih  and u . a re  Independent fo r  t* s  and (c) 
I  Is  a s ta t io n a ry  p ro cess , i t  can be shown th a t  th e  e s tim a to r  o f T Is
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cone 1bte n t . A dd itionally , a s  noted by Judge a t .  a l ,  s in c e  u Is  assuaed  
to  be norm ally d is tr ib u te d , r  I s  a sy m p to tica lly  eq u ivalen t to  the  
maximum llk lih o o d  e s tim a to r and i s  th e re fo re  a sy m p to tica lly  e f f ic ie n t  
and norm ally d is tr ib u te d . That i s
T"(r-D KOJr) <4.B)
where L- ~ L X T ’ w ith Q = p i le  (T )-1 a 'X )
111. In te rp re ta tio n  of VIS Kodele
A. Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decompositions
In te rp re ta tio n  of the  c o e f f ic ie n ts  given In aquation <4.0 Is  
d i f f i c u l t  s in ce  the  VAR model Is  a reduced fo ra  and th e re fo re  I t  may 
have sev e ra l o b se rv a tlo n a lly  equ ivalen t re p re se n ta tio n s . As a r e s u l t  of 
t h i s  d if f ic u l ty ,  th e  In te rp re ta tio n  of a VAR Is  u sually  based on the 
v ec to r moving average (VMA) rep re se n ta tio n  of the  model. In o rder to  
e lu c id a te  th e  re la tio n s h ip  between th e  a u to reg re ss iv e  re p re se n ta tio n  and 
the  VXA rep re se n tlo n , an a l te rn a t iv e  form ulation  of th e  b asic  VAR model 
Is  p resen ted  below. In p a r t ic u la r ,  the  model of aquation (4.3) can be 
w ritten  as
I*. = to + r(L)R t + u*. <4.9)
where, H*. -  nxl column v ec to r of th e  system s v a ria b le s  re p re sen tab le  a s  
IIIi«,.....Tin*.]', Ao -  nxl v ec to r of c o n s ta n ts , iu  * nxl column v ec to r of
w hite no ise  e r ro r  term s re p re se n ta b le  a s  lui*. Uni)', and TO.) 3 nxn
m atrix  of polynom ials In th e  lag o p e ra to r, L, such th a t:
01
ra> -
r,, a >  rt„a)
* *
ft-* 1 Qi) ■ * * • • fnmCD
r , , (L) = E tK ti.iL1 fo r 1 = 1,2,. ,.,J; K n ,t = th e  c o e f f ic ie n t on th e  i th  
of v a ria b le  Tit In equation 1; and L*llit s ITt — t . All o th e r e le a e n ts  
of T(L) a re  s l a l l a r l y  defined . A dd itionally , J I s  the  caaaon  lag 
leng th . Given a s ta t io n a ry  v ecto r p rocess, T<L) Is  In v e rtib le  and I f  we 
use the  Innocuous a su ap tlo n  th a t  the  c o n stan t t e r a s  In (4.0) a re  a l l  
zero , (4.0) has a VJtA re p re se n ta tio n  given by,
I*  = I t l i U t - .  1 = 0,1 ,2 ........ » (4.10)
where I t  Is  a s  defined  p rev iously , U t-t I s  a coluan v ec to r of shocks to  
the  s y s te a s  v a r ia b le s  In period  t-1 , and I t  I s  a  a a t r l z  o f la p u lse  
response  c o e f f ic ie n ts  such th a t  I t s  kj**1 e le a e n t Is  th e  response of the  
v a r ia b le  to  an unpredlcted  Innovation In th e  J**' v a ria b le  In period  
t-1  (I.e. th e  J*** e le a e n t o f u t - , ) .  However, I t  I s  frequen tly  a ls le a d ln g  
to  In te rp re t  the  e le a e n ts  of K* In th i s  fash ion  s in ce  th e  presence of 
conteaporaneous c o rre la tio n  aaong the  e le a e n ts  o f uv-1  moke i t  
d i f f i c u l t  to  Is o la te  the  response of the  k " 1 v a ria b le  to  Innovations In 
the  v a riab le . l o r e  co ap ac tly , L  -  Eu*ju Is  not d iagonal.
In o rd e r to  a o re  accu ra te ly  In te rp re t  th e  e le a e n ts  of I t ,  I t  i s  
In s tru c tiv e  to  work w ith o rthogonal lzed Innovations, S ince the
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s t a t lo n a r l ty  o f th e  vecto r p ro cess  ensu res th a t  Xu Is  p o s it iv e  d e f in ite , 
th i s  can be achieved by fin d in g  a  nonsingu lar m atrix  P such th a t  PIP = 
I. T h is im plies th a t  (4.10) can be w ritten  as
■«. = r ,* iP - ’ Pu^_, = IiO .Vv-t 1 = 0 ,1 ,2 ....... •  (4.11)
and th a t  the  kj**' e le a e n t of fi* can be c o rre c t ly  in te rp re te d  a s  the  
u neon ta n  loafed response  of the  k**1 v a ria b le  In I*, to  a s u rp r is e  
innovation  in th e  J**' e le a e n t of v « ^ i. In general th e  m atrix  P i s  not 
unique; th e re fo re , th e  e le a e n ts  of fi* — which a re  th e  im pulse response  
fu n c tio n s  (IRPs)— w ill tend to  vary w ith P. For our purposes 
o rth o g o n a llza tlo n  i s  achieved using the  C holeskl decom position. This 
decom position i s  based on the  p r in c ip le  th a t  th e re  i s  only one 
fa c to r iz a tio n  o f Xu in to  88* such th a t  8 i s  a lower tr ia n g u la r  m atrix  
w ith p o s itiv e  numbers along th e  d iagonal. However, a s  th e  rows or 
columns of Zu a re  rearranged  S w ill a ls o  tend to  vary. T his means th a t  
fit w ill vary  a s  th e  o rd erin g  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  change. I t  should be 
noted, however, th a t  the  choice of o rd ering  m a tte rs  only to  th e  ex ten t 
th a t  th e re  i s  conteaporaneous c o rre la tio n  between th e  m odel's v a r ia b le s .
At a more in tu i t iv e  le v e l, I t  i s  in s tru c t iv e  to  note th a t  the  
Choleskl decom position a s s ig n s  c r e d i t  f a r  any conteaporaneous 
c o rre la tio n  among th e  v a r ia b le s  to  v a r ia b le s  h igher in  the  o rdering . 
T herefore, when a v a ria b le  h igher in the  o rd erin g  changes, v a r ia b le s  
th a t  follow  i t  in the  o rd ering  a re  assumed to  change. This has 
prompted Bernanke (1986) to  argue th a t  use of the  Choleskl 
decom position imposes assum ptions about economic c a u s a li ty  on the
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■odel. Therefore, he recommends th a t  in s t i tu t io n a l  and th e o re tic a l 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  should guide th e  choice of o rd e rin g s .
In order to  provide so ae  a d d itio n a l in tu i t io n , I t  Is  in s tru c t iv e  to  
view the  IBFs a s  the  end r e s u l t  of a s in u la tlo n  ex e rc ise  where one of 
the  sy stem 's  v a r ia b le s  i s  su b jec t to  a shock of given magnitude. 
Subsequently, th e  d ire c t  and in d ir e c t  e f fe c ts  of th i s  shock on the  
v a ria b le  I t s e l f  and on the  o th e r v a r ia b le s  In the  e y s te n  a re  tra ced  
through fu tu re  p e rio d s  o r horizons. The s iz e  and d ire c tio n  of these  
e f fe c ts  a re  given by th e  e le a e n ts  of fi*. which a re  th e  ISPs. T herefore, 
the  IRPs a re  re a l ly  th e  dynamic m u ltip lie rs  of the  system . F u rth e r, I t  
I s  in s tru c t iv e  to  note th a t  th e  magnitude of th e  shock to  th e  system  Is
u sually  chosen to  be equal to  one s tan d a rd  dev ia tio n ; however, th i s
choice Is , In genera l, a rb i t r a ry .
In ad d itio n  to  the  IRPs, th e  TXA re p re se n ta tio n  p rov ides ano ther 
opportun ity  to  In te rp re t  a VAR. This Is  so  bscauss th e  mean square  
e r ro r  (MSB) o r fo re c a s t e r ro r  covariance m atrix  from an h -e te p  
fo re c a s t of the  system  can be decomposed In to  th e  p o rtio n s  accounted 
fo r by innovations in the  Ind iv idual v a ria b le s . S ince th e se  variance  
decom positions (VDCs) re ly  on th e  VMA re p re se n ta tio n , they w ill tend  to  
vary w ith the  o rd erin g  of th e  v a r ia b le s  In Xu.
To see  th i s  l e t  1(h) denote th e  mean square  e r ro r  m atrix  of an h-
s te p  fo re c a s t  of H. Than
1(h) = Btin-r-r, -  I t (h))[l-r*t, -  l-rd l)) ')  (4.12)
where I t+* I s  th e  a c tu a l value of V a t  period  T+h and I t (1i ) Is  th e  
fo re c a s t fo r  period  T+h. S ince our e a r l ie r  d iscu ss io n  Im plies th a t  th e
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fo re c a s t WT (b) le  unbiased, Z(h) I s  equal to  th e  fo re c a s t e r ro r  
covariance s a t r lx .  I t  can bs shown th a t
X(h) = lu  + KiZbJIi * + . . .+ I ^ - i L A , - , '  (4.13)
where th e  I t ' s  a re  the  c o sp llc a te d  fu n c tio n s  of th e  a u to re g re ss iv e  
p a ra n e te rs  of th e  VAS defined  In (4.10) and Zu I s  a s  defined  e a r l ie r .  
A dd itionally , th e  p rev iously  defined P m atrix  can be used to  
o rthogonallze  th e  Innovations In (4.13) so  th a t  (4.13) may be re w ritte n  
as
1(h) = QoQo' + QiQi* + . . . + (4.14)
where fit i s  a s  defined e a r l ie r .  The n ^  d iagonal elem ant of fi*fi»' Is  
the  sun of squares of th e  elem ents In th e  n ^  row of fit. The fo re c a s t 
e r ro r  variance  of the  h -s te p  fo e rc a s t of the  n ^  v a riab le  in I  I s  given 
by the  sum of th e  d iagonal elem ents of fiofio', . . . ,
F u rther, th e  fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a riance  of th e  nM' v a r ia b le  can be 
decomposed In to  the  f r a c t io n s  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  Innovations In th e  
Ind iv idual v a ria b le s . This decom position y ie ld s  th e  variance  
decom positions (VDCs) which g ive  an In d ica tio n  of the  re la t iv e  
im portance of Innovations In the  v a ria b le  In exp la in ing  f lu c tu a tio n s  
In the  n1*' v a riab le . A dd itiona lly , Sims (1962) has noted th a t  th e  VDCs 
g ive some In d ica tio n  of th e  s tre n g th  o f Granger causal re la tio n s h ip s . 
However, I t  should be noted th a t  VDCs do no t g ive  any In d ica tio n  of th e  
d ire c tio n  o f the  e f fe c t  of one v a ria b le  on an o ther. F u rth er, I t  bears  
reem phasizing th a t  the  VDCs a s  captured  w ith in  equation  (4.14) depend 
on th e  P m atrix  and a6 such a re  a ffe c ted  by th e  o rd e rin g  o f the  
v a r ia b le s  In Zu.
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B. Measures of Confidence fo r  VDCs and ISPs
I t  I s  custom ary fo r ISPs and VDCs to  be re  p arted  w ithout 
confidence in te rv a ls  or s tan d a rd  e r ro rs .  However, Bunkle (1087) has 
noted th a t  th i s  I s  equ ivalen t to  re p o rtin g  re g re ss io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  
w ithout t - s t a t i s t l c s  and has ou tlined  procedures th a t  say  he used to  
c a lc u la te  e n p lr lc a l  s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  fo r th e  p o in t e s tim a te s  of IRPs and 
VDCs.
Several au th o rs  Including Genberg, S a le s 1, and Swoboda (1087) and 
C h rls tlan o  (1080) have used a Monte C arlo In te g ra tio n  procedure 
ou tlined  In Doan and L it te r s a n  (1084) to  conpute s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  and 
sean s  fo r th e  VDCs and IBFs. The procedure used In th is  study  to  
compute s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  fo r the  VDCs and IBFs Is  based upon example 
19.1 of Doan and L ltterm an <1984). Given th ese  s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  and 
means, confidence In te rv a ls  may be co n stru c ted  fo r th e  IBFs and VDCs 
by tak in g  two s tan d a rd  d e v ia tio n s  on each of th e  mean.
IV. Innovation Accounting 
The two most w idely encountered uses of v ec to r au to r  agree  a lcms a re  
Granger c a u sa lity  te s t in g  and Innovation accounting. V hlle th ese  
techn iques have received  s ig n if ic a n t  acceptance In th e  l i te r a tu re ,  
s u b s ta n tia l  debate  p e r s i s t s  a s  to  the  ap p ro p ria te  uses of th ese  
techn iques in  macroeconomic a n a ly s is . As a re s u l t  o f th i s  ongoing 
debate, a number of " leg itim ate" uses of th e se  techniques have been 
id e n tif ie d . Since the  prim ary em pirica l technique used In the  follow ipg 
em pirica l c h ap te rs  Is  innovation  accounting, In what fo llow s J  a ttem p t
to  c la r i f y  the  a p p ro p ria te n ess  of th i s  technique fo r th e  purposes of 
t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n .
Innovation accounting r e f e r s  to  th e  use of IBFs and VDCs to  analyze 
th e  dynanlc  e f fe c ts  of Innovations In the  s y e te a 's  v a ria b le s  on the  
o th e r v a r ia b le s  In the  so d e l. As noted In se c tio n  III , th e  VAR nodel 
Is  a reduced fo ra , and as  such, I t  nay be one of sev era l 
o b se rv a tio n a l ly  eq u iv alen t re p re se n ta tio n s  of a whale c la s s  of 
s t ru c tu ra l  ao d e ls . Therefore, i t  Is  gen era lly  d i f f i c u l t  to  d is tin g u ish  
aaong s tru c tu ra l  hypotheses by exan ln lng  IBFs and VDCs. Cooley and 
LeRoy <1985, pp 304) have observed th a t  • The exclusive  purpose of 
n o n s tru c tu ra l aodellng  Is  to  cap tu re  the  p ro b a b il is t ic  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  
of the  d a ta  under ex aa ln a tlo n  and to  answer q uestions th a t  can be 
answered with th a t  In fo raa tlo n " .
As noted In sec tio n  III , th e  presence of conteaporaneous 
c o rre la tio n  aaong the  v a ria b le s  in  a VAB n e c e s s ita te s  th e  use of 
orthogonalized  Innovations in th e  c a lc u la tio n  of IBFs and VDCs. The 
a o s t  coaaon d eco ap o sltlo n  used to  ach ieve orthogonal Innovations Is  
the  C holeskl deco ap o sltlo n . Bernanke (I960) and Gordon and King 
(1982) have shown th a t  the  Banner In which the  v a ria b le s  a re  ordered 
In the  variance  covariance a a t r lx  o f re s id u a ls  la p o se s  a recu rs iv e  
s tru c tu re  on th e  aodel. In p a r t ic u la r ,  Bernanke has cautioned a g a in s t 
th e  use of an o rd e rin g  i f  th e  a n a ly s t does no t have th e o re tic a l  and /o r 
In s t i tu t io n a l  reaso n s to  be lieve  th a t  the  s y s te a  under In v es tig a tio n  
e x h ib its  th e  re c u rs iv e  s tru c tu re  la p lie d  by th a t  o rdering . 
A dd itiona lly , I t  I s  In s tru c tiv e  to  p o in t out, a s  do Gordon and l in g ,
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th a t  choosing a  p a r t ic u la r  o rdering  la  aqu lvalan t to  d is t r ib u t in g  zero 
r e s t r ic t io n s  on th e  contemporaneous values of th e  aodel*s v a ria b le s . 
The above c o n s id e ra tio n s  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  v a l id i ty  of th e  IRFs and 
VDCs say  be su b jec t to  th e  th e o re tic a l  and In s t i tu t io n a l  c o n sid e ra tio n s  
th a t  guide the  choice o f o rdering . Throughout th e  e s p l r lc a l  d iscu ss io n  
th a t  fo llow s In c h ap te rs  V and VI every  a ttem p t Is  made to  allow  these  
c o n s id e ra tio n s  to  in fluence the  choice of o rdering .
Based on the  a n a ly s is  in Cooley and Leioy (1905), Learner (1065), 
and Elchenbaum <1985), sev e ra l a p p ro p ria te  uses o f VASs a re  
recommended. These Include: (a) te s t in g  th e o r ie s  th a t  is p ly  Granger 
causal r e la tio n s h ip s  w ithout in te rp re tin g  the  r e s u l ts  In term s of the  
exogeneity  or endogeneity of the  v a ria b le s  concerned; (b) e s ta b lis h in g  
em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  a g a in s t which the  p re d ic tio n s  of e x is t in g  
th e o rie s  may be compared o r which may be used a s  a guide In the  
form ulation  of new th e o r ie s  and th e i r  a tte n d a n t s t ru c tu ra l  models; <c> 
d e sc rib in g  the  tim e s e r ie s  behavior of th e  economy; and <d) 
fo rec a s tin g . In the  em pirica l a n a ly s is  conducted in c h ap te rs  V and VI, 
my prim ary purpose i s  to  g en era te  em p irica l r e g u la r i t ie s  a g a in s t  which 
the  p re d ic tio n s  o f competing th e o r ie s  may be compared. Therefore, use 
of th e  innovation accounting techn iques ou tlined  in  th i s  ch ap te r i s  
c le a r ly  ap p ro p ria te .
CHAPTER V
THE MACROHCOMOMIC EPPECTS OP FISCAL AID HOIBTART IMPULSES: 
EMPIRICAL BV1DEICB PROM THE HTBRVAR PERIOD
I. In troduction
The purpose of th i s  ch ap te r i s  to  evalua te  th e  m acroeconaalc ro le  
of f i s c a l  and monetary policy  v a ria b le s  such a s  d e f ic i t s ,  average 
personal m arginal tax  ra te s ,  government e x p en d itu res , and th e  noney 
supply In the  in te rw ar period in o rder to  genera te  em p irica l 
re g u la r i t ie s  a g a in s t  which the  p re d ic tio n s  of competing macroeconomic 
th e o r ie s  say  be compared. In o rder to  do th i s  we employ v ecto r 
a u to reg re ss iv e  techn iques and monthly d a ta  from July 1921 - June 1938.
In c h ap te rs  1 and II sev e ra l shortcom ings of th e  em p irica l 
l i te r a tu r e  on the  is su e s  of concern here were id e n tif ie d . The a n a ly s is  
in th i s  ch ap te r a ttem p ts  to  r e c t i fy  th e se  shortcom ings and thereby 
make some meaningful c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  the  l i te r a tu r e  In t h i s  a rea . 
This i s  done by: (a) co n cen tra tin g  on the  ln te rw ar period ; (b) using 
vecto r a u to re g re ss iv e  techniques of the  type d esc rib ed  in  ch ap te r IV; 
(c) includ ing  a measure of average personal m arginal tax  r a te s  and 
government expend itu res in the  VAR so d el; and (d) p re sen tin g  m easures 
th a t  allow  a Judgement a s  to  the  p re c is io n  w ith which th e  impulse 
response fu n c tio n s  (IRPs) and v ariance  decom positions (VDCs) a re  
estim ated . A dd itiona lly , the  inc lusion  of the  tax  measure a llow s us to  
evalua te  the  In frequen tly  analyzed em pirica l ro le  of changes in  
m arginal ta x  ra te s .
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In what fo llow s, the  so d e l employed le  sp ec if ie d  In s ec tio n  II 
w hile s ec tio n  III is  devoted to  a  d e sc r ip tio n  of th e  em p irica l
■ethodology. Section  IV p re se n ts  th e  em p irica l r e s u l t s  and th e ir
in te rp re ta tio n . F in a lly , s ec tio n  V e u a sa rlz e e  the  conclusions drawn 
Iro n  the  a n a ly s is  th a t  p recedes I t.
II. Hodel S p e c if ic a tio n  
In o rder to  evaluate  the  aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  o f f i s c a l  po licy , I t  
I s  aasuned th a t  the  nacroeconaay can be rep resen ted  by a vecto r 
p ro cess  defined  by seven v a ria b le s : n a se ly , the  In te re s t  r a te  CSCP); th e  
■oney supply  (M2); d e f ic i t s  (DBF); government expend itu res (HIP); 
w holesale p r ic e s  (VPI); In d u s tr ia l  production (IP); and average 
personal m arginal tax  r a te s  (XTAZ). Following Sims (1980a), a v ecto r 
a u to reg re ss iv e  model Is  sp ec if ie d  and estim ated . This v ec to r p rocess 
approach Is  used in lieu  of a s t ru c tu ra l  approach In o rd e r to  avoid 
using r e s t r i c t io n s  th a t  a re  Inadequately supported  by economic theory. 
As noted in ch ap te r IV, VARe may be leg itim a te ly  used to  e s ta b lis h  
em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  th a t  may be compared to  e x is t in g  th e o r ie s  o r 
used a s  a guide In form ulating  new th e o rie s . A dd itionally , F ischer 
(1981) and Genberg, Salam i, and Swoboda (1987) note th a t  VARs a re  
usefu l devices In study ing  th e  channels through which a v a riab le
o p e ra tes  s in c e  very few a p r io r i  r e s t r ic t io n s  a re  Imposed on the  
in te ra c t io n s  aaong the  v a ria b le s  of th e  system . Since my prim ary
purpose is  to  e s ta b lis h  em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  fo r th e  ln te rw ar period 
and to  examine th e  macroeconomic ro le  of th e  po licy  v a ria b le s  In the  
model, the  use of a VAR Is  c le a r ly  ap p ro p ria te .
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A. Choice of V ariab les I
As noted In ch ap te r IV, the  key s te p s  In th e  s p e c if ic a tio n  of a VAR 
sodel a re  th e  choice of v a ria b le s  th a t  e n te r  th e  e y s te s  and 
d e te rs in a tlo n  of the  connon lag  leng th . In th i s  regard , th e  v a ria b le s  
th a t  e n te r  the  s y s te s  used here were chosen because of th e i r  
nacroecononic In te re s t  and to  avoid o n ltte d  v a ria b le s  problems o f the 
type described  by Lutkephol (1082). S ince th i s  approach could lead to  
so d e ls  th a t  exhaust our techno log ica l c a p a b i l i t ie s ,  th e  choice of 
v a r ia b le s  was a lso  guided by econoslc  theory . A ccordingly, the  r a te  of 
In te re s t  su a a a r lz e s  co n d itio n s  In the  f in a n c ia l m arkets w hile 
In d u s tr ia l production and p r ic e s  r e f le c t  th e  s t a t e  of th e  goods m arket. 
A dd itionally , so n e ta ry  po licy  i s  rep resen ted  by th e  soney supply while 
th e  s tan ce  of f i s c a l  po licy  i s  Ind ica ted  by governaen t expend itu res, 
d e f ic i t s ,  and average p ersonal M arginal tax  ra te s .
P u rth er, and in  o rder to  b e tte r  understand the  ro le  o f governaen t 
expend itu res and average personal M arginal ta x  r a te s  In the  Model, I t  
Is  In s tru c tiv e  to  coapare  th e  s e t  of f i s c a l  a c tio n s  considered  to  be 
expansionary  in  the  conventional (ley n eslan ) view to  th a t  in  the  
R icard ian  view. V lth ln  th e  R icard ian  fraaew ork , expansionary f is c a l  
p o lic ie s  a re  H a lte d  to  Inc reases  In governaen t spending and red u c tio n s  
In average M arginal ta x  r a te s .  However, In th e  conventional p a rad lg a , 
the  s e t  of expansionary  f i s c a l  p o lic ie s  Is  expanded to  Include the  
s u b s ti tu tio n  of debt fo r tax  finance  fo r a given level of governaen t 
expend itu res. Therefore, In o rd er to  evalua te  em p irica lly  the  ro le  of 
d e f ic i t s  In the  aacroeconoay, i t  la  n ecessary  to  Iso la te  I t s  e f fe c ts
101
from th a t  of o th e r f i s c a l  v a ria b le s . W ithin th e  framework of the  model 
used here, th i s  Is  achieved by inc lusion  of government expend itu res  and 
average personal n a rg ln a l tax  r a te s  in  th e  s o d e l .1
B. Data Sources
As noted I d su b sec tion  11. A above, the  l i s t  of v a r ia b le s  to  be used 
in th i s  chap ter include the  r a te  of in te r e s t ,  p r ic e s , the  supply of 
aoney, in d u s tr ia l  p roduction , d e f ic i t s ,  fed era l governaen t expenditures, 
and average m arginal personal tax  ra te s .  Xonthly o b serv a tio n s  on the 
em pirica l co u n te rp a rts  to  th e se  v a ria b le s  a re  used throughout the  
d is s e r ta t io n .  These em pirica l co u n te rp a rts  were chosen a s  fo llow s. 
The In te re s t  r a te  s e r ie s  (RCP) Is  the  4 -0  month r a te  on prime 
commercial paper and comes from Banking and Monetary S a t ie t ie s  1914 -  
1941 (Board of Governors of th e  Federal Reserve System, 1943). The 
p rice  measure (VPI) Is  the  w holesale p ric e  Index and co se s  from the  
1933, 1938, and 1943 e d itio n s  of th e  S t a t i s t i c a l  A b strac t nf the  Onlted 
S ta te s . Data fo r th e  In d u s tr ia l  production s e r ie s  (IP) w ith  1977 a s
11deally, I t  would be p re fe ra b le  to  use a more genera l measure of 
Income ta x es  th a t  in co rp o ra te s  personal so c ia l s e c u r ity  and co rp o ra te  
Income tax  ra te s .  However, such a measure Is  c u rre n tly  unavailab le . 
Sea te r  (1985) has ca lcu la ted  sep a ra te  s e r ie s  of average personal and 
c o rp o ra te  m arginal Income tax  ra te s ,  bu t I t  I s  d i f f ic u l t  to  co n so lid a te  
them. This means th a t  a choice must be made between the  personal and 
c o rp o ra te  tax  m easures. However, s in c e  th e se  ta x es  accounted fo r  a 
roughly equal percentage of tax  revenue during th e  in te rw ar period  — 
see Annual Rep o r ts  of th e  S ecre ta ry  nf thw T rM tn r t  nn thm fitn ta  nf 
F inances <1940, pp. 406-534) — th e re  Is  no o b jec tiv e  c r i te r io n  upon 
which to  base t h i s  choice. Subsequent a n a ly s is  In d ic a te s  th a t  the  
f i r s t  d iffe ren c es  of th ese  v a ria b le s  should e n te r  th e  model. Since 
th e re  Is  very l i t t l e  v a r ia tio n  In the  co rp o ra te  s e r ie s  , tak in g  f i r s t  
d iffe re n c e s  makes approxim ately  90 p ercen t of th e  o b serv a tio n s  zero. 
Therefore, the  only v iab le  ta x  measure Is  the  average personal m arginal 
tax  r a te  which Includes an adjustm ent fo r  so c ia l  s e c u r ity  tax es  fo r  
1937 -  38.
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base year Is  taken from the  1965 re v is io n  o f In d u s tr ia l  Production 
(Board of Governors of th e  Federal Baserve, 1905). Honey OC2) Is  
rep resen ted  by F rledaan  and Schw artz 's (1963) aeasu re  of X2 f ro a  th e i r  
ta b le  A-1.3 The d e f ic i t  (DBF) i s  ca lcu la ted  on a  cash  b a s is  as  
re c e ip ts  a ln u s  expend itu res  so th a t  an Increase  in  DBF i s  re a lly  an
Increase  in the  su rp lu s . G overnaent expend itu res  (BXP) includes 
t r a n s fe r  p ay aen ts  but th ese  a re  very s a a l l  r e la t iv e  to  expenditu res. 
F in a lly , both d e f ic i t s  and governaen t expend itu res  a re  aeasured  in  
b i l l io n s  of d o l la r s  and coae f ro a  F ires to n e  (1900), ta b le  A-3.
The ao n th ly  aensu res of th e  average personal m arginal tax  ra te s  
used here are  derived f ro a  the  y early  r a te s  ca lcu la ted  by S ea ter (1982 
; 1985a). Following Boschen and Talbot (1987), the  ao n th ly  d a ta  fo r
aon th  n of year t  I s  rep resen ted  as;
KTAIvr, = t(1 2 -n )/1 2 ) NTAIt-, + (n/12) NT Alt. (1)
where NTAX tn  -  the  average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te  fo r  th e  n th  aon th  of year
t ;  NT A lt -  S ea ter *s aeasu re  of the  average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te  fo r  year
t; NTAXt-i = Seater*s aeasu re  of the  average a a rg ln a l tax  r a te  fo r
aA p o te n tia l  ob jection  to  the  use of N2 Instead  of N1 i s  th a t  In 
c o n tra s t  to  N1 which c o n ta in s  only i t e a s  th a t  a re  media of exchange, 
N2 c o n ta in s  t i a e  d e p o s its  which can be used a s  a aed lua  of exchange 
only a f t e r  conversion  In to  currency  o r daaand d e p o sits . However, 
F rledaan  and Schwartz (1963 pp. 649-53) have noted th a t  t h i s  c r i t ic is m  
aay hold fo r very la rg e  denom inations of currency . F u rth e r, they 
argue th a t  th e  choice of monetary agg regate  should depend on * the  
em pirica l s t a b i l i t y  and re g u la r ity  of re la tio n s h ip s  between th e  chosen 
to ta l  and o th er v a riab les ."
In l ig h t  of the  p o r tfo lio  approaches to  the  demand fa r  money, I t  
se e a s  reasonab le  to  Include tim e d e p o s its  In th e  m onetary aggregate  
s in ce  th e re  i s  a g re a te r  degree of s u b s t i tu ta b i l i ty  between t i a e  
d e p o s its  and demand d e p o s its  than  th e re  i s  between t i a e  d e p o s its  and 
o th e r f in a n c ia l a s s e ts .
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year t - 1 ;  fo r n = 1, 2 ........... 12 and t  = 1021, 1022.......1038. This
procedure was used to  generate  ao n th ly  d a ta  fo r  average personal 
a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  f ro a  July 1021 to  June 1038.
Ose of the  above procedure Is  In tu i t iv e ly  appealing  s in c e  I t  a llow s 
the  value fo r aon th  n of year t  to  be a ore heav ily  Influenced by the  
yearly  observation  c lo s e s t  to  I t  In t i a e .  A dd itiona lly , t h i s  aethod 
y ie ld s  a f a i r ly  sao o th  s e r ie s  which appears  to  be c o n s is te n t w ith the  
view th a t  aon th ly  changes In a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  a re  not d ra m a tic .
C. S ta t io n a r l ty  and Lag Length S e lec tio n
In chap ter IV we noted th a t  a c ru c ia l re q u lre a en t of the  VAR 
approach Is  th a t  th e  t i a e  s e r ie s  under co n sid e ra tio n  be s ta t io n a ry . 
However, I t  i s  well known th a t  a o s t  a ac ro  s e r ie s  a re  n o n sta tlo n ary . In 
o rder to  d e te ra ln e  the  fo ra  of t h i s  n o n s ta t lo n a r lty , and thereby , the 
a p p ro p ria te  tran sfo rm a tio n  requ ired , u n it ro o t t e s t s  of the  type 
suggested by Yelson and P lo sse r (1982) and d escribed  in  ch ap te r IV 
were iap len en ted  fo r  a l l  the  v a ria b le s  chosen to  e n te r  th e  aodel. 
F u rther, the  s e n s i t iv i ty  of the  r e s u l ts  to  th e  choice of o rd e r (k) in 
(4.4) was ta s te d  by conducting th ese  t e s t s  fo r  k = 3, 0, and 12. In a l l  
c ases  and fo r a l l  v a rlb le6  the  nu ll h y p o th esis  th a t  th e se  s e r ie s  
e x h ib it s to c h a s t ic  n o n s ta t lo n a r lty  <pi=1) and th a t  f i r s t  d iffe ren c in g  
I s  th e  ap p ro p ria te  tran sfo rm a tio n  could no t be re je c te d .9 Therefore,
^Equation (4.4) re q u ire s  tak in g  th e  logs of the  s e r ie s  in  question  
except w ith re sp ec t to  RCP, DBF and KTAX. Taking th e  f i r s t  d iffe ren c es  
of the  log of ECP and XTAX would convert th ese  r a te s  to  r a te s  of r a te s  
of grow th, which would be ra th e r  d i f f i c u l t  to  in te rp re t .  A dd itionally , 
we a re  unable to  take  the  log of DBF s in c e  th e  s e r ie s  co n ta in s  same 
negative  numbers.
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the  em p irica l a n a ly s is  proceeded w ith a l l  v a r ia b le s  en te r in g  the  >odel 
In th e i r  f i r s t  d iffe ren c es .
Following Lutkepohl (1982), X cX lllln  (1968), X cX lllln  and Beard 
(1988), and X cX lllln and Koray <1989), the  lag length  i s  sp ec ified  
using Akalke's A 1C c r i te r io n .  (This c r i te r io n  i s  form ally sp ec if ie d  In 
chap ter IV, equation (4.5) >. Taking the  maximum lag leng th  considered  
to  be tw elve (I.e. m -  12 in (4 .5)), t h i s  c r i te r io n  in d ica ted  an optim al 
lag length  of s ix .
In summary, the  model s p e c if ic a tio n  re q u ire s  th a t  we use DLK2, 
DLIP, DLEXP, DLVPI, DRCP, DXTAI, and DDBF a s  th e  system  v a ria b le s , 
where DLX2, DLIP, DLBIP and DLVPI a re  the  f i r s t  d iffe re n c e s  o f the  log 
of X2, IP, EXP and VPI, re sp ec tiv e ly , and DRCP, DXTAX, and DDBF a re  the 
f i r s t  d iffe ren c es  of RCP, XTAX and DBF. A fter accounting fo r 
o b serv a tio n s  lo s t  due to  th e  maximum lag length  of tw elve used In 
choosing the  optim al lag  length  and th a t  due to  tak in g  f i r s t  
d iffe ren c es , the  model was estim ated  fo r th e  period August 1922 to  June 
1938. The em pirica l methodology and in te rp re ta t io n  of the  r e s u l t s  to  
be derived  a re  p resen ted  In sec tio n  111 below.
III. Em pirical Xethodology
The prim ary purpose of the  em pirica l a n a ly s is  conducted here Is  to  
evalua te  the  macroeconomic ro le  of the  f is c a l  and monetary policy  
v a ria b le s  Included In the model. S p e c if ic a lly , concern c e n te rs  on the 
co n sis ten cy  of th e  R icardian equivalence and debt m onetization 
hypotheses with the  em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  th a t  emerge from the 
a n a ly s is . F u rth er, sp ec ia l a tte n tio n  i s  paid  to  the  ro le  of average
105
personal a a rg ln a l tax  r a te s ,  governaen t ex p end itu res , and aoney I d the  
aacroeconoay. In o rder to  exaa lne  th e se  Issu es , th e  VAE aodel ou tlined  
In th e  previous sec tio n  was e s t la s te d  on an equation  by equation  b a s is  
using OLS, Examination of the  LJung -  Box Q - s ta t i s t ic  fo r  each of th e
a o d e l 's  equations in d ica ted  th a t  th e  aodel i s  well sp ec if ie d . Since the
re su ltin g  p a ran e te r e s tim a te s  a re  d i f f ic u l t  to  In te rp re t , IBFs and VDCs 
a re  computed and used to  evaluate  th e  is su e s  under co n sid e ra tio n , As 
noted In ch ap te r IV, I t  i s  Im portan t to  decompose th e  variance
covariance m atrix  of re s id u a ls  such th a t  the  Innovations a re
orthogonal. Accordingly, we use th e  C holeskl d eco ap o sltlo n  to  achieve 
th is .  Since the  IBFs and VDCs a re  s e n s i t iv e  to  the  aanner In which the 
v a ria b le s  a re  ordered  In the  variance  covariance m atrix  of re s id u a ls , 
and s in ce  th e  Choleskl d eco ap o sltlo n  la  poses a recu rs iv e  s tru c tu re  on 
the  aodel, I t  i s  In s tru c tiv e  to  t r y  d if f e r e n t  o rd e rin g s  and to  allow 
th e o re tic a l and In s t i tu t io n a l  c o n s id e ra tio n s  to  Influence th e  choice of 
o rd e rin g s .
In l ig h t  of the  foregoing and In o rder to  e ffe c tiv e ly  In te rp re t  the 
aodel, f iv e  d i s t in c t  o rd e rin g s  were considered . These a re : (1) DLBIP, 
DMTAX, DDBF, DLM2, DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI; (2) DMTAI, DLBIP, DDBF, DLK2, 
DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI; (3) DLK2, DLBIP, DMTAI, DDBF, DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI; (4) 
DLBIP, DMTAI, DDBF, DLX2, DRCP, DLVPI, DLIP; and (5) DLBIP, DMTAI, DDBF, 
DLM2, DLIP, DLVPI, DRCP.
The ra tio n a le  fo r  th e se  o rd e rin g s  Is  a s  follow s. F i r s t ly ,  the  
model's v a r ia b le s  a re  considered  to  be In two b locks. Block one Is  
com prised of th e  f i s c a l  and ao n e ta ry  p o licy  v a ria b le s , namely, DLBIP,
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DXTAX, DDBF and DLX2. Block two Includes DRCP and th e  good* a a rk e t 
v a r ia b le s  namely, DLIP and DLVPI. In accordance w ith th e  widely used 
ra t io n a l  ex p ec ta tio n s  models of th e  aacroeconoey , conteaporaneous 
values of the  v a r ia b le s  In block two a re  assumed no t to  Influence the 
v a ria b le s  In block one w hile Innovations In the  po licy  v a ria b le s  a ffe c t 
the  goods and f in a n c ia l m arkets. This view im plies th a t  th e  v a ria b le s  
In block one should precede those  in block two. This genera l p r in c ip le  
Is  adhered to  throughout th i s  ch ap te r and Is  re f le c te d  In the  
a l te rn a t iv e  o rd e rin g s  l i s te d  above.
In o rdering  (1) the  f is c a l  po licy  v a ria b le s  precede the  monetary 
po licy  v a riab le  in o rder to  r e f le c t  those  th e o r ie s  which advocate th a t  
the  monetary a u th o rity  responds to  innovations in th e  f is c a l  policy
v a ria b le s , p a r t ic u la r ly  DDBF. Since one o f the  concerns of th i s  chap ter 
i s  to  in v e s tig a te  th e  em pirica l v a lid ity  of th e  deb t m onetization 
h y p o th esis , I t  seems reasonab le  to  allow  every opportun ity  fo r 
Innovations in DDBF to  Influence DLX2. Among the  f i s c a l  v a r ia b le s , 
DLSXP and DXTAX a re  placed f i r s t  in o rd er to  r e f le c t  th e  predom inant 
th e o re tic a l  view th a t  th e se  v a ria b le s  a re  more l ik e ly  influenced by 
fa c to r s  o u ts id e  the  model and th a t  they in fluence o th e r key v a ria b le s  
In th e  system . A dd itionally , s in ce  the  level of d e f ic i t s  depends on the  
d iffe ren ce  between tax  revenues and governaen t expen d itu res , I t  appears 
reasonab le  to  argue th a t  DDBP is  lik e ly  to  be contem poraneously
Influenced by th e se  v a ria b le s .
O rdering (2) i s  m otivated by th e  v ir tu a l  im p o ss ib ility  of
determ ining  on a priori grounds the  o rder in  which DLBIP and DXTAX
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should e n te r  the  aodel. Therefore, o rd ering  (2) d i f f e r s  f ro a  o rdering  
(1) In th a t  DMTAI precedes DLBIP. S ince ex aa ln a tlo n  of th e  ISPs and 
VDCs fo r both o rd e rin g s  In d ica te  no s u b s ta n tia l  d iffe ren ce  In the  
r e s u l ts ,  1 conclude th a t  the  Banner In which the  a e t  o f f is c a l
v a ria b le s  a re  ordered In re la t io n  to  each o th e r does not B a tte r .
Therefore, th e  a n a ly s is  proceeded w ith th e  s e t  of f is c a l  v a r ia b le s
ordered a s  In <1).
For o rdering  (3) a tte n tio n  Is  paid  to  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  
aonetary  po licy  is  conducted Independently of f i s c a l  po licy  and th a t  
the  f is c a l  a u th o rity , because o f th e  d i f f ic u l ty  I t  faces  In a r r iv in g  a t  
a policy  consensus, uses the  p o s itio n s  taken by the  FED a s  a coaaon 
s ta r t in g  p o in t for th e  fo ra u la tlo n  of f i s c a l  po licy . In o rder to  allow 
fo r th is ,  DLM2 is  placed before  th e  f is c a l  policy  v a ria b le s  In (3). 
S ince the  VDCs and IRFs fo r <3) a re  not a a te r la l ly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  th a t  
In Cl>, I t  i s  concluded th a t  the  o rd erin g  of th e  po licy  v a ria b le s  i s  of 
l i t t l e  lap o rtan ce  and so  we proceed w ith (1).
Throughout the  foregoing d iscu ss io n  and In o rd e rin g s  (1) to  (3),
the  v a ria b le s  In block two were ordered a s  DRCP, DLIP, and DLVPI. This 
o rd ering  Is  c o n s is te n t w ith the  usual IS-LM approach to  the  
aacroeconoay where Innovations In po licy  v a ria b le s  a f f e c t  in te re s t  
r a te s  which In tu rn  In fluences In d u s tr ia l  production and p ric e s . 
However, I t  Is  not c le a r  th a t  DLIP should precede DLVPI s in ce  I t  Is 
p o ss ib le  to  argue th a t  the  two a re  d e te ra ln ed  s lau ltan e o u s ly . 
Therefore, In o rder to  allow  fo r  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  th i s  u n certa in ty  
is  la p o r ta n t ,  DLVPI Is  placed before  DLIP in (4).
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As noted by Gordon and Veitch (1986), th e  e f f ic ie n t  m arkets 
hy p o th esis  1 s p i le s  th a t  th e  in te r e s t  r a te  responds in s tan tan eo u sly  to  
Innovations in  o th e r p e r tin e n t v a ria b le s . This su g g es ts  th a t  DBCP 
should be placed l a s t  so th a t  I t  Is  con tesporaneously  Influenced by a l l  
v a r ia b le s  in the  so d e l. Consequently, DRCP i s  p laced a f te r  th e  goods 
m arket v a r ia b le s  in o rdering  (5). In a l l  c a se s  (i.e . o rd e rin g s  (1) 
through (5)) th e  choice of o rd ering  d id  not M ate ria lly  a f fe c t  the 
r e s u l ts .  Therefore, I re p o rt only the  r e s u l ts  derived  f ro a  o rdering  
Cl).
In o rd e r to  provide so ae  in d ic a tio n  of th e  p rec is io n  w ith which 
the  IRFs and VDCs a re  e s t la a te d ,  and thereby  a aeasu re  of the 
confidence th a t  Bay be placed in th ese  e s tim a te s , I use th e  Konte Carlo 
in te g ra tio n  procedure ou tlined  in  Doan and L ltte ra a n  (1984) to  
c a lc u la te  th e i r  Beans and s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  f ro a  500 draw s. F urther, 
a ssu a ln g  th a t  th e  param eters of th e  IRFs and VDCs a re  approxim ately  
norm ally d is tr ib u te d , we can make the  follow ing in te rp re ta t io n s . For 
the  VDCs, th e  r a t io  of a p o in t e s tim a te  to  i t s  s tan d a rd  e r ro r  p rov ides 
an in tu i t iv e  guide to  the  "sig n ifican ce"  of th a t  e s tim ate . Therefore, a 
quasi t-v a lu e  of a t  le a s t  2 w ill be in te rp re te d  a s  in d ic a tin g  th a t  the 
p o in t e s tim a te  i s  " s ig n if ic a n tly "  d if f e r e n t  from zero a t  th e  5 percen t 
level w hile a quasi t  o f a t  le a s t  1.45 w ill be taken to  In d ica te  
" s ig n ifican ce"  a t  th e  10 p ercen t level. F u rth er, under the  assum ption 
th a t  the  IRFs a re  d is tr ib u te d  approxim ately  normal, I c a lcu la ted  95 
percen t confidence in te rv a ls  fo r  the  IRPs by tak in g  1.94 s tan d a rd  
d e v ia tio n s  on each s id e  o f the  mean. The upper and lower bounds of the
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confidence in te rv a le  Merc then p lo tte d  to g e th e r w ith the  p o in t 
e s tim a te s . The p o in t e s tim ate  is  then considered  to  be s ig n if ic a n tly  
d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero  a t  a  p a r t ic u la r  horizon I f  fo r  th a t  horizon i t  f a l l s  
w ith in  th e  confidence bands and the  confidence In te rv a ls  do no t include 
zero. If the  confidence bands Include zero a t  a p a r t ic u la r  horizon the 
p o in t e s t l a a te  a t  th a t  horizon is  taken to  be In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  
f ro a  zero. These r e s u l ts  a re  repo rted  in f ig u re s  5.1 through 5.5. 
P oin t e s t l a a te s  of th e  VDCs to g e th e r w ith s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  a re  p resen ted  
in ta b le  5.1.
IV. E a p lr lc a l R esults
A. R icardian Equivalence
The R icard ian  equivalence h y p o thesis  lead s  us to  expect th a t  an 
Increase  In the  d e f ic i t ,  holding governaen t spending and tax  r a te s  
c o n sta n t, has no re a l e f fe c ts  on th e  aacroeconoay . V lth ln  the  
fraaew ork of the  VAR ao d el th i s  a san s  th a t  v a riance  decom positions of 
In te re s t  r a te s ,  In d u s tr ia l  production and p ric e s  should show th a t  the  
percentage of the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a riance  of th e se  v a ria b le s  
a t t r ib u ta b le  to  Innovations In d e f ic i t s  i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  In s ig n if ic a n tly  
d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. Moreover, the  la p u lse  resp o n ses  of th sse  v a r ia b le s  
to  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  shock to  d e f ic i t s  should no t be 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe re n t  f ro a  zero.
In ta b le  5.1 the  variance  d eco ap o sltlo n  o f DRCP shows th a t  the 
percentage of the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a riance  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  DDEF v a rie s  
f ro a  0.7 in the  f i r s t  horizon to  2.0 In the  fo r ty -e ig h th . Moreover, our 
quasi t - t e s t  In d ic a te s  th a t  th ese  p o in t e s t l a a te s  a re  not s ig n if ic a n tly
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d if fe re n t  f ro a  zero  a t  e i th e r  th e  5 o r 10 percen t level of s ig n ific a n ce . 
The f i r s t  graph In fig u re  5.1 p lo ts  th e  lsp u lse  resp o n ses  of DRCP to  a 
one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  Innovation In DDBF to g e th e r w ith th e  upper
(DRCPUB) and lower (DRCPLB) bounds of a 05 peroent confidence
In te rv a l co n stru c ted  by tak in g  1.00 s tan d a rd  d e v ia tio n s  on each s id e  of
the  sean . The Inclusion  of zero w ith in  th i s  confidence In te rv a l is  
in te rp re te d  to  aean th a t  th e  response Is  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  
zero. Therefore, fo r exaap le , s in ce  DRCP f a l l s  w ith in  the  a rea  bounded 
by DRCPUB and DRCPLB which Includes zero  throughout th e  fo r ty -e ig h t  
aon th  fo re c a s t horizon, we conclude th a t  the  response of DRCP to  
Innovations In DDE? Is  not s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero.
Poin t e s t l a a te s  of the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  of DLIP a t t r ib u ta b le  
to  d e f ic i t s  vary f ro a  0.9 percen t In the  f i r s t  horizon to  2.6 In the 
tw en ty -fo u rth , t h i r ty - s ix th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. In a l l  c a se s  the 
r a t io  of the  po in t e s t l a a te  to  th e  s tan d a rd  e r ro r  in d ic a te s  th a t  the  
po in t e s t l a a te s  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  In s ig n if ic a n t a t  th e  5 and 10 percen t 
lev e ls . The p lo t of the  IRFs o f DLIP to  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tion
Innovation In DDEF to g e th e r w ith upper (DLIPUB) and lower CDL1PLB) 
bounds of confidence in te rv a ls  co n stru c ted  a s  d esc rib ed  fo r DRCP above 
is  shown in  the  second graph of fig u re  5.1. This shows th a t  th e re  Is  
no s ig n if ic a n t  response  of DLIP to  changes in  DDEF.
The VDCs of DLVPI In ta b le  5.1 show th a t  th e  po rtio n  o f I t s  
fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  th a t  can be a t tr ib u te d  to  Innovations In DDEF
I l l
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• I n  ta b le  5 .1  th e  f i r s t  row fo r  a h o rizo n  ( e g  12) I s  th e  p o in t 
e s t im a te  of th e  VDC fo r  th a t  h o rizo n  w hile th e  s ta n d a rd  e r r o r s  
a re  In  p a re n th e se s . A d d itio n a lly , a • in d ic a te s  s ig n if ic a n c e  a t  
th e  5 p e rc en t le v e l w hile  a ** in d ic a te s  s ig n i f ic a n c e  a t  th e  10 
p e rc e n t le v e l .
“■FBV s ta n d s  fo r  fo r e c a s t  e r r o r  v a r ia n c e .
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T a b le  5 . 1  c o n t ' d .  VDCs and S ta n d a r d  B rro r a
FEV Months E xp lained  by In n o v a tio n s  in
in  L a te r  DLBXP DOT AX DDBP DLX2 DRCP DLIP DLVPI
1 75. 7* 0. 3 23. 9* 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0
<3. 1) (0. 4) (3. 1> <0. 0) <0. 0) (0. 0) (0. 0)
12 64. 2* 4. 0 21. 1* 3. 4 1. 7 4. 6 1. 0
(5. 9) (2. 6) (3. 7) (2. 6) <2. 2) (3. 0) (1. 6)
24 63. 4* 4. 2 20. 1* 3. 8 1. 8 4. 9 1. 2
(6. 1> (2. 6) (3. 7) (2. 6) (2. 2) (3. 0) (1. 6)
36 63. 4* 4. 2 20. 1* 3. 6 1. 8 4. 9 1. 2
(6. 2) (2. 6) (3. 6) (2. 8) (2. 2) (3. 0) (1, 6)
46 63. 4* 4. 2 20. 1* 3. 8 1. 8 4. 9 1. 2
<6. 2) (2. 6) (3. 6) C2. 9) <2. 2) (3. 0) (1. 6)
1 0. 1 0. 2 1. 7 98. 0* 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0
(0. 9) (1. 1) (1. 8) (2. 3) (0. 0) (0. 0) (0. 0)
12 3. 0 2. 7 2. 7 70. 8* 2. 6 2. 4 15. 7*
(2. 3) <2. 9; (2. 0) 15. 9) (2. 1) (1. 8) <4. 9)
24 3. 3 3. 6 2. 9 67. 7* 3. 1 2. 7 16. 8*
(2. 4 > <4. 0) (2. 1) (6. 7) <2. 4) <1. 9) {5. 5)
36 3. 3 4. 2 3. 0 66. 9* 3. 1 2. 7 16. 8*
<2. 5) <4. 7) (2. 2) (7, 6) <2. 6) (2. 0) (5. 7)
46 3. 3 4. 2 3. 0 66, 9* 3. 1 2. 7 16. 8*
(2. 7) (5. 2) (2. 3) (8. 1) <2. 7) (2. 1) (5. 9)
1 0. 0 0. 4 0. 7 14. 3* 84. 6* 0. 0 0. 0
(0. 7) <1. 1) (1. 3) (4. 2) <4. 6) <0. 0) <0. 0)
12 1. 3 3. 4 1. 7 16. 1* 71. 0* 3. 9 2. 7
(2. 0) (2. 4) <1. 7) (3. 9) <5. 3) (2. 3) <2. 3)
24 1. 6 4. 8 2. 0 15. 8* 68. 7* 4. 0 3. 1
(2. 2) <3. 2) (1. 7) (3. 8) (5. 7) <2. 3) (2. 3)
36 1. 7 4. 6 1. 6 15. 8* 68. 6* 4. 0 3. 1
(2. 2) (3. 4) (1. 6> (3. 8) (5. 9) (2. 3) <2. 4)
46 1. 7 4. 8 2. 0 15. 7* 68. 6* 4. 0 3. 1
(2. 3) <3. 7) (1. 6) (3. 8) (6. 1) <2. 4) (2. 41
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T a b le  5 . 1  c o n t ' d .  VDCa and S ta n d a r d  E r r o r s
FEV Months 
In L a te r DLBXP
E xplained  by 
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v a rie s  from 2.9 p e rcen t In th e  f i r s t  horizon to  3.4 in  the  tw e lfth , and
4.7 In th e  tw en ty -fo u rth , th i r ty - s ix th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizon a . V hile 
our rough a  ensure of s ig n if ic a n c e  in d ic a te s  th a t  the  p o in t e s tim a te s  
fo r  the tw e lfth  through fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  f ro a  zero  a t  th e  10 p e rcen t lev e l, th e  magnitude 
of th e se  e f fe c ts  a re  so  s n a i l ,  i t  seems reasonab le  to  Judge then  to  be 
econom ically In s ig n if ic a n t. In ad d itio n  to  th e  VDCs, the  la  pulse 
responses of DLVPI to  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  shock to  DDBF to g e th er 
w ith the  upper (DLVPIUB) and lower (DLVPILB) bounds of th e  confidence 
in te rv a ls  co n stru c ted  a s  described  fo r D8CP above i s  p lo tted  in  th e  
th ird  graph in  fig u re  5.1. The p lo ts  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  response of 
DLVPI to  a s u rp r is e  In DDEF i s  in s ig n if ic a n tly  d if fe re n t  from zero 
throughout th e  fo r ty -e ig h t  month fo re c a s t horizon.
The r e s u l ts  ou tlined  above provide no support fo r  conventional 
macroeconomic models which su g g es t th a t  an Increase  in  d e f ic i t s  due to  
a sw itch  between lump-sum tax  and deb t finance  fo r  a given lev e l of 
expend itu res w ill have a s ig n if ic a n t ly  p o s it iv e  e f fe c t  on in te r e s t  
ra te s ,  output, and p r ic e s . These r e s u l t s  dem onstrate  th a t  DDEF had no 
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  on DBCP, DLIP, and DLVPI during  the  ln te rw ar period . 
This i s  c o n s is te n t w ith K cX lllln  and Beard (1986) who found no 
im portan t e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  on th e se  v a ria b le s  fo r a  sample period 
id e n tic a l to  th a t  used here. A dd itiona lly , the  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  paper 
a re  s im ila r  to  th a t  o f Bvans (1985;1987> who found no s ig n if ic a n tly  
p o s it iv e  e f fe c ts  o f d e f ic i t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s  fo r  sam ples th a t  Included 
the  ln te rw ar period . On th e  b a s is  o f th e  foregoing, i t  s a a a s
lie
reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  the  B lcardlan equivalence hy p o th esis  I s  not 
In c o n s is te n t w ith the  e s p l r ic a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  In th i s  paper 
fo r  the  ln te rw ar period .
B. Debt M onetization
In a re g le e  where the  deb t eo n e tlz a tlo n  hypo thesis  ho lds, one would 
expect th a t  wlthlD the  framework of the  VAR aodel used here 
Innovations In DDEF would account fo r a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  
percentage of th e  fo re c a s t e r ro r  va rian ce  in the  money supply (DLK2). 
A dd itionally , we would expect an unexpected one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tion  
Innovation in DDBP to  e l i c i t  a p o s itiv e ly  s ig n if ic a n t  response in  th e  
DLK2. Therefore, the  em p irica l v a l id i ty  of th is  hypo thesis  can be 
evaluated  by looking a t  the ap p ro p ria te  VDCs and IRFs. The VDCs fo r 
DLM2 presen ted  in ta b le  5.1 show th a t  the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  In 
DLM2 a t t r ib u ta b le  to  DDBF v a r ie s  from 1.7 percen t In the  f i r s t  horizon 
to  a maximum of 3.0 in the  fo r ty -e ig h th  horizon. F u rth e r, our rough 
measure of s ig n if ic a n c e  In d ic a te s  th a t  th e se  p o in t e s tim a te s  a re  not 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if f e r e n t  from zero a t  e i th e r  the  5 o r 10 percen t level. 
The po in t e s tim a te s  of the  Impulse resp o n ses  of DLX2 to  a one s tan d a rd  
d ev ia tio n  Innovation In DDBF to g e th e r w ith  confidence bands con stru c ted  
In a manner analogous to  th a t  d esc rib ed  In sec tio n  A above a re  
p resen ted  In fig u re  5.2. S ince th e  confidence bands include zero a t  a l l  
ho rizons, I t  I s  c le a r  th a t  impulse resp o n ses  of DLK2 to  s u rp r is e  
Innovations In DDEF a re  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  from zero fo r the  
e n t i r e  fo r ty -e ig h t  month fo re c a s t horizon.
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The foregoing a n a ly s is  p rov ides no sup p o rt fo r th e  debt 
a o n e tlz a tio n  hyp o th esis . This r e s u l t  I s  d ir e c t ly  c o n s is te n t w ith th e  
r e s u l ts  of Jo lnes (1085) and H cH illin  and Beard (1088) who fin d  no 
evidence of monetary accoeeodatlon  In th e  ln te rw ar period .
C. E ffe c ts  of Government E xpenditures
As noted In ch ap te r II, B arro 's  m arket c le a r in g  approach 
d is tin g u ish e s  between th e  e f fe c ts  of In c reases  In per»anen t and 
ten p o ra ry  government purchases. S ince tem porary purchases a re  usually
a sso c ia te d  w ith war cy c le s , we note th a t  th e  exclusion  o f war cycles
from the  sam ple used here a llow s us to  In te rp re t  innovations In DLBXP 
as  p rim arily  shocks to  permanent government purchases. Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory  Ignores the foregoing d is t in c t io n  and p o s tu la te s  
th a t  an Increase  In government purchases leads to  in c rease s  in  output, 
In te re s t  r a te s ,  and th e  general level of p r ic e s . On the  o th e r hand, the  
m arket c le a r in g  approach p re d ic ts  th a t  an Increase  in  permanent
purchases lead s  to  an Increase  In output, no e f fe c t  on In te re s t  r a te s ,  
and ambiguous e f fe c ts  on the  p rice  lev e l.
The VDCs of DRCP, DLIP, and DLVPI repo rted  In ta b le  5.1 In d ica te  
th a t  only a  sm all and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  In s ig n if ic a n t p o rtio n  of th e  
fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  In DRCP and DLVPI can be a t t r ib u te d  to  DLBXP. 
A much la rg e r  and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  p o rtio n  of th e  fo re c a s t 
e r ro r  variance  in DLIP th a t  ranges from 9.8 percen t In th e  tw e lfth
horizon, to  10.8 In th e  fo r ty -e ig h th  may be ass ig n ed  to  s u rp r is e s  in 
DLBXP. The IRPs and th e i r  corresponding  confidence bands p resen ted  In 
fig u re  5.3, In d ica te  th a t  the  responses o f DRCP and DLVPI to  DLBXP a re
1 ) 9
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I n i t ia l ly  p o s it iv e  bu t In s ig n if ic a n t throughout th e  fo r ty -e ig h t  aonth  
fo re c a s t horizon w hile th ose  of DLIP a re  s ig n if ic a n t ly  p o s it iv e  fro a  
about th e  second through th e  f i f t h  horizons, and in s ig n if ic a n tly
d if f e re n t  fro a  zero henceforth .
To the  ex ten t th a t  the  I n i t ia l  e f fe c ts  of DLBXP on DKCP, DLIP, and 
DLVPI a re  of the  c o rre c t s ig n , i t  Is  reasonab le  to  argue th a t  these  
r e s u l t s  a re  weakly c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  Keynesian view. This 
co n sis ten cy  i s  fu r th e r  re in fo rced  by th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  of the  
e f fe c ts  of DLBXP on DLIP. F u rth er, i t  Is  c le a r  th a t  th e  e a p lr lc a l  
r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  w ith  re sp ec t to  the  e f f e c ts  of DLBXP coincide
ex ac tly  w ith what one would expect under B arro 's  m arket c lea rin g  
approach. I t  Is  th e re fo re  reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  th e se  e a p lr lc a l  
r e s u l t s  a re  no t In c o n s is te n t w ith the  theory .
D. Role of Average Personal M arginal Tax Bates
The th e o re tic a l  d iscu ss io n  in  ch ap te r II Id e n tif ie d  th ree  
th e o re tic a l  approaches to  th e  aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  o f changes in
m arginal tax  r a te s .  These were the  Keynesian, Kanklw -  S u aaers , and 
a a rk e t c lea rin g  approaches. The Keynesian approach p re d ic ts  th a t  an 
in c rease  in m arginal ta x  r a te s  w ill lead to  a f a l l  in  output and 
ambiguous e f fe c ts  on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  th e  p ric e  lev e l, and the  r a te  of 
in f la t io n . The Xankiw -  S u a a e rs  framework p o s tu la te s  ambiguous 
e f fe c ts  an output, In te re s t  r a te s ,  the  p r ic e  lev e l, and th e  r a te  of
in f la tio n . In B arro 's  a a rk e t c le a rin g  approach th e  in c rease  In m arginal
tax  r a te s  lead s  to  f a l l s  in  output and the  a f te r - ta x  re a l r a te  of
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In te re s t  and ambiguous e f fe c ts  on th e  p ric e  lev e l, In f la tio n , and th e  
b e fo re -ta x  re a l r a te  of In te re s t .
As noted e a r l ie r ,  d a ta  c o n s tr a in ts  forced ue to  use th e  average 
m arginal tax  r a te  on personal lncoae to  the  exclusion  of m arginal tax  
ra te s  on co rp o ra te  lncoee. Consequently, th e  so d el used here does not 
cap tu re  the e f fe c ts  of Innovations In e a rg ln a l co rp o ra te  m arginal tax  
r a te s  on co rp o ra te  Investm ent behavior. This I s  an im portan t om ission 
s in ce  an overwhelming percentage of investm ent expend itu res Is  
undertaken by co rp o ra tio n s . I t  Is  th e re fo re  reasonab le  to  expect th a t  
the  response of aggregate  demand to  changes in  DNTAX w ill be much 
weaker than I t  would be i f  DNTAX inco rpo ra ted  changes In co rp o ra te  
lncoae tax es . In general th i s  means th a t  the  e a p lr lc a l  e f fe c ts  of 
DNTAX can be expected to  be s u b s ta n tia l ly  weaker than what the  
th e o re tic a l  models d iscu ssed  above would lead us to  expect.
Examination of th e  a p p ro p ria te  VDCs p resen ted  in ta b le  5.1 shows 
th a t  the  f ra c tio n  o f v a ria tio n  In DRCP a ss ig n a b le  to  Innovations in 
DNTAX v a rie s  from 0.4 percen t in the  f i r s t  horizon to  a maximum of
4.8 percen t In the  tw en ty -fo u rth , t h i r ty - s ix th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  
horizons. A dd itionally , our rough measure of s ig n if ic a n c e  In d ica tes  
th a t  th ese  p o in t e s tim a te s  a re  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  from zero. The 
impulse responses of DRCP to  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  In DNTAX 
to g e th e r w ith confidence bands co n stru c ted  as d escribed  In the  previous 
s e c tio n s  a re  p lo tte d  In the f i r s t  graph In fig u re  5.4. S ince the 
confidence bands include zero  fo r a l l  horizons, I t  Is  s a fe  to  conclude 
th a t  the  responses of DRCP to  DNTAX a re  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  from
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zero. This re s u l t  I s  not In c o n s is te n t w ith  any of th e  th e o re tic a l  
approaches considered  above.
As shown In ta b le  5 .1 , Innovations in DNTAX account fo r
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  p o rtio n s  of the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a riance  In 
DLIP th a t  ranges f ro a  10.0 percen t tw elve periods la te r  to  11.2 percen t 
by the  fo r ty -e ig h th  period . The ls p u lse  responses of DLIP to  DNTAX 
to g e th er w ith the  a p p ro p ria te  confidence In te rv a ls  a re  p lo tte d  In the  
second graph in fig u re  5.4. The p lo t shows th a t  a one s tandard  
d ev ia tio n  shock to  DNTAX e l i c i t s  a s ig n if ic a n t ly  p o s it iv e  response from 
DLIP fro a  the  e ig h th  through the  th ir te e n th  horlxons and no s ig n if ic a n t  
response henceforth . This re s u l t  Is  in c o n s is te n t w ith both the
Keynesian and Market c lea rin g  approaches; however, I t  i s  not
In c o n s is te n t w ith the  Nanklw - S u s se rs  model.
F in a lly , s ig n if ic a n t  p o rtio n s  of th e  fo re c a s t e r ro r  va rian ce  In 
DLVPI vary ing  f ro s  11.3 pe rcen t in  th e  tw e lfth  horizon to  17.4 In th e  
fo r ty -e ig h th , can be assigned  to  Innovations in  DNTAX. A dditionally , 
the  th ird  graph In fig u re  5.4 p lo ts  the  response  of DLVPI to  a one 
s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  shock to  DNTAX. The response Is  s ig n if ic a n t ly  
p o s itiv e  f ro a  th e  seven th  through the  n in e teen th  horizons and
in s ig n if ic a n t  everywhere e lse . The behavior of DLVPI i s  not 
in c o n s is te n t w ith th e  th e o re tic a l  approaches considered  above s in ce  a l l  
th re e  approaches f a l l  to  p re d ic t th e  e f fe c ts  o f ta x e s  on both th e  p rice  
level and the  r a te  of In f la tio n . Furtherm ore, the  p o s it iv e  e f fe c ts  of 
th e  In c rease  In DNTAX on both output and p r ic e s  I s  c o n s is te n t w ith the
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re a liz a tio n  of a p o s itiv e  e f fe c t  on agg regate  demand in  th e  Manklw -  
Summers framework.
E. B ffec te  of Mcmey Supply Shocks on th e  Kacroeconomy
T rad itio n a l Keynesian and M onetarist to g e th e r w ith th e  more recen t 
incom plete inform ation  r a t io n a l  ex p ec ta tio n s  and im perfec t m arkets 
ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  models a l l  In d ica te  th a t  money i s  n o n -neu tra l in  
the  sh o r t- ru n . T his means th a t  an in c rease  in  th e  money supply la  
expected to  cause an Increase  In output and p r ic e s  and a f a l l  in  
in te r e s t  r a te s  in th e  sh o r t- ru n . In the  long-run  money i s  g en era lly  
considered  to  be n e u tra l so  th a t  i t  has no e f fe c ts  on re a l v a ria b le s .
V lth ln  the  sp e c if ic  framework of th i s  ch ap te r, th e  th e o re tic a l  
views summarized above lead us to  expect th a t  th e  p o rtio n  of th e  
fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a rian ces  of DLIP, DRCP, and DLVPI a t t r ib u ta b le  to  
v a r ia tio n  in DLM2 should be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  and econom ically s ig n if ic a n t .  
A dd itionally , a s u rp r is e  innovation  in  DLM2 should e l i c i t  s ig n if ic a n t ly  
p o s itiv e  responses in DLIP and DLVPI and s ig n if ic a n t ly  negative 
responses from DRCP. Moreover, th e se  e f fe c ts  should be r e la t iv e ly  
s h o r t- l iv e d  re f le c tin g  the  long-run  n e u tra l i ty  of money.
The VDCs fo r DRCP rep o rted  in ta b le  5.1 show th a t  th e  fra c tio n  of 
i t s  fo re c a s t e r ro r  v a riance  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  DLM2 i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n t  fo r a l l  ho rizons and i s  14.3 p e rcen t in  th e  f i r s t  fo re c a s t 
horizon, reaches a peak of 16.1 in  th e  tw e lfth  horizon and f a l l s  to  15.7 
by the  fo r ty -e ig h th . A dd itiona lly , the  f i r s t  graph in  f ig u re  5.5 shows 
th a t  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  innovation  in  DLM2 e l i c i t s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  
negative  responses from DRCP in th e  f i r s t  and second months follow ing
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the  shock. F u rther, the  confidence bands Include zero in  a l l  o ther 
horizons In d ica tin g  th a t  th e  re s  ponses in  those  p e rio d s  a re  
in s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. These r e s u l t s  a re  no t in c o n s is te n t 
w ith the  theory  both w ith re sp e c t to  the  p e rs is te n c e  and d ire c tio n  of 
the  e f fe c ts  of DLK2 on DRCP.
In ta b le  5.1 the  VDCs rep o rted  fo r DLIP show th a t  th e  fra c tio n  of 
the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance  in  DLIP explained by v a r ia tio n  in DLM2 
ranges fro n  11.5 percen t in th e  f i r s t  horizon to  15.6 in  the  tw e lfth  
and f a l l s  to  14.9 p ercen t by th e  fo r ty -e ig h th  horizon. The p o in t 
e s t i a a te s  fo r a l l  horizons a re  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  th e  5 p e rcen t level. In 
ad d itio n  to  the  VDCs, th e  ISPs rep o rted  In the  second graph of f ig u re  
5.5 show th a t  DLIP's response to  a one s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n  shock to  
DLX2 i s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  p o s itiv e  in th e  f i r s t  and second a o n th s  follow ing 
the  shock, becoaes s ig n if ic a n t ly  negative  between th e  th ird  and f i f th  
a o n th s , and I s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  p o s itiv e  f ro a  the  seven th  through n in th  
a o n th s . In a l l  o th e r horizons the  responses were in s ig n if ic a n tly  
d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. S ince two out of th ree  of th e  s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  
a re  p o s it iv e  and th e re fo re  of expected s ig n , and s in ce  I t  I s  p o ssib le  
to  argue th a t  th e  s ig n if ic a n t  negative  e f fe c ts  between th e  th ir d  and 
f i f th  horizons r e f le c t  th e  dynaaic  response  of th e  s y s ts a  to  the  
i n i t i a l  f a l l  in DRCP and th a t  i t  subsequently  rebounds, i t  s e e a s  
reasonab le  to  argue th a t  th e se  r e s u l ts  a re  roughly c o n s is te n t w ith the  
theory .
The VDCs fo r DLVPI show th a t  the  p ercen t o f i t s  fo re c a s t e r ro r  
v a riance  explained  by v a r ia tio n  in  DLH2 v aried  f ro a  a low of 0.0 In th e
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f i r s t  horizon to  a maximum of 4.0 in  tha  fo r ty -e lg h th . Moreover, our 
rough measure of B lgnlflcanoe In d ic a te s  th a t  a l l  of th a  p o in t e s tim a te s  
were In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero . The corresponding  la p u lse  
responses to g e th e r w ith th e i r  confidence bands a re  rep o rted  In th a  Last 
graph In fig u re  5.5. V lth  th e  exception of a  m arg inally  s ig n if ic a n t  
p o s itiv e  e f fe c t  In the  f i r s t  fo re c a s t horizon, th e  confidence bands 
include zero a t  a l l  o ther horizons in d ic a tin g  th a t  th a  responses In 
those  horizons a re  in s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero . These r e s u l t s  
In d ica te  th a t  growth in th e  aoney supply  d id  not have auch e f fe c t  on 
p r ic e s  and the  r a te  of In f la tio n  during the  ln te rw ar period . However, 
the work of Friedman and Schwartz <1903) lead s  us to  expect auch 
s tro n g e r  e f fe c ts  on p ric e s .
Given the  n a tu re  of the  period under in v e s tig a tio n  In t h i s  
d is s e r ta t io n ,  I t  I s  in s tru c t iv e  to  exp lo re  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the  
see a ln g ly  anoaalous r e s u l t s  rep o rted  in the  preceding paragraph  aay  be 
re f le c t iv e  of the  p rev a ilin g  agg regate  supply curve. S p e c if ic a lly , If  
the  aggregate  supply curve was re la t iv e ly  f l a t  fo r a o s t  of th e  ln te rw ar 
period , shocks to  v a ria b le s  th a t  s h i f t  agg regate  demand and leave 
aggregate  supply  unchanged would have la rg e  e f fe c ts  on output and 
sm aller e f fe c ts  on th e  p r ic e  lev e l, and thereby , on in f la tio n . However, 
a shock lik e  an in c rease  in m arginal ta x  r a te s  which has the  p o te n tia l 
to  in c rease  aggregate  demand In the  Manklw - S u aaers  framework and 
which s h i f t s  th e  aggregate  supply curve Inwards w ill lead to  auch 
la rg e r Inc reases  In the  p ric e  level, and p o te n tia lly , In in f la t io n . In 
th is  reg ard , exam ination of th e  VDCs fo r DLVPI show th a t  shocks to
126
v a ria b le s  such a s  DLEXP and DLM2 which a re  expected to  a f f e c t  only 
aggregate  deeand, jo in t ly  account fo r  only 7.2 percen t o f th e  fo re c a s t 
e r ro r  variance  In DLVPI In th e  fo r ty -e ig h th  fo re c a s t horizon. Moreover, 
these  e f fe c ts  a re  In s ig n if ic a n tly  d if f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. In c o n tra s t  the  
percen t □! the  fo re c a s t e r ro r  variance In DLVPI explained by 
Innovations to  DMTAI Is  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  a l l  horizons and v a r ie s  fro a  
11.3 percen t In th e  tw e lfth  horizon to  17.4 p ercen t in th e  fo r ty -e ig h th . 
In l ig h t  of the  Manklw -  S u aaers  fraaew ork , th e se  r e s u l ts  appear to  be 
su p p o rtiv e  of the  view th a t  the  aggregate  supply curve fo r  th e  United 
S ta te s  during  th e  ln te rw ar period was ra th e r  f l a t  so  th a t  purely deoand 
shocks had very l i t t l e  e f fe c t  on th e  p ric e  level.
F. P o ten tia l Caveats
Several fa c to rs  req u ire  th a t  the  re s u l ts  p resen ted  here should  be 
In te rp re te d  w ith cau tion . The a o s t  obvious exaap le  I s  the 
In te rp re ta tio n  of th e  e f fe c ts  of average personal o a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  on 
the  aacroeconoay. S ince th e  aeasu re  employed Is  c le a r ly  not th e  Ideal 
aeasu re , th e re  Is  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the  r e s u l t s  a re  plagued by 
aea su rea e n t e r ro r . A dd itionally , the  absence of co rp o ra te  ta x e s  does 
no t allow  us to  fu lly  lnpoee the  world of lu ap  sua tax es  th a t  Barro 
envisioned  In b is  re s u s c i ta t io n  of the  R icard ian  equivalence hypo thesis.
All of th e se  cav ea ts  a s id e , I t  b ears  em phasizing th a t  th e  ln c lu  on of
a tax  aeasu re  In th i s  aodel Is  a s ig n if ic a n t  though Incom plete s te p  in 
the  r ig h t  d ire c tio n .
One of the assum ptions underly ing the  use o f tha  VAR aodel i s  th a t  
of s t ru c tu ra l  hoaogenlety  over the  s a a p le  considered . To th e  ex ten t
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th a t  th i s  assum ption t a i l s  to  approxim ate r e a l i ty ,  th e  r e s u l t s  derived  
ought to  be le s s  convincing. Therefore, I t  would be usefu l to  s p l i t  
th e  s a s p le  and e s tim a te  the  so d e l fo r both su b sa sp le s  and then  compare 
th e  r e s u l t s  a c ro ss  su b sa sp le s . If th e se  r e s u l t s  a re  s im ila r  to  those 
derived  fo r the  fu l l  sample, we could In te rp re t  th i s  a s  evidence In
support of s tru c tu ra l  homogenlety. However, due to  the  la rg e  number of 
param eters estim ated  in th i s  model I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  we would run out of 
degrees of freedom. A dd itionally , i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to  decide where 
to  s p l i t  the  sample s in c e  th e  ln te rw ar period was ch a rac te rized  by so 
many even ts  around which a s tru c tu ra l  s h i f t  could have occurred. V hlle 
th ese  problem s preclude d ire c t  evaluation  of the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of
s t ru c tu ra l  nonhoaogenlety, some in d ire c t  evidence may be brought to  
bear on th i s  question . S p e c if ic a lly , H cN illln and Beard (198B) using a 
sm alle r model than  th a t  employed here, found l i t t l e  change in th e i r  
r e s u l t s  when they s p l i t  a sample id e n tic a l to  th a t  used hare. This 
r e s u l t  appears to  t i l t  the  evidence in favo r of s t ru c tu ra l  homogenlety.
Hsaio <1979;1981) has sp ec if ie d  a procedure th a t  uses th e  FPE 
c r i te r io n  to  sp ec ify  th e  lag  len g th s  fo r  each v a ria b le  in each equation 
In a VAR aodel. T his procedure a llow s d if f e r e n t  v a r ia b le s  to  e n te r  
each equation  with d if f e r e n t  lag len g th s  and th e re fo re  sav es  degrees 
of freedom. As a fu r th e r  t e s t  of ro b u s tn e ss , I evaluated  th e  ro le  of
th e  f i s c a l  policy  v a ria b le s  w ith in  the  framework of a VAR of th e  type
proposed by Hsalo. In a l l  c a se s  the  r e s u l t s  were very s im ila r  to  th a t  
repo rted  fo r the  Sims system . This s im i la r i ty  w hile no t conclusive  is  
encouraging.
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V. Concluding C onsen ts
The foregoing a n a ly s is  uses a S ls s - ty p e  VAR to  evalua te  th e  ro le  
of f i s c a l  and Monetary policy  In the  ln te rw ar period . A tten tion  Is  
focused on the  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s ,  government expend itu res, average 
personal s a rg ln a l  tax  r a te s ,  and money on the  m acroeconosy. V lth ln  
the  c r e d ib i l i ty  bounds a r t ic u la te d  In the  previous sec tio n , sev e ra l 
e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  emerge.
D e fic its  a re  found to  have no s ig n if ic a n t  p o s itiv e  e f fe c ts  on 
In te re s t  r a te s ,  in d u s tr ia l  production , and p r ic e s . V hlle th ese  r e s u l t s  
a re  In c o n s is te n t w ith th e  conventional (Keynesian) th e o re tic a l  view, 
they a re  fu lly  c o n s is te n t w ith the  R icardian equivalence hypo thesis. 
A dd itiona lly , I find  no evidence of monetary accommodation in the 
ln te rw ar period .
Average personal m arginal tax  ra te s  were found to  have no
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  on In te re s t  r a te s  and sm all bu t s ig n if ic a n tly  
p o s it iv e  e f fe c ts  on in d u s tr ia l  production and th e  r a te  of In f la tio n . In 
comparing th e se  r e s u l ts  to  Keynesian p re d ic tio n s , we find  th a t  DXTAX's 
e f fe c t  on output Is  In c o n s is te n t, while I t s  e f fe c t  on In te re s t  r a te s  and 
the  r a te  of In f la tio n  a re  not In c o n s is te n t. F u rth e r, com parison to  the
p re d ic tio n s  of the  Manklw -  Summers aodel rev ea ls  th a t  the  behaviors
of ou tput, In te re s t  r a te s ,  and th e  r a te  of in f la tio n  a re  not
In c o n s is te n t. The resp o n ses  of both in te r e s t  r a te s  and p r ic e s  a re  not 
In c o n s is te n t w ith B arro 's  a a rk e t c le a r in g  approach. However, the  
p o s it iv e  response  of output I s  In c o n s is te n t w ith th i s  approach.
131
In ad d itio n  to  the  tax  e f fe c ts ,  we find  th a t  th a  e f fe c ts  of 
governaen t expend itu res a re  c o n s is te n t w ith B arro 's  s a r k e t  c lea rin g  
approach — when changes In government expend itu res can be 
In te rp re te d  a s  p e rsan e n t — and a re  weakly c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  so re  
t r a d i t io n a l  Keynesian approach. F u rther, th e  e f fe c ts  of soney supply 
shocks on output, in te r e s t  r a te s ,  and p r ic e s  a re  of expected s ig n  and 
d u ra tio n . The e f fe c ts  on DLVPI were s u rp r is in g ly  weak, but I t  appears 
reasonab le  to  argue th a t  th i s  was probably due to  a ra th e r  f l a t  
aggregate  supply curve during  the  ln te rw ar period .
The r e s u l ts  p resen ted  in th e  foregoing d iscu ss io n  allow  us to  sake  
soae com parisons asong th e  th e o re tic a l fraoew orks considered . In 
p a r t ic u la r ,  the  e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  generated w ith re sp ec t to  the  
e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  and governaen t expend itu res su g g ests  th a t  a Borrcr 
type model in which governaen t bonds a re  no t ne t w ealth p rovides a 
reasonably  c o n s is te n t exp lana tion  of th e  e a p lr lc a l  fa c ts .  To th e  
c o n tra ry , t r a d i t io n a l  models th a t  t r e a t  government bonds a s  n e t wealth 
f a l l  to  exp lain  th e  apparen t In s ig n ifica n ce  of d e f ic i t s  and a re  only 
weakly c o n s is te n t w ith th e  e a p l r lc l s a  on th e  e f fe c ts  of government 
expend itu res. Both the  Keynesian and m arket c lea rin g  approaches were 
unable to  exp la in  the  em p irica l e f fe c ts  of DHTAX; however, th ese  tax  
e f fe c ts  appeared to  be s o re  su p p o rtiv e  of th e  Hank lw-Suamers 
framework. In sum, I t  seems reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  the  em p irica l 
r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  In th i s  chap ter fo r the  ln te rw ar period  do not 
provide overwhelming support fo r any of the  th e o re tic a l  frameworks 
considered ; however, when taken a s  a whole I t  p rov ides more sup p o rt for
132
B arro 's  a a rk e t c lea rin g  approach when bonds a re  not n e t w ealth than  
fo r  any o ther th e o re tic a l  fraaew ork.
At le a s t  four d i s t in c t  c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  the  l i te r a tu r e  can be 
Id e n tif ied  f ro a  the  a n a ly s is  In th i s  paper. F i r s t ly ,  our focus on th e  
ln te rw ar period broadens the  scope of the  e a p lr lc a l  evidence in the  
aanner suggested by Brunner. Secondly, because Inclusion  of a tax  
aeasu re  In the  aodel aakes I t  le s s  su sc e p tib le  to  c r l t l c l s a  fo r  a a l t te d  
v a ria b le s  b ia s , theee  r e s u l t s  re in fo rc e  the  burgeoning l i te r a tu r e  In 
support of the equivalence h y po thesis . T h ird ly , un like a o s t  previous 
s tu d ie s  th a t  have eaployed VAR ao d els , the  conclusions a rr iv e d  a t  In 
th i s  ch ap te r have been teapered  by our p re sen ta tio n  of, and re lia n ce  
upon, oeasu res  of th e  p rec is io n  with which the  IRPs and VDCs have been 
e s t la s te d .  F in a lly , the  d eao n s tra ted  Im portance o f average personal 
a a rg ln a l tax  ra te s  In th i s  aodel su g g es ts  th a t  aodel b u ild e rs  seeking 
to  evalua te  the  e f fe c ts  of aacroeconoalc  policy  v a ria b le s  should 
Include a tax  aeasu re  In th e ir  ao d e ls . In s p i te  of th e se  co n trib u tio n s , 
I t  I s  In s tru c tiv e  to  note th a t  th is  re sea rch  agenda Is  not co ap le te . 
S p e c if ic a lly , a d d itio n a l re sea rch  e f f o r t  a u s t  be d ire c ted  a t  
dem onstrating  the  ro b u stn ess  of th e se  r e s u l t s  a c ro ss  e a p lr lc a l  
techn iques, t l a e  p e rio d s , and In s t i tu t io n a l  arrangem ents. More 
u rg en tly , fu r th e r  re sea rch  a t te n tio n  should be devoted to  c o n stru c tin g  
more coaprehenslve  tax  aeasu res .
CHAPTER VI
FIIAICIAL FACTORS AID AGGRBGATH HCOIOIIC ACTIVITT I I  THE 
IITERVAR PERIOD; AI BIPIRICAL AIALYSIS
I. In troduction
The purpose of th i s  chap ter I s  to  in v e s tig a te  the  aacroeconoalc  
ra le  of a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  during the  ln te rw ar period . V hlle 
the p r la a ry  e ap h a s ls  of th e  a n a ly s is  w ill be on the  independent 
nonaonetary  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on agg regate  econoalc a c t iv i ty ,  
s u b s ta n tia l  a t te n tio n  w ill be focused on the  Banner in  which the  proxy 
fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  in te ra c ts  w ith o ther v a ria b le s  In the aodel. In 
th is  regard , I t  w ill be in s tru c tiv e  to  explore  how th e  inc lusion  of the  
proxy a f fe c ts  the  r e s u l ts  in the  prev ious ch ap te r e sp e c ia lly  w ith 
re sp ec t to  hypotheses such a s  debt a o n e tlz a tio n  and R icardian 
equivalence. A dd itiona lly , the  c ro s s  aodel behav ior of tax es , 
governaen t spending, and the  aoney supply w ill be a key focus of the  
d iscu ss io n .
The need to  analyze the  aacroeconoalc  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  
i s  a c tiv a te d  by a burgeoning th e o re tic a l l i te r a tu r e  th a t  id e n t i f ie s  an 
la p o r ta n t  ro le  fo r f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  In the  d e te ra ln a tlo n  of the  level 
of aggregate  econoalc a c t iv i ty .  As noted in ch ap te r III , th i s  Increased 
a tte n tio n  Is  a o tlv a te d  In la rg e  p a r t  by the  fa i lu re  of t ra d i t io n a l  
ao d e ls  - -  which a ssu ae  th a t  fin a n c ia l e f fe c ts  a re  adequately captured 
by the  aoney supply and an in te r e s t  r a te  - -  to  s u f f ic ie n tly  explain  
aacroeconoalc  f lu c tu a tio n s  such a s  th e  G reat D epression.
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V hile the  th e o re tic a l l i te r a tu r e  has p rogressed  ra th e r  ra p id ly , the 
e a p lr lc a l  work on th is  Issue  Is  a t  b e s t  sp a rse  (see se c tio n  IV of
ch ap te r I I I ) . Perhaps th e  s o s t  notew orthy study  In t h i s  a rea  i s  the 
work of Bernanke (1963) who d e ao n s tra te d  th a t  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  had a 
s u b s ta n tia l  nonaonetary  ro le  In the  d e te ra in a tlo n  of aggregate  a c t iv i ty  
during the  G reat D epression. However, and a s  noted In ch ap te r III, 
before Bernanke's r e s u l ts  can be construed  a s  conclusive  evidence In
support of the f in a n c ia l ~ fa c to rs  -  m atter hypo thesis , a t  le a s t  th ree  
cav ea ts  should be noted. F i r s t ly ,  by using  a s in g le  equation aodel, 
Bernanke Im p lic it ly  assum es th a t  money and h is  proxy fo r f in a n c ia l 
c r l s l6  a re  exogenous to  output. Secondly, and follow ing Lutkephol
(1982), I t  seems a p p ro p ria te  to  examine th i s  issu e  In an expanded 
framework th a t  Includes o th e r im portan t macro v a ria b le s  lik e  the
In te re s t  ra te , p r ic e s , e tc . F in a lly , s in ce  Bernanke's re sea rch  was 
p rim arily  concerned w ith the  G reat D epression, I t  Is  In s tru c tiv e  to
In v e s tig a te  the  a p p lic a b il i ty  of h is  r e s u l ts  to  longer pe rio d s  and 
d if fe re n t  e ra s .
The a n a ly s is  of th i s  ch ap te r av o id s  making p o ssib ly  spurious 
assum ptions about the  exogenlety o r endogenlety of th e  v a r ia b le s  th a t  
e n te r th e  model by using a vecto r au to reg re ss io n  of the  type suggested 
by Sims (1980a) and reviewed In ch ap te r IV. A dd itiona lly , a  much wider 
a rray  of v a ria b le s  than  th a t  which en tered  th e  ao d el in Bernanke
(1983) e n te rs  th e  VAR aodel used here. This i s  In o rd e r to  avoid the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of om itted v a ria b le s  b ia s  and to  allow  us to  analyze the
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ro b u s tn e ss  of th e  r e s u l ts  p resen ted  in ch ap te r V to  th e  in c lu sion  of a 
proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .
In a d d itio n  to  th e  above c o n sid e ra tio n s , th e  a n a ly s is  in th i s  
ch ap te r Is  fu r th e r  d is tin g u ish ed  from th a t  in  Bernanke by our choice of 
the  ln te rw ar period  — defined  a s  July 1921 to  June 193B - -  a s  the  
a p p ro p ria te  saa p le . The use of t h i s  broader s a s p le  say  allow  us to  
d e te rn ln e  w hether Bernanke's r e s u l t s  were s a s p le  s p e c if ic . In ad d itio n  
to  the  J u s t if ic a t io n s  provided fo r th e  choice of th i s  period in e a r l ie r  
ch ap te rs , I t  bears  e sp h as lz ln g  th a t  the  ln te rw ar period was 
ch a rac te rized  by ex ten siv e  v o la t i l i ty  in  the  f in a n c ia l s e c to r  and as  
such Is  a n a tu ra l sample w ith in  which to  examine the  Issues of concern 
here.
In what fo llow s, I sp ec ify  the  aodel used in sec tio n  II w hile in 
se c tio n  111 I d e sc rib e  the  e a p lr lc a l  aethodology eaployed. Section  IV 
Is devoted to  the  p re sen ta tio n  and In te rp re ta tio n  of th e  e a p lr lc a l  
r e s u l t s  while in sec tio n  V, the  conclusions drawn fro a  the  a n a ly s is  a re  
summarized.
II. Xodel S p ec ific a tio n
In accordance w ith the  d iscu ss io n  in ch ap te r V, the  a n a ly s is  In 
th i s  c h ap te r assumes th a t  th e  aacroeconoay i s  adequately  summarized by 
an e ig h t v a ria b le  vecto r p rocess. The v a ria b le s  th a t  d efine  the  v ecto r 
p ro cess  a re  the  in te r e s t  ra te , the  money supply , d e f ic i t s ,  governaent 
ex p end itu res , p r ic e s , in d u s tr ia l  production , average personal m arginal 
tax  r a te s ,  and a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  o f th e  type d esc rib ed  in  
ch ap te r I I I . The UBe of th i s  vecto r p rocess approach a llow s us to
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avoid aasu a ln g  th a t  v a r ia b le s  auch a s  aoney and th e  proxy fo r 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  are  exogenous a s  I s  done in  Bernanke (1983).
In l ig h t  ol the  d iscu ss io n  p resen ted  In c h a p te rs  IV and V about the 
f a c to rs  which should be considered  In choosing th e  v a ria b le s  th a t  en te r 
the  VA8 ao d el, the  v a r ia b le s  th a t  d e fin e  the  v ec to r p rocess In th is  
ch ap te r were chosen fo r th e  follow ing reasons. The ra te  of in te re s t  
and the  proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  were chosen to  su a a a r lz e  co n d itio n s  
in the f in a n c ia l a a rk e ts . This d i f f e r s  f ro a  the  aodel in the  previous 
ch ap te r In th a t  the  f in a n c ia l a a rk e t d e sc r ip tio n  is  augmented by the  
Inclusion  of a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  F u rth er, the  s t a t e  of the  
goods a a rk e t i s  re f le c te d  by In d u s tr ia l  production and p ric e s . 
A dd itiona lly , and a s  In ch ap te r V, th e  s tan ce  of ao netary  po licy  Is  
su aa a rlz ed  by the  aoney supply while f i s c a l  po licy  Is  Ind ica ted  by 
governaen t expend itu res, d e f ic i t s ,  and average personal a a rg in a l tax  
r a te s .  With th e  excep tion  of th e  proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s ,  the  
e a p lr lc a l  co u n te rp a rts  fo r th ese  v a ria b le s  a re  a s  described  in chap ter 
V.
In o rder to  d isc u ss  a proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  a ean ln g fu lly , I t  
Is  In s tru c tiv e  to  p re c ise ly  In d ica te  what c o n s t i tu te s  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  
T herefore, fo r the  purposes of th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  and a s  In Bernanke 
(1933), f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  invo lves two major components. These are: (a) 
lo ss  of confidence in f in a n c ia l In s t i tu t io n s  (p a r tic u la r ly  banks) and 
w idespread fe a r  of runs on th e  p a r t of banks th a t  lead s  to  severe  
c re d i t  ra tio n in g  and d is in te rm e d ia tio n  a s  banks make p o r tfo lio  
s u b s t i tu t io n s  away fro a  loans In to  s a fe r  a s s e ts  such a s  governaen t
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bonds and axce66 re se rv e s ; and (b) w idespread borrower Insolvency and 
erosion  of d e b to rs ' c o l la te r a l  r e la t iv e  to  tb e l r  deb t burdens th a t  
hampers th e ir  a b i l i ty  to  secure  bank c re d it  and to  In v es t In p ro f ita b le  
p ro je c ts . Since a usefu l proxy s u e t  be linked In so ae  Id e n tif ia b le  
way to  th e  v a ria b le  fo r which I t  s ta n d s , I t  i s  Im perative th a t  we 
understand  the  manner In which f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  a f fe c ts  the  economy. 
While the  a n a ly s is  In ch ap te r III goe6 a long way In th i s  reg ard , a 
c lo se r  look a t  Bernanke's percep tion  of the  manner in which f in a n c ia l 
c r i s i s  a ffec ted  the  economy during the  G reat D epression should fu r th e r  
c la r i fy  th i s  issue .
Bernanke <1983) argues th a t  banks face two ty p es  of borrow ers, 
namely, good and bad. However, because of In fo rm ational Im perfections 
banks a re  unable to  d is tin g u ish  the  good from the  bad. Therefore, 
banks Incur c o s ts  due to  th e i r  ex -an te  evalua tion  and ex poet 
m onitoring of borrow ers and c o s ts  due to  expected lo s se s  from loans 
made to  bad borrow ers. Bernanke In te rp re ts  th e se  c a s ts  a s  th e  c o s t  of 
t r a n s fe r r in g  funds from u ltim ate  s a v e rs /le n d e rs  (bank d e p o s ito rs )  to  
worthy borrow ers and c a l l s  I t  the c o s t of c re d i t  In term ed ia tion  (CCI). 
Banks, In p u rsu it of th e ir  p ro f i t  maximization ob jec tive , develop 
e x p e r tise  a t  evalua ting  p o te n tia l borrow ers, e s ta b lis h  long-term  
re la tio n s h ip s  w ith custom ers, and o f fe r  loan c o n tra c ts  th a t  induce 
p o te n tia l borrow ers to  s e l f  s e le c t  in the  manner d escribed  in Jaffee  
and R ussell (1970) and In S t lg l l t z  and V elss (1981). These 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of bank o p era tio n s  se rv e  to  a l le v ia te  o r a d ju s t f a r  the 
aforem entioned In fo rm ational asymmetry and thereby minim izes the  CCI.
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Therefore, any event th a t  d is ru p ts  hanks' a b i l i ty  to  perform In th ese  
ways or th a t  exacerb a tes  the  in fo rm ational problem lead s  to  in c reases  
in the  CCI. I t  i s  c le a r  fron  the foregoing d iscu ss io n  th a t  f in a n c ia l 
c r i s i s  as defined In a previous paragraph  leads to  In c reases  in the  
CCI. So, fo r exaople , the  erosion  of d e b to rs ' c o l la te r a l  re la t iv e  to  
deb t burden caused by the  un an tic ip ated  p rice  d e fla tio n  of the  Great 
Depression increased  th e  re a l value of deb t, which led to  h igher 
s o n lto r ln g  c o s ts  and thereby Increased  th e  CCI. Therefore, i t  i s  
reasonab le  to  argue th a t  the CCI is  a s u f f ic ie n t  e u u a r y  of the  degree 
of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  S ince th e  CCI Is  not observable, a  proxy fa r  I t  
■ay e ffe c tiv e ly  cap tu re  the  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .
i t  the  a o s t  general level a t  le a s t  two b asic  c r i t e r ia  may be 
id e n tif ie d  in d e fin in g  the  id ea l proxy fo r an unobservable v a riab le . 
These are: (a) the  proxy should be Influenced in  a r a th e r  p re d ic tab le  
fash ion  by the s e t  of shocks th a t  Influence the  unobservable v a riab le ; 
and (b) the  proxy should not be Influenced by shocks th a t  have no 
Influence on the unobservable v a riab le . I t  should be noted, however, 
th a t  th ese  c r i t e r i a  a re  indeed very s t r in g e n t  and may well Bake i t  
Im possible to  find  an Ideal proxy. Therefore, th e  sea rch  fo r an 
accep tab le  proxy Is  freq u en tly  an a ttem p t to  find  a v a ria b le  which 
cones as c lo se  a s  p o ss ib le  to  f u l f i l l in g  the  a fo reaen tlo n ed  c r i t e r ia .  
Because of the  d if f ic u l ty  Involved in p ick ing  the  "best" proxy, i t  Is  
not uncoaaon fo r the  a n a ly s t to  pick sev e ra l p ro x ies  and p resen t 
r e s u l t s  fo r a l l  of them.
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In accordance w ith th e  above c r i t e r i a ,  the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  
between Baa co rp o ra te  and long-term  U.S. government bonds was se lec ted  
to  proxy fo r the  CCI and thereby fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  during  the  period 
under co n sid e ra tio n . In o rder to  dem onstrate  adherence to  c r i te r io n  
(a) above, I t  Is  im portan t to  explore the  th e o re tic a l lin k ag es  betweeen 
the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  and the  CCI, and, thereby , f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  As 
d iscussed  in ch ap te r III and noted in Bernanke and B linder <1986), 
shocks to  the f in a n c ia l system  such a s  a perceived in c rease  in  the 
r is k in e s s  of bank loans or w idespread fea r of runs, w ill Induce banks 
to  make p o r tfo lio  s u b s t i tu t io n s  away from loans and lower grade 
s e c u r i t ie s  In to  excess re se rv es  and s a fe r  co rpo ra te  o r government 
bonds. These s u b s t i tu t io n s  widen the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  so  th a t  i t s  
s iz e  can be construed  as a reasonab le  In d ic a to r  of the  degree of 
fin a n c ia l c r i s i s .  F u rther, s in c e  the  CCI Inc reases  a s  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  
worsens, i t  Is  reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  th e  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  and 
the CCI w ill tend to  move to g e th e r. S ince banks undertake the 
aforem entioned s u b s t i tu t io n s  In order to  achieve s a fe r  and more liq u id  
p o r tfo lio s , I t  is  In s tru c tiv e  to  note th a t  th e  opportun ity  c o s ts  of th is
s a fe ty  o r l iq u id ity  a re  the  h igher r a te s  of re tu rn  th a t  they  forego.
This of course Is  an ad d itio n  to  the  CCI. On the  borrower s id e  of th i s
problem, In d iv id u a ls  and firm s w ill draw down th e i r  demand and t in e
d e p o sits  due to  lack of confidence in banks and In vest in s a f e r  a s s e ts  
such a s  government bonds and cash. To the  ex ten t th a t  they In v es t In 
sa fe  government bonds the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  w ill widen. More 
fundam entally, however, the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  Is  In d ica tiv e  of the  level
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of d e fau lt r is k  th a t  economic ag en ts  perceive. S ince many of the  
models d iscussed  In ch ap te r 111 p o s tu la te  a d ire c t  re la tio n s h ip  
betweeen borrow er's  ne t worth or c o l la te r a l  and d e fa u lt p ro b a b il i t ie s ,  
and s in ce  c o l la te r a l  is  d ir e c t ly  re la te d  to  f in a n c ia l cap ac ity  and the  
a b i l i ty  to  undertake Investm ent expend itu res, I t  seems reasonab le  to  
argue th a t  movement In th e  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  may be In d ica tiv e  of the 
e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r lB is  on borrower balance sh ee t p o s itio n s . In 
l ig h t  of the  foregoing argum ents, I t  is  reasonab le  to  argue th a t  the 
choice of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  a s  the  a p p ro p ria te  proxy i s  c o n s is te n t 
w ith the  f i r s t  c r i te r io n  d iscu ssed  in th e  p rev ious p arag raph .'
As noted by Bernanke (1983), a p o te n tia l drawback to  using the 
y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  a6 a proxy fo r  the  CCI was th a t  the  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  may r e f le c t  pure f in a n c ia l m arket a n tic ip a tio n  of changes 
In fu tu re  output, and a s  such, i t s  use a s  a proxy fo r the  CCI would not
'A p o te n tia l problem with the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa and long­
term US government bonds Is  th a t  co rp o ra te  bonds a re  gen era lly  
co n v e rtib le  w hile government bonds a re  no t. The c o n v e r t ib i l i ty  of 
co rp o ra te  bonds means th a t  they w ill s e l l  a t  premium In o rder to  
r e f le c t  th e  value o f th e  option to  convert In to  sh a re s  of s to ck  in  the  
even t th a t  the  conversion  p rice  Is  exceeded by the  s to c k 's  m arket 
value. (See Tan Horne (1984, pp. 249-271) fo r an in tu i t iv e  d e sc rip tio n  
of th is  e f fe c t .)  S ince US government bonds a re  not co n v e rtib le , 
comparing these  y ie ld s  may be a l i t t l e  tenuous. However, s in ce  th e  
d e sc rip tio n  of th e se  s e r ie s  a t  th e i r  source does not c le a r ly  in d ic a te  
th a t  the co rp o ra te  s e r ie s  used was a c tu a lly  c o n v e rtib le , th e re  Is  some 
doubt a s  to  the  re levance  of th i s  issu e . In o rder to  ad d ress  th ese  
concerns, I e stim ated  the  model and ca lcu la ted  variance  decom positions 
using the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa and Aaa co rp o ra te  bonds. The 
r e s u l ts  derived  were v ir tu a l ly  Id e n tic a l to  th a t  derived  using the  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa and long term  US government bonds. F u rther, 
s in ce  one of our key concerns Is  to  cap tu re  the  e f fe c ts  of bank 
s u b s t i tu t io n  of s a f e r  and more liq u id  a s s e ts  fo r r e la t iv e ly  r is k y  and 
le s s  liq u id  a s s e ts ,  th e  choice of th e  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa 
co rp o ra te  and th e  u ltim ate ly  sa fe  and m arketable US government bonds 
appears to  be ap p ro p ria te .
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be c o n s is te n t w ith the  second of the  two c r i t e r i a  d iscu ssed  above. 
V hlle th i s  observation  nay Indeed be c o rre c t , we argue below th a t  
a l te rn a t iv e  p ro x ies  considered  a re  In general su b jec t to  th e  san e  
c r l t i c l s n .  Therefore, while th is  Is  c le a r ly  an Im portant co n sid e ra tio n , 
I t  does not allow  us to  d is tin g u ish  anong a l te rn a t iv e  p rox ies. In
order to  fu r th e r  c la r i f y  th i s  p o in t and to  d is tin g u is h  the  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  fro n  o th e r a l te rn a t iv e s ,  I t  I s  in s tru c t iv e  to  exanine the 
a l te rn a t iv e  p rox ies used by Bernanke.
Bernanke used p ro x ies  of two g enera l types. F i r s t ly ,  he used the
d e p o s its  of fa l l in g  banks and the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  b u sin esses  to
cap tu re  the e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  In the banking s y s te a  and of 
the  deb t c r i s i s  anong borrow ers. These p rox ies  a re  assuned to  Jo in tly  
cap tu re  the  to ta l  e f fe c t  on the  CCI and thereby on nacroeconoalc
a c t iv i ty .  Secondly, he used the  growth r a te  of bank loans and the
d if f e r e n t ia l  between the  y ie ld s  on Baa co rp o ra te  bonds and on long te rn  
US governnent bonds. These p rox ies a re  assuned to  s in g ly  cap tu re  the 
to ta l  e f fe c t  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on the  CCI and thereby  on re a l
a c t iv i ty .  I t  should be noted th a t ,  perhaps In an a ttem p t to  nore
c lo se ly  confo rn  w ith the  second c r i t e r i a  l i s te d  in the  previous
paragraph, Bernanke used only the f i t t e d  s e r ie s  from a re g re ss io n  of 
the  r a te  of growth of bank loans on the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  banks 
and b u sinesses. However, he p resen ted  re s u l ts  fo r th e  pure y ie ld
d if f e r e n t ia l  and fo r the  f i t t e d  s e r ie s  derived  fro n  a re g re ss io n  of the
y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  on the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  banks and bu sin esses . 
S ince Bernanke placed such g re a te r  e n p h as ls  on the  r e s u l t s  he obtained
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using d e p o s its  of fa l l in g  banks and the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  
b u sin esses , and s in ce  he sade  no a ttem p t to  remove extraneous e f fe c ts  
a s  he d id  w ith the  growth r a te  of bank loans and the  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l ,  I t  Is  in s tru c t iv e  to  exaa lne  th ese  measures In l ig h t  of 
the c r i t e r i a  la id  out above.
The d ep o sits  of fa l l in g  banks Is  intended to  cap tu re  th e  e f fe c ts  of 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on bank behavior and perform ance. V hlle th i s  s e r ie s  
c ap tu res  or Is  h igh ly  c o rre la te d  w ith the c re d it  c o n tra c tio n  th a t  
re su lte d  from bank f a i lu re s , I t  does not cap tu re  the  c re d i t  ra tio n in g  
behavior of banks th a t  remained so lv en t. This I s  an im portan t 
om ission, s in ce  a s  shown In Bernanke and B linder (1988), shocks to  
c re d i t  supply Induce p o r tfo lio  s u b s t i tu t io n s  away from loans in to  
excess re se rv es  o r sa fe  bonds and u ltim a te ly  a f fe c t  aggregate  demand. 
I t  is  th e re fo re  reasonab le  to  conclude th a t th e  d e p o s its  o f f a l l in g  
banks do not com pletely cap tu re  the  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  from 
the  s tan d p o in t of banks.
i s  ou tlined  in ch ap te r 111, Bernanke and G e rtle r  (1989) and G ertla r 
and Hubbard (1988) p re sen t models th a t  c le a r ly  dem onstrate  th a t  the  
e ro sio n  of borrow ers ' c o l la te r a l  r e la t iv e  to  th e i r  debt burdens makes 
th e i r  financing  c o n s tr a in ts  more binding , low ers th e i r  Investm ent 
spending, and has macroeconomic e f fe c ts  even If they  manage to  avoid 
bankruptcy. S ince the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  busin esses  Is  intended to  
summarize the  borrow er's s id e  of the  fin a n c ia l c r i s i s ,  I t  I s  reasonab le  
to  req u ire  th a t  I t  cap tu re  both the  s t a t e  of borrower inso lvency and 
the  e rosion  of d e b to rs ' c o l la te r a l  re la t iv e  to  th e i r  debt burden.
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However, s in ce  only th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  of f a i l in g  b u sin esses  a re  Included, 
i t  does not cap tu re  th ese  a f fe c ts  fo r f l r s s  th a t  re a a ln  so lv en t.
The c u su la tlv e  im plica tion  of the  d iscu ss io n  In the  above
paragraphs Is  th a t  the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa i l in g  banks and b u sin esses  w ill 
Jo in tly  f a l l  to  cap tu re  so ee  Im portant e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  
Therefore, tak ing  th e  p red ic ted  values of the  growth r a te  of bank loans 
and the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  f r o s  re g re ss in g  th ese  v a ria b le s  a g a in s t the  
l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  banks and busin esses  w ill a lso  omit Im portant 
a sp ec ts  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .
i t  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  level, use of the  f i t t e d  values mentioned above 
In an output equation may pose generated  re g re sso r problem s of th e
type d iscu ssed  in Pagan (1984). S p e c if ic a lly , Pagan In v e s tig a te s  the
econom etric p ro p e r tie s  of e s tim a to rs  ob tained  from re g re ss io n s  w ith 
re g re s so rs  th a t  have been generated  from tak in g  th e  p red ic ted  value 
from a p r io r  re g re ss io n . The two p rin c ip le  is su es  analyzed by Pagan 
a re  the  co n sis ten cy  and e ff ic ie n c y  of the  e s tim a to rs  and the  v a lid i ty  
of the  In ferences th a t  may be made w ith the  s tan d a rd  e r ro r s  from the  
second s ta g e  reg re ss io n . He no tes th a t  most two s te p  e s tim a to rs  of the  
type under d iscu ss io n  here a re  c o n s is te n t and e f f ic ie n t  but f a l l  to  
p rovide v a lid  in fe ren ces , id d l t lo n a l ly ,  he recommends jo in t  e stim atio n  
of the equations Involved using maximum llk llh o o d  methods In o rd e r to  
Improve the  In fe re n tia l  p ro p e r tie s  of the  e s tim a to r . S ince Bernanke's 
a ttem p t to  remove ex traneous e f fe c ts  from the  growth r a te  of bank 
loans and from th e  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  Is  an a ttem p t to  generate
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re g re s so rs , the  use of th ese  generated re g re s so rs  in troduces problem s 
of the  type d iscussed  In Pagan.
Since Bernanke a lso  used the  ac tu a l s e r ie s  fo r  th e  y ie ld
d if f e r e n t ia l ,  i t  i s  in s tru c tiv e  to  c r i t i c a l ly  examine why he d id  n o t
consider I t  to  be a s  good a proxy a s  the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  banks
and bu sin esses  taken jo in tly . In th i s  regard  he expressed  two
p rin c ip le  re s e rv a tio n s  about the  e ffe c tiv e n e ss  of th e  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l
as a proxy fo r the CCI, and thereby , fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  The f i r s t  of
these  cen tered  upon th e  lin k  between h is  th e o re tic a l c o n s tru c t and th e
asso c ia ted  e a p l r lc l s a .  S p e c if ic a lly , in a t te a p tln g  to  generate  th e
uniqueness of bank a s s e ts  and thereby  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  d is ru p tio n s
in the  banking system  w ill have re a l e f fe c ts ,  Bernanke assumed th a t
banks have unique access  to  c e r ta in  p ro je c ts  because bank custom ers a re
sm all and do not have access  to  open m arket c re d i t .  Consequently in
evaluating  the  ap p ro p ria ten ess  of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  as a proxy fo r
the CCI, Bernanke argues th a t  i t  i s  not c o n s is te n t w ith b is  s to ry .
However, in  a la te r  study  Bernanke and G e rtle r (1987 pp. 91) make th e
follow ing observation .
" The sp ec ia ln e ss  of bank a s s e ts ,  due to  th e  exclu sive  access  
of banks to  a c la s s  of p ro je c ts , i s  obviously  going to  be an 
Im portant reason why changes in the  level of in te rm ed ia tion  
w ill have re a l e f fe c ts  in th i s  a n a ly s is . Vhat i s  Im portant 
here, however, i s  not th a t  th e  banking system  has unique 
access to  c e r ta in  p ro jec ts ; ra th e r  only th a t  s p e c ia liz a tio n  
g ives banks some c o s t advantage, perhaps only a tem porary one, 
In making c e r ta in  types of loans. There i s  co n sid erab le  
evidence th a t  th i s  lending advantage, re f le c te d  in  the 
Im perfect s u b s t i tu ta b i l i ty  between c e r ta in  types of bank loans 
and open m arket c re d i t ,  i s  an im portan t c h a r a c te r is t ic  of 
banking, (see, e.g., Fama(1985).1"
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Given the  above quote, I t  seems reasonab le  to  suggest th a t  I t s  au th o rs  
would not ob ject to  the  p ro p o sitio n  th a t  Bernanke's <1933) assum ption 
Is  perhaps too r e s t r ic t iv e .
Bernanke's second re se rv a tio n  about the  ap p ro p ria ten ess  of the  
y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  a s  a proxy fo r the  CCI wa6 th a t  the  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  nay r e f le c t  pure f in a n c ia l n a rk e t a n tic ip a tio n  of changes 
in fu tu re  output. V hlle I t  Is  d i f f i c u l t  to  d e te rn ln e  which of these  
re s e rv a tio n s  Bernanke considered  to  be n o s t d e b il i ta t in g , th i s  second 
re se rv a tio n  appears to  have co n trib u ted  s u b s ta n tia l ly  to  b is  choice of 
p re fe rred  proxy. In p a r t ic u la r ,  w hile Bernanke recognized the  
p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  h is  p re fe rred  p rox ies may a lso  r e f le c t  a n tic ip a to ry  
output e f fe c ts ,  he argued th a t  b u siness b ankrup tc ies  a re  a o re  lik e ly  due 
to  p a s t b u siness  co n d itio n s  than  to  a n tic ip a tio n s  of unfavorable 
c o n d itio n s  in the  fu tu re . F u rther, he no tes th a t  Friedman and Schwartz, 
anong o th e rs , have documented s p e c if ic  even ts  th a t  p re c ip ita te d  bank 
runs. Therefore, he argues th a t  I t  i s  lik e ly  th a t  bank fa i lu re s  a re  
roughly Independent of ex p ec ta tio n s  of fu tu re  output and th a t  fa c to rs  
o ther than  cu rre n t and p a s t output perform ance con trib u ted  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  to  bank fa ilu re s . However, in la te r  papers, Bernanke and 
G e rtle r (1967,1939) c o n s tru c t th e o re tic a l models in which the  q u a lity  
and q u an tity  of in te rm ed ia tio n  th a t  banks a re  ab le  to  perform depends 
on th e i r  level of In s id e r c a p ita l  w hile f irm s ' f in a n c ia l c a p a c it ie s  a re  
dependent on th e ir  net worth p o s itio n s . Along the  same lin e s , G ertle r 
and Hubbard (1966) c o n s tru c t a two period model in which a f irm 's  ne t 
worth p o s itio n  is  equal to  the  sum of I t s  liq u id  a s s e t  p o s itio n  In the
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I n i t i a l  period and the  p re sen t value of I t s  col la te ra l lz a b le  expected 
fu tu re  p r o f i t s  In the  subsequent period . To the  e x ten t th a t  expected 
fu tu re  p r o f i ts  depend on expected output, I t  nay be argued th a t  the 
d e p o s its  of fa l l in g  banks and the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa l l in g  busin esses  
r e f le c t  a n tic ip a te d  output f lu c tu a tio n s . Therefore, the  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  
any of the  p rox ies considered  here say  r e f le c t  fu tu re  output novenents 
does not appear to  provide s u f f ic ie n t  b a s is  upon which one proxy say  
be chosen over ano ther.
The foregoing d iscu ss io n  on the  p rox ies considered  by Bernanke has 
a ttem pted to  c r i t i c a l ly  evaluate  th e  ap p ro p ria ten ess  of th e se  p rox ies 
fo r the  purpose a t  hand. V lth re sp e c t to  the  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa ilin g  
banks and b u s in esses , we have shown th a t  th ese  neasu res da not cap tu re  
sone Im portant a sp e c ts  o f f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  For th e  generated  
re g re s so rs  d iscussed  above we have shown th a t  In ad d itio n  to  being 
su b jec t to  the  eax e  c r l t l c l s n s  levelled  a t  th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  of fa ll in g  
banks and b u s in esses , they nay be su b jec t to  generated  re g re sso r 
p ro b len s  of the  type  d iscu ssed  In Pagan (1964). F in a lly , we have shown 
th a t  sone of Bernanke's re se rv a tio n s  about the  u sefu lness  o f the  pure 
y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa co rp o ra te  and long te rn  OS governnent 
bonds nay not be a s  d e b i l i ta t in g  a s  Bernanke suggests . S p e c if ic a lly , 
we have shows th a t  lees  r e s t r i c t iv e  a ssu n p tlo n s  about banks' c l ie n te le  
would continue to  y ie ld  output e f fe c ts  In th e  th e o re tic a l  nodel. 
F u rth er, I t  should be enphaslzed  th a t  th e re  Is  no generated re g re sso r 
p rob len  w ith the  pure y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  and th a t  I t  i s  a n a re  general 
r e f le c to r  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  than the  o th er n easu res d iscu ssed  here.
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Therefore, w hile the  la p e rfe c tlo n  of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  ae a proxy 
fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  i s  acknowledged, i t  la  in s tru c t iv e  to  no te  th a t I t s  
a t t r ib u te s  fa r  outweigh i t s  drawbacks.
Use of the TAR aodel re q u ire s  s ta t io n a ry  d a ta . However, s in c e  a o s t  
aac ro  t in e  s e r ie s  e x h ib it n o n s ta t lo n a r l ty , i t  i s  necessary  to  conduct 
u n it ro o t t e s t s  th a t  in d ic a te  the  a p p ro p ria te  tra n s fo ra a t io n . 
In p len en ta tlo n  of these  u n it ro o t t e s t s  fo r the  v a ria b le s  in  c h ap te r V 
Ind ica ted  th a t  they should a l l  e n te r  in th e ir  f i r s t  d iffe ren c es . 
Therefore, i t  Is  oDly necessary  to  conduct a u n it ro o t t e s t  fo r th e  
y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  in t h i s  ch ap te r. The r e s u l t s  of th i s  t e s t  In d ica te  
th a t  the  n o n s ta tlo n a r lty  is  due to  a s to c h a s t ic  trend ; th e re fo re , f i r s t  
d iffe ren c in g  Is  the recoanended tra n s fo ra a t io n . S ince the  nodel used 
here Is  a S in s - ty p e  VAR, a l l  v a r ia b le s  e n te r  each equation  w ith a 
c o o b o d  lag  leng th . Therefore, the  next s te p  in  the  sp e c if ic a tio n  of th e  
aodel is  the  choice of th is  co in o n  lag leng th . Following th e  a n a ly s is  
In the previous ch ap te r, the  o p tla a l  lag length  is  sp ec if ie d  using 
Akalke's AIC c r i te r io n .  Using a a ax la u a  lag  length  of twelve, t h i s  
c r i te r io n  In d ic a te s  an o p tla a l  coaaon lag length  of eleven.
In su aa a ry , the  foregoing a n a ly s is  re q u ire s  th a t  we use DLM2, DLIP, 
DLEXP, DLVPI, DROP, DMT AX, DDBF, and DRPM a s  the  s y s te m s  v a ria b le s , 
where the  f i r s t  seven v a ria b le s  a re  a s  sp ec if ie d  in ch ap te r V and DRPM 
is  the  f i r s t  d iffe ren ce  of the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa co rp o ra te  
and long term  US governaen t bonds obtained  f ro a  Banking and Monetary 
S t a t i s t i c s  1914 - 1941 (Board of Governors of the  Federal Reserve
S y s te a , 1943). The aodel to  be e s t ia a te d  i s  c o b  p rise d  of e ig h t
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equations w ith eleven lag s  o f a l l  e ig h t v a ria b le s  e n te r in g  each 
equation. Since sp e c if ic a tio n  of the  lag length  and th e  use of f i r s t  
d iffe ren c es  used up th ir te e n  o b serv a tio n s , a s  in ch ap te r V, th e  aodel 
was estim ated  fo r the  period August 1922 to  June 1938. The e a p lr lc a l  
methodology and In te rp re ta tio n  of the  m odel's param eters a re  presen ted  
in sec tio n  III below.
III. B ap lrlc a l Methodology and In te rp re ta tio n
The em pirica l a n a ly s is  In th i s  ch ap te r i s  concerned p rim arily  w ith 
documenting the  macroeconomic ro le  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  during the 
ln te rw ar period . S p e c if ic a lly , concern c e n te rs  on the  e f fe c ts  of 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  a s  captured  by th e  y ie ld  d if f e r e n t ia l  on output, 
In te re s t  r a te s  and p ric e s . F u rther, the  em pirica l v a l id i ty  Df 
hypotheses such a s  R icardian equivalence and debt m onetization a re  
In v es tig a ted  and the  r e s u l ts  a re  compared to  th a t  In ch ap te r V. A 
s im ila r  com parative a n a ly s is  is  undertaken w ith re sp e c t to  the  
macroeconomic e f fe c ts  of government spending, average personal m arginal 
tax  r a te s  and changes In the  money supply . In o rder to  analyze these  
Issues the  VAR model ou tlined  In sec tio n  II was estim ated  and 
In te rp re te d . In a l l  c ases  exam ination of the  Q - s ta t l s t l c s  fo r each 
equation Ind ica ted  support fo r the  hypo thesis  th a t  the  model i s  well 
s p e c if ie d .
In o rder to  in te rp re t  the  model, 1 ca lcu la ted  ISPs and VDCs using 
the  Choleskl decom position and f iv e  d i s t in c t  o rd e rin g s . These are: (1) 
DLBXP, DMTAX, DDEF, DLM2, DRPM, DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI; (2) DLBXP, DMTAX, 
DDBF, DRPM, DLM2, DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI; (3) DLBXP, DMTAX, DDBF, DLM2, DRCP,
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DRPM, DLIP, DLVPI; (4) DLBXP, DMTAX, DDBF, DLM2, DLIP, DLVPI, DRPM, DRCP; 
and (5) DRPM, DLBXP, DMTAX, DDBF, DLM2, DRCP, DLIP, DLVPI.
The above o rd erin g s  a re  based on the  general p r in c ip le  th a t  the  
model's v a ria b le s  can be d iv ided  In to  th ree  conceptual groups. The 
policy group Is  co n p rlsed  of DLBXP, DMTAI, DDBF, and DLM2 w hile the  
goods Market group includes DLIP and DLVPI. A dd itionally , the
tra n s a ls s lo n  group i s  made up of DRCP and DRPM. This grouping le  In 
accordance w ith ra tio n a l ex p ec ta tio n s  models of the  macroeconomy which 
p o s tu la te  th a t  s u rp r is e  Innovations In the  policy  v a ria b le s  a f f e c t  the  
o th e r v a r ia b le s  In the aodel w ithout feedback and w ith monetary
tran sm iss io n  th e o rie s  which argue th a t  monetary im pulses a re  
tra n sm itte d  to  the  goods market v a ria b le s  by the  tran sm issio n
v a ria b le s  w ith no contemporaneous feedback. This view of th e
aacroeconoay su g g es ts  th a t  the  policy  v a ria b le s  should be placed f i r s t  
in the  o rdering  followed by th e  tran sm iss io n  v a ria b le s  and, f in a l ly , by 
the  goods m arket v a ria b le s .
In o rdering  (1) the  v a ria b le s  w ith in  the  po licy  group a re  placed In 
th a t  p a r tic u la r  o rder on the  b a s is  of the  a n a ly s is  in the  previous 
ch ap te r where changing the  o rd ering  among th ese  v a ria b le s  did not 
change th e  r e s u lts .  Since th i s  In in d ic a tiv e  of th e  absence of
coateaporaneous c o rre la tio n  among th e se  v a ria b le s , i t  i s  unreasonable 
to  expect the o rdering  among them to  m atter In th i s  model. F urther, I t  
Is  im portan t to  note th a t  the  placement of DLM2 before DRPM i s  of some 
s ig n if ic a n c e  s in ce , a s  argued by Bernanke and B lin d e r(1985) and B linder 
and S t lg l l t z  (1953), monetary Im pulses may be Included among the
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exogenous shocks th a t  a f f e c t  bank c r e d i t  behavior. A dditionally , 
anong the  tran sm iss io n  v a r iab le s ,  DRPX I s  placed before  DRCP to  allow 
for the  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  a s  neasured by DRPK leads to  
lower s h o r t  t e r n  In te r e s t  r a t e s  as agen ts  In search  of l iq u id i ty  
Increase  th e i r  denand fo r  s h o r t  te rn  a s s e t s  causing an Increase In 
p rice  and a f a l l  In the  a sso c ia ted  ra t s 6  of re tu rn . F ilially , In the  
goods market, DLIP precedes DLVPI to  r e f l e c t  the  a n a ly s is  of the  
previous chap ter  which Ind ica tes  th e  absence of su b s ta n t ia l  
contemporaneous c o r re la t io n  between these  v a r iab les .
Ordering <2) d i f f e r s  from ordering  (1) In th a t  DRPX Is  placed 
before DLK2. Since bank6 play a c ru c ia l  ro le  In th e  money supply 
process and s in ce  some prominent au tho rs  including Friedman and 
Schwartz <1963) have argued th a t  the  prim ary e f fe c t  of f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  
on the  macroeconomy i s  via the  c o n s t r ic t io n  of the  money supply th a t  
r e s u l t s  from banking co llap se ,  I t  1b in s t ru c t iv e  to  allow every 
opportunity  fo r DRPX to  a f f e c t  money. Vhlle examination of the  IRFs 
and VDCs for o rd e rin g s  (1) and (2) In d ica tes  a sm all d if fe ren ce  In the  
r e s u l t s ,  t h i s  d if fe ren ce  was Judged to  be Immaterial.
A c lea r  im plica tion  of the a n a ly s is  In Bernanke and Blinder (1986) 
Is  th a t  the banking s e c to r s '  c r e d i t  supply function depends on open 
market In te r e s t  r a te s .  For example, an Increase  In open market 
In te r e s t  r a te s  causes banks to  Increase  th e i r  holdings of a s s e t s  such 
a s  commercial paper and to  decrease th e i r  supply of loans. This 
Implies th a t  DRCP should precede DRPX In the  ordering . This view is  
re f le c ted  In o rdering  (3) which d i f f e r s  from ordering  (1) In th a t  DRCP
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Is  placed before DRPX. Once again , evaluation  o f  th e  IRFs and VDCe for 
ordering  (3) In d ica tes  th a t  the  r e s u l t s  a re  roughly equ ivalen t to  th a t  
derived fo r  o rd e r in g s  <1) and (2).
As the  d iscu ss io n  of an ap p ro p r ia te  proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  In 
sec tion  II above Ind ica tes ,  I t  Is  d i s t i n c t l y  p o ss ib le  th a t  f lu c tu a t io n s  
In output contemporaneously Influence f in a n c ia l  market conditions . In 
order to  allow for t h i s  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  the  goods Barket block Is placed 
before the  f in a n c ia l  market o r  tran sm iss io n  group In o rdering  (4). 
A dditionally , s in ce  DRCP i s  placed l a s t  In t h i s  ordering  I t  g ives  
con s id e ra tio n  to  the  im plica tion  of the  e f f i c i e n t  markets hypothesis  
th a t  the  in te r e s t  r a t e  responds Ins tan taneously  to  Innovations in the  
o ther v a r ia b le s  of the model. As In the  previous cases , the  ISFs and 
VDCs for t h i s  o rdering  did not m a te r ia l ly  d i f f e r  from those  for 
o rderings  (1) to  <3>.
In o rdering  (5), DRPX Is  placed f i r s t  in  o rder to  explore  the  
p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  shocks to  the  f in a n c ia l  system a re  la rg e ly  exogenous 
and a s  such DRPX contemporaneously Influences the  o ther v a r iab le s  In 
the  aodel with no feedback. This Is  of some I n te r e s t  s in ce  p oss ib le  
Influences of f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  on f i s c a l  po licy  have been la rge ly  
Ignored. For o rdering  (5), the  e f fe c t s  of DRPX were a l i t t l e  s t ro n g e r  
than th a t  In the  previous o rde rings . However, s in ce  the  p a t te rn  of 
e f fe c t s  remained la rg e ly  s im ila r  and s ince  th ese  s t ro n g e r  e f fe c t s  a re  
due In la rge  p a r t  to  DRPX's p o s it ion  in  the  o rdering , we Judge th i s  
d if fe ren ce  to  be Imm aterial. Since the  ordering  chosen appears  to  have 
no m ate r ia l  Influence on the  IRFs and VDCe, I re p o r t  only the  r e s u l t s
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for o rdering  2. This choice le  p a r t i a l l y  out of deference to  the  long 
s tand ing  view th a t  the  primary Influence of f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  I s  v ia  I t s  
e f fe c t s  on the  noney supply. However, I t  bears  reesp h as lz ln g  th a t  the  
o rdering  chosen fa i le d  to  s a t e r l a l l y  a l t e r  the  r e s u l t s .
In o rder to  provide s o se  Measure of the  confidence th a t  can be
placed In the IRPs and VDCs presented , the  sean  and s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  of
these  s t a t i s t i c s  were ca lcu la ted  using Doan and L ltterm an 's  (1934) 
Xante Carlo In te g ra t io n  procedure. For the  VDCs, I f  the  r a t io  of a 
po in t e s t im ate  to  I t s  s tan d a rd  e r ro r  Is  g re a te r  than or equal to  2, the 
po in t e s t l n a t e  Is considered to  be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ron  zero a t  
the  5 percen t level while a r a t i o  of a t  le a s t  1.65 in d ica te s
s ig n if ic a n ce  a t  the  10 percen t level. Under the  a ssu sp t lo n  th a t  the 
IRFs a re  approxim ately normally d is t r ib u te d ,  95 percent confidence 
In te rv a ls  a re  construc ted  by tak ing  1.96 s tan d a rd  d ev ia t io n s  on each 
s id e  of the  sean. The confidence bands a re  then p lo t ted  toge the r  with 
the p o in t e s t im a te s .  In accordance with the  In te rp re ta t io n  in chap ter 
five , I f  the  confidence bands Include zero a t  a p a r t ic u la r  horizon the 
poin t e s tim ate  a t  th a t  horizon I s  considered to  be In s ig n if ic a n t ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from zero. In sec t io n  IV below the  VDCs are  presented in
tab le  6.1 while th e  IRFs a re  p lo t ted  In f ig u res  6.1 to  6.7.
IV. Em pirical R esults
A. Macroeconomic E ffec ts  of F inancia l C r is i s
The essence of the  theory underlying the  a n a ly s is  in  t h i s  chap te r  
Is th a t  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  leads  to  Inc reases  In the  CCI which leads to  a 
d e te r io ra t io n  in  th e  qu an ti ty  and q u a l i ty  of f in a n c ia l  In term edia tion
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t h a t  banks undertake. This d e te r io ra t io n  In f in a n c ia l  In term edia tion  Is  
m anifested p r im ari ly  via an Increase  In the  s e v e r i ty  of c re d i t  
ra t io n in g  In loan markets. In Bernanke and B linder 's  (1966) CC-LM 
model, an adverse loan supply shock leads to  an Inward s h i f t  In the  CC 
curve which leads to  a f a l l  in aggregate  demand and open market 
I n te r e s t  r a te s .  T ransfe r lng  t h i s  a n a ly s is  to  an AD -  AS framework we 
have a f a l l  In aggregate  demand and a decrease In aggregate  supply. 
The Inward s h i f t  In the  aggregate  supply curve I s  due to  the  overa ll  
t ig h ten in g  of c r e d i t  and the l ik e ly  In a b i l i ty  of sone f irm s to  obtain 
f inancing  fo r  p ro f i ta b le  p ro jec ts .  Under t h i s  scenario  the  e f f e c t s  on 
the p r ice  level, I n te r e s t  r a te s ,  and the  r a te  of In f la t io n  a re  ambiguous.
i s  shown In ta b le  6.1, the  percent of the fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  
In DRCP a t t r ib u ta b le  to  Innovations in DRPM Is  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  
from zero and ranges from 11.96 percent In th e  tw e lf th  horizon to  13.15 
percent In the  fo r ty -e ig h th .  The corresponding IRFs In the  f i r s t  graph 
In f ig u re  6.1 show th a t  a one s tandard  dev ia t ion  shock to  DRPM e l i c i t s  
a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  response  from DRCP In the  f i r s t  through second 
horizons and s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative responses  around the  seventh  and 
e igh th  and a t  the  fourteen th  horizons. Since the  confidence bands 
Include zero a t  a l l  o ther horizons, the  responses  in these  horizons are  
In te rp re ted  to  be In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  fron  zero. Since two out of 
th ree  of the s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t s  c a r ry  the  c o r re c t  s ig n  and s in ce  the 
I n i t i a l  p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  nay be re f le c t iv e  of dynamic adjustm ent o f  the 
system, g re a te r  weight i s  placed on the  subsequent negative  e f fe c ts .  
This leads to  the  conclusion th a t  the  response of In te r e s t  r a t e s  to
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4 .8  
(5. 1)
“ In t a b l e  6 .1  the  f i r s t  row fo r  a h o r izo n  < e .g . , 12) I s  th e  p o in t  
e s t l n a t e  of the  VDC fo r  t h a t  h o rizon  w hile  th e  s ta n d a rd  e r r o r s  a r e  In 
p a re n th e s e s .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  a i  I n d i c a t e s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  th e  5 p e rcen t  
l e v e l  while a •* I n d i c a t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  th e  10 p e rc e n t  l e v e l .
















T ab le  6 .1  c o a t ' d .  VDCs and S ta n d a rd  B r r o r s
Explained  by In n o v a t io n s  In
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7. 2* 1. 2 1. 2 90. 4* 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0
(3. 6) (1. 7) (1. 5) (3. 9) (0. 0) (0. 0) (0. 0)
12. 8* 5. 2 5 47. 5* 7. 2* 14. 8* 6. 1*
(4. 3) (2. 9) (2. 2) (5. 4) (3. 2) (4. 3) 12. 5)
13. 3* 4. 3. 1 44. 3* 7. 9* 13. 3* 6. 9*
(4. 1) (2. 9) (2. 3) (5. 2) (3. 1) (3. 9) (2. 7)
13. 1* 5. 2 3. 1 43. 2* 7. 8* 14. 0* 7. 1*
(4. 1) (3. 2) (2. 5) (5. 4) (3. 1) (4. 0) (2. 9)
13. 1* 5. 2 3. 1 43. 0* 7. 8* 14. 0* 7. 2*
(4. 2) (3. 4) (2. 6) (5. 6) (3. 3) (4. 1) (3. 1)
0. 3 0. 1 2. 1 8. 0* 89. 6* 0. 0 0. 0
(1. 1) (0. 9) (2. 0) (3. 4) (4. 1) (0. 0) <0. 0)
6, 8* 5. 0 3. 6 14. 1* 51. 1* 4. 5* 1. 7
(3. 0) (3. 2) (2. 3) (3. 6) (4. 9) (2. 2) (1. 7)
7. 6* 6. 0** 5. 1** 13. 7* 43. 4* 6. 8* 2. 9
(2. 9) (3. 5) (2. 6) (3. 6) (4. 9) (2. 7) (2. 0)
7. 8* 7. 9 5. 13. 6* 41. 2* 7. 2* 3. 0
(3. 1) (4. 9) (2. 8) (3. 5) (5. 2) (3. 2) (2. 0)
7. 8* 8. 1 5. j »» 13. 8* 40. 5* 7. 5* 3. 0
















T ab le  6 .1  c a n t 'd .  VDCe and S ta n d a rd  E r r o r s
Explained  by In n o v a t io n s  In  
DLEIP DMTAX DDBF DRPM DLM2 DRCP DLIP
0. 3 0. 0 0. 5 3. 4 3. 0 92. 8* 0. 0
(1. 0) (0. 8) (1. 3) (2. 5) (2. 3) (3. 6) (0. 0)
3. 5 1. 9 3. 3 12. 0* 6. 7* 62. 7* 5. 5*
(2. 3) (2. 3) (2. 2) (3. 4) (3. 0) (4. 8) (2. 3)
4. 4** 7. 5* 4. 5* 13. 1* 6. 5* 52. 9* 6. 3*
(2. 4) (3. 3) (2. 2) (3. 0) (2. 6) (4. 7) (2. 4)
4. 7** 7. 8* 4. 6** 13. 2* 6. 7* 51. 4* 6. 4*
(2. 5) (3. 5) (2. 3) (3. 2) (2. 7) (4. 9) (2. 4)
4. 7* * 8. 0* 4. 6** 13. 2* 6. 7* 51. 1* 6. 4*
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DRPX shocks le  not In c o n s is ten t  with the  th e o re t ic a l  d iscu ss io n  In the  
previous paragraph.
The VDCs fo r  DLIP in tab le  6.1 show th a t  the  percent of I t s  
fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  explained by v a r ia t io n  In DRPX varied  f r o s  an 
In s ig n if ic a n t  3.76 percent In the  f i r s t  horizon to  17.13 and 16.83 
percent in the  tw e lf th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. Moreover, these  
e f fe c t s  were s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  5 percen t level. The second graph In 
f igure  6.1 p lo ts  the  ac tua l response  of DLIP to  a one s tan d a rd  
dev ia t ion  Innovation In DRPX, toge ther  with the  upper (DLIPUB) and 
lower (DLIPLB) bounds of I t s  95 percent confidence in te rv a l .  These 
p lo ts  show th a t  DLIP's response was s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative In the  f i r s t  
through fourth  and the  seventh  through tw e lfth  horizons. For a l l  o ther 
horizons the  confidence bands included zero, Ind ica ting  In s ig n if ican ce  
a t  the 5 percent level. Once again , these  r e s u l t s  a re  not In co n s is te n t  
with the  th e o re t ic a l  d iscuss ion .
Examination of the  VDCs fo r  DLVPI In ta b le  6.1 In d ica te s  th a t  the 
percen t of I t s  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  explained by v a r ia t io n  in DRPM 
varied  fron  an In s ig n i f ic a n t  1.99 percen t In horizon one to  11.63 and 
10.9 percen t In the  tw e lf th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. Further, our 
rough measure of s ig n if ic a n c e  Ind ica tes  th a t  these  l a t t e r  e f f e c t s  a re  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ro n  zero a t  th e  5 percen t level. A dditionally , 
the  impulse responses  of DLVPI to  a one s tan d a rd  dev ia t ion  shock to  
DRPX p lo tted  toge ther  with i t s  confidence bands In th e  th i r d  graph in 
figu re  6.1 show th a t  the  DRPM innovation e l i c i t s  a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
p o s i t iv e  response from DLVPI fo r  the  fourth  and f i f t h  horizons and
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s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative  responses  In the  seventh  and e igh th , and the  
ninth  through e leventh  horizons. Since the  confidence bands Include
zero in a l l  o ther horizons, th e  e f f e c t s  In these  horizons a re  
in te rp re ted  to  be in s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f r o s  zero. These r e s u l t s  
a re  not in c o n s is te n t  with the  th e o re t ic a l  view th a t  the  e f fe c t s  of 
f in an c ia l  c r i s i s  on p r ic e s  a re  ambiguous.
In add ition  to  the  foregoing e f f e c t s ,  i t  i s  useful to  examine the
e f fe c ts  of the  proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  on the  money supply. I t  i s  
well known th a t  bank l i a b i l i t i e s  and a s s e t s  play a c ru c ia l  ro le  In the  
money supply process; th e re fo re ,  adverse  shocks to  the  banking system 
a re  l ik e ly  to  lead to  c o n s t r ic t io n  of the  money supply in th e  manner 
documented by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) fo r  the  in terw ar period.
In ta b le  6.1 the  VDCs for DLN2 show th a t  innovations in  DRPX accounted 
fo r  7.96, 14.1, and 13.81 percen t of th e  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  in DLX2 
fo r  the f i r s t ,  tw e lf th , and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons, re sp ec tiv e ly .  
Moreover, our quasi t - s t a t i s t i c s  in d ica te  th a t  these  e f f e c t s  a re  a l l  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero a t  the  5 percen t level. A dditionally , 
the corresponding IRFs and th e i r  confidence in te rv a ls  p la t te d  in figure  
6.2 shows th a t  the  shock to  DRPX leads to  a s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative 
response In DLX2 from the f i r s t  through fourth  and the n in th  through 
eleventh  horizons. The responses  in  a l l  o ther horizons a re  
In s ig n if ic a n t .  These r e s u l t s  a re  c o n s is te n t  with our th e o re t ic a l  
expec ta tions  and allow fo r  a l i t t l e  more confidence In th e  choice of 
DRPX as the  ap p ro p r ia te  proxy fa r  the  CCI and thereby f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s .
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B. R icardian Equivalence In the  Presence of Financial C onsiderations
In the  seven v a r iab le  aodel of chap ter  V, we found th a t  both the  
VDCs and IRFs fo r  in t e r e s t  r a te s ,  p r ice s ,  and output ind ica ted  th a t  
d e f i c i t s  had no s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t s  on the  re a l  econoay. These r e s u l t s  
were In te rp re ted  a s  not In co n s is ten t  with the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis  which p o s tu la te s  th a t  a s u b s t i tu t io n  of debt fo r  tax 
f inancing  holding government spending c o n s ta n t  has no re a l  e f f e c t s  on 
aggregate  economic a c t iv i ty .  However, s in ce  the  a n a ly s is  in 
subsec tions  IV. A and B In d ica te s  th a t  DRPX has s u b s ta n t ia l  e f f e c t s  on 
the aacroeconony, I t  can be reasonably argued th a t  an Im portant 
v a r iab le  was omitted from the model In chap ter  V. Accordingly, I t  Is  
im portant to  compare the  r e s u l t s  from t h i s  c h ap te r 's  aodel to  those 
from chap te r  V.
Examination of the  VDCs fo r  DRCP In ta b le  6.1 shows th a t  v a r ia t io n  
In DDBF was re sp o n sib le  fo r  0.52 and 3.26 percen t of I t s  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  
variance  in horizons one and twelve re sp ec tiv e ly ,  and th a t  these  
e f fe c t s  were In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero. In horizon twenty- 
four, t h i s  percentage was s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  f iv e  percent level and 
Increased to  4.54. Vhlle the  percen t of the  fo re c a s t  e r r o r  variance 
explained by DDEF remained roughly the  same In the  t h i r t y - s i x t h  and 
fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons, our quasi t - s t a t l s t l c s  imply th a t  they were 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero only a t  the  10 percen t level. 
However, s ince  these  e f fe c t s  a re  a l l  r a th e r  sm all, we Judge them to  be 
economically In s ig n if ic a n t .  A dditionally , the  p lo t  of the  Impulse 
responses  of DRCP to  a one s tandard  dev ia t ion  Innovation In DDBF
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toge ther  with th e i r  confidence bands In d ica te  th a t  th e se  responses  were 
In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero fo r a l l  horizons. These r e s u l t s  a re  
roughly c o n s is te n t  with those  derived In the  previous ch ap te r  except 
th a t  none of the  p o in t e s t im a te s  were s ig n i f ic a n t .
The VDC of DLIP shows th a t  the  f rac t io n  of I t s  fo re c a s t  e r ro r
variance  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  v a r ia t io n  In DDBF varied  from an In s ig n if ic a n t
1.85 percent In the  f i r s t  horizon, to  5.7 and 7.07 percent In the
tw e lfth  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. Jforeover, these  l a t t e r  e f f e c t s  were 
s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  10 and 5 percen t lev e ls ,  re sp ec tiv e ly .  The p lo t  of 
the  po in t e s t im ates  of the  Impulse responses  of DLIP toge ther  with I t s  
confidence bands In figu re  6.3 In d ica te s  th a t  a one s tanda rd  dev ia tion  
Innovation In DDEF e l i c i t s  small s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative responses  in 
DLIP from the e igh th  through ten th  horizons and a m arginally
s ig n i f ic a n t  negative response a t  the  four teen th  horizon. Since the
confidence bands Include zero a t  a l l  o th e r  horizons, the  response in 
these  horizons were In te rp re ted  to  be In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from 
zero. These r e s u l t s  d i f f e r  from the  r e s u l t s  in the  previous chap ter  
where d e f i c i t s  had no s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  on output. However, the  
e f fe c t s  In t h i s  chap te r  a re  ra th e r  sm all and may be too weak to  Ju s t ify  
a t ta ch in g  too much Importance to  them.
The e f fe c t s  of DDBF on DLVPI a re  summarized In the  VDCs in tab le
6.1 and the  IRFs p lo t ted  In the  th i r d  graph of f igu re  6.3. The VDCs 
show th a t  the  percentage of the  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  In DLVPI 
explained by shocks to  DDBF was s ig n i f i c a n t  from th e  tw e lf th  through 
fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons and ranged from 6.83 to  6.75 percent.
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Examination of the corresponding IRFs In d ica tes  th a t  the  shock to  DDBF 
e l i c i t s  s n a i l  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative e f fe c t s  f ro n  DLVPI In horizons one 
and two and fron  the  n in th  through eleventh  horizons. The responses  
in a l l  o ther horizons were In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ron  zero. Vhile 
these  e f fe c t s  a re  a l i t t l e  s tro n g e r  than those in the  previous chapter, 
they a re  of s im ila r  sign.
The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis  leads us to  expect th a t  an 
Increase In d e f i c i t s  should have no re a l  e f f e c t s  on aggregate  economic 
a c t iv i ty  while the  t r a d i t io n a l  (Keynesian) view su g g es ts  expansionary 
e f fe c ts .  Recalling th a t  DDBF Is  measured a s  re c e ip ts  minus 
expenditures, an inc rease  In DDBF i s  re a l ly  an increase  in the  surp lus . 
Therefore, the  negative  e f f e c t s  of the  DDBF 6hock on p r ic e s  and output 
in d ica te s  th a t  an Increase In the  su rp lu s  had co n trac t io n a ry  e f fe c t s  
during the  ln te rw ar period. These r e s u l t s  a re  not In c o n s is ten t  with 
t r a d i t io n a l  models. A dditionally , while they may seem to  be 
in c o n s is te n t  with the  notion th a t  bonds a re  not net wealth, I t  Is  
reasonable  to  argue a s  do Barsky, Xanklw, and Zeldes (1964) th a t  in the  
presence of u n cer ta in ty  with re sp ec t  to  fu ture  Income, a e u b s tl tu io n  of 
debt for tax  financing  may lower the  r i s k  of adverse f lu c tu a t io n s  in 
fu ture  income b o  t h a t  agen ts  reduce th e i r  p recau tionary  demands fo r 
sav ings  and inc rease  rea l  consumption. This  argument im plies  th a t  in  a 
framework where bonds a re  not net wealth, an Increase in the  su rp lus  
may lead to  a f a l l  In output a s  agen ts  inc rease  th e i r  p recautionary  
demands fo r  sav in g s  in response to  the  Increased r i s k  of adverse  
f lu c tu a t io n s  In fu ture  income.
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Given the  above arguments, I t  becoaes im portant to  explain  why
these  negative e f f e c t s  a re  more p ro a ln en t In t h i s  aodel than they were
in the  seven v a r iab le  aodel. A p o te n t ia l  explanation  Bay be th a t
previous r e s u l t s  were biased due to an o a l t t e d  v a r iab le  and th a t  the 
Inclusion of the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s  a proxy for f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  In 
t h i s  c h ap te r 's  aodel a l l e v ia te s  the problem.
C. Debt Monetization
The other area  in which the re  Is  soae  concern about the  e f fe c t s  of 
d e f i c i t s  Is  with re sp ec t  to  th e i r  e f f e c t s  on the  aDney supply. In
chap ter V, both th e  VDCs and IRFs Indicated  th a t  d e f i c i t s  had no e f fe c t  
on aoney supply growth. In th i s  chap ter , the  variance  decomposition of 
DLM2 shows th a t  v a r ia t io n  in DDEF accounted fo r  an In s ig n if ic a n t  
f rac t io n  of I t s  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  in the  f i r s t  through tw e lfth  
horizons. However, t h i s  percentage Is  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero 
a t  the  10 percen t level fo r the  tw enty-fourth  through fo r ty -e ig h th  
horizons. The impulse responses  reported  In figure  6.4 show th a t  these  
responses  a re  In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ro a  zero fo r  a l l  fo recas t  
horizons. These r e s u l t s  a re  e n t i r e ly  c o n s is te n t  with the  conclusion 
a rr iv e d  a t  In chap te r  V, namely, th a t  the re  i s  no evidence of debt 
non e tlza t lo n  during the  ln terw ar period. A dditionally , we any conclude 
th a t  the  In troduction  of f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  leaves th a t  conclusion In tac t .
D. The Role of Government Expenditures
In the  em pirica l a n a ly s is  of the  previous chap ter , the  combined 
evidence of the  VDCs and IRFs Indicated th a t  gavernaen t expenditures
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had do s ig n i f ic a n t  e f fe c t s  on p r ic e s  and the  r a te  of in t e r e s t  but had 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  e f fe c t s  on output. In t h i s  chap te r ,  th e  re levan t 
VDCs in tab le  6.1 shows th a t  the  percei. of the  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance 
in DRCP a ss ig n ab le  to  v a r ia t io n  In DLEXP varied  f ro a  ‘'.32 percent in 
the  f i r s t  horizon to  4.37 and 4,66 percen t In the  tw en ty -fourth  and
fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. A dditionally , the  quasi t - s t a t l s t l c s  Ind ica te  
th a t  the po in t e s t im a te s  fo r the  tw en ty -fourth  horizon and beyond are  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero a t  the  10 percen t level. The 
corresponding IRFs show th a t  the  confidence bands includes zero a t  a l l  
horizons, thereby Ind ica ting  th a t  the  po in t e s t im a te s  a re  a l l
In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. Since the  s ig n i f ic a n t  VDCs are
very s a a l l  and th e  IRFs show no s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t s  i t  s e e a s  
reasonable  to  conclude th a t  DLEXP has l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on DRCP in th i s  
aodel. This i s  c o n s is te n t  with the  r e s u l t s  In the  seven v a r ia b le  aodel 
of chap ter  V and with the  th e o re t ic a l  explanation  given there .
The VDCs for DLIP show th a t  the  percen t of i t s  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  
variance  explained by v a r ia t io n  In DLEXP varied  f ro a  12.46 percen t In 
the tw e lf th  fo re c a s t  period to  16.73 pe rcen t in the  fo r ty -e ig h th  period. 
The IRFs reported  In the second graph of figu re  6.5 show th a t  a one 
s tandard  dev ia t ion  shock to  DLBXP e l i c i t s  i n i t i a l l y  p o s i t iv e  but
in s ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t s  on DLIP and s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative  e f f e c t s  f ro a  
the f i f t h  through ten th  horizons and f ro a  the  n ineteenth  through twenty 
- f i r s t  horizons. These r e s u l t s  d i f f e r  f ro a  those In the  previous 
chap ter . In t h a t  chap ter , the  i n i t i a l  p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t s  were 
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here, and th e re  Is  no apparent reason fo r  t h i s  rev e rsa l .
In ta b le  6.1, the  VDCs fo r  DLVPI show th a t  DLEXP was re sponsib le  
fo r  6.42, 6.40, and 6.76 percen t of the  fo rec a s t  e r ro r  variance  In the 
r a te  of In f la t io n  In the  tw e lf th , tw en ty -fourth , and fo r ty -e ig h th  
horizons, re sp ec tiv e ly .  Moreover, our measure of s ig n if ic a n ce  in d ica tes  
th a t  these  po in t e s t im ates  were a l l  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  th e  5 percent level. 
The p lo t  of the  point e s t l n a t e s  of the Inpulse  responses  of DLVPI to  a 
s u rp r is e  Innovation in DLEXP, toge ther with i t s  confidence bands, 
In d ica tes  th a t  with the exception of a n inu te ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e
e f f e c t  a t  the  th i rd  horizon the  po in t e s t l n a t e s  a re  not s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
d i f f e r e n t  fron  zero. As Indicated in ch ap te rs  II and V five , the
th e o re t ic a l  a n a ly s is  p re d ic ts  anblguous e f fe c t s  on the  p r ic e  level but 
makes no p red ic tio n  about the  ra te  of in f la t io n .  Therefore, the  r e s u l t s  
of th i s  chap te r  a re  not in c o n s is te n t  w ith the  theory and with the  
r e s u l t s  derived In the  seven v a r iab le  nodel.
E. Role of Average Personal Marginal Tax Rates
In chap ter V, we ezanlned th ree  th e o re t ic a l  approaches to  
evaluation  of th e  nacroecononlc e f f e c t s  of taxes . Dnder the  t r a d i t io n a l  
or Keynesian approach a tax  r a t e  Increase  leads to  a f a l l  In output and 
anblguous e f fe c t s  on I n te r e s t  r a te s ,  p r ic e s ,  and In f la t io n .  B arro 's
neo c la ss ica l  approach p re d ic ts  th a t  a tax  inc rease  has  ambiguous 
e f f e c t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s  and p r ic e s  and co n trac t io n ary  e f fe c t s  on 
output. F ina lly , the  Manklw-Suaners approach p re d ic ts  ambiguous
e f f e c t s  on output and p r ice s  and an unambiguous f a l l  In In te r e s t  r a te s .  
Vhlle the in troduction  of the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s  a proxy fo r  the  CCI
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and thereby f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  nay a l t e r  the  e f fe c t s  of a  tax  Increase In 
t h i s  chap ter , th e re  Is  no a priori reason to  expect such a change.
As shown In tab le  6.1 the  percent of the  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  In
DRCP a ss ig n ab le  to  v a r ia t io n  In DNTAX ranges fron  an in s ig n i f ic a n t
1.94 percen t In the  tw e lfth  horizon to  s ig n i f ic a n t  po rt io n s  in the
tw en ty -fourth , t h i r t y - s i x t h ,  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons ranging f ron  
7.46 to  7.98 percent. This Is  In c o n t ra s t  to  the  r e s u l t s  in the
previous nod el where the  corresponding VDCs were nuch sm alle r  and 
In s ig n if ic a n t .  The IRFs p lo tted  In the  f i r s t  graph in f igu re  6.6 show 
th a t ,  with the  exception of th e  fourteenth  through s ix te en th  horizons 
where the  lnpu lse  response of DHCP to  a one s tandard  dev ia tion  in 
DKTAX is  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e ,  the  innovation in DKTAI f a l l s  to  e l i c i t  
s ig n i f ic a n t  responses  In DKCP. Once again, these  r e s u l t s  a re  In 
c o n t ra s t  to  those  in chap ter  V where a DKTAI Innovation re su l ted  In 
only a m arginally  s ig n i f i c a n t  negative  e f f e c t  a t  the  th i r d  horizon. 
These r e s u l t s  a re  not In co n s is te n t  with any of the  th ree  th e o re t ic a l  
frameworks considered above.
The percent of the  fo re c a s t  e r ro r  variance  In DLIP explained by 
v a r ia t io n  In DMTAX v a r ie s  from 14.26 In the tw e lf th  to  12.31 In the  
fo r ty -e ig h th  fo re c a s t  period. Moreover, our quasi t - s t a t l s t l c s  Ind ica te  
s ig n if ic a n ce  a t  the 5 percent level. The IKFs p lo t ted  In the  second 
graph In f igure  6.6 shows th a t  a s u rp r i s e  Innovation In DMTAI e l i c i t s  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  responses  from DLIP in the  seventh  through 
tw e lfth  horizons. Since the  confidence bands in a l l  o th e r  fo rec a s t  
horizons include zero, the  responses  In those horizons a re  in te rp re te d
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to  be In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ro a  zero. These r e s u l t s  a re  c o n s is te n t  
with the  Nanklw-Summers framework and a re  la rge ly  s l a l l a r  to  the 
r e s u l t s  generated In the  previous chap te r .  However, a s  In the  previous 
chap ter, they a re  In co n s is ten t  with the  p re d ic t io n s  of both the 
Keynesian and Barro aodels .
V ariation In DMTAI accounted fa r  12.45 and 1C.35 percen t of the 
fo rec a s t  e r ro r  va riance  in DLVPI fo r  tw e lf th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. 
A dditionally , our rough aeasu re  of s ig n if ic a n ce  In d ica tes  th a t  these  
e f fe c t s  were s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  5 percen t level. These r e s u l t s  a re  
roughly s l a l l a r  to  those  In chap ter  V. Additionally , the  ap p ro p r ia te  
IKFs p lo tted  In the  th i rd  graph of f igure  6.6 Indicate  th a t  a one 
s tan d a rd  dev ia tion  Innovation in DXTAX e l i c i t s  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  
e f f e c t s  in DLVPI f ro n  the  seventh  through e igh th , and the  ten th  through 
th i r te e n th  horizons. The response In a l l  o th e r  horizons were Judged to  
be In s ig n if ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ron  zero s in ce  the  confidence bands 
Included zero fo r  those  horizons. Once again  th ese  r e s u l t s  a re  roughly 
s im ila r  to  those in the previous chap te r  and a re  not in c o n s is te n t  with 
any of the  th re e  models d iscussed  above.
I t  Is  apparen t from the  preceding d iscu ss io n  th a t  the  responses  of 
p r ic e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and output to  s u rp r i s e  in c reases  in  average 
personal marginal tax  r a t e s  can be c o n s is te n t ly  explained w ithin  
Xanklw and Summers' th e o re t ic a l  framework. However, th e  p o s i t iv e  
e f fe c t  on output Is  anomalous within B arro 's  market c lea r in g  approach 
and the Keynesian framework.
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F. The Xacroeconoalc E ffec ts  of Honey Supply Changes
In chap te r  V we found th a t  the  e f fe c t s  of shocks to  the  soney 
supply on In te r e s t  r a te s ,  output, and p r ic e s  were roughly c o n s is te n t  
with our th e o re t ic a l  expec ta tions . In the  cu rren t  chap ter  I t  Is  useful 
to analyze the e f fe c t s  of noney supply changes on the aacroeconoay in 
order to  d e te rn ln e  whether the  Inclusion of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s  a 
proxy fo r  the  CCI, and thereby fo r  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s ,  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
a l t e r s  the  ro le  of aoney In t h i s  aodel. As noted In chap te r  III, 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) have argued th a t  an Increase in the  aoney 
supply Is  l ik e ly  to  be ao re  expansionary In th e i r  CC-LM aodel - -  which 
a t t e a p t s  to  account fo r  the  ro le  played by bank a s s e t s  In the  c r e d i t  
a l lo c a t io n  p rocess  - -  than I t  would be In the t r a d i t io n a l  IS-LM aodel. 
Therefore, in ad d it io n  to  exaa in ing  the  r e s u l t s  for consis tency  with 
the  theory , one of our key concerns in t h i s  sec t io n  w ill  be to  see  i f  
aoney’s  e f f e c t s  a re  s t r a n g e r  in t h i s  aodel than they were in the  seven 
va r iab le  aodel.
The VDCs fo r  DRCP In ta b le  6.1 show th a t  DLH2 was re sp o n sib le  for 
6.74 and 6.70 percen t of the  fo rec as t  e r ro r  variance  In DRCP In the 
tw e lfth  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. A dditionally , these  e f f e c t s  were 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  f ro a  zero a t  the  5 percen t level. Further, they 
a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  weaker than those in the seven v a r iab le  aodel where 
they were s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  5 percent level and ranged f ro a  16.1 to
15.7 percen t In the  tw e lf th  and fo r ty -e ig h th  horizons. This r e s u l t  
appears to  be c o n s is te n t  with Bernanke and B lin d e r 's  CC-LM aodel where 
a p o s i t iv e  shock to  aoney s h i f t s  th e  LH curve outwards and lowers
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In te r e s t  ra te s .  However, a t  the  s a a e  time the CC curve s h i f t s  outwards 
causing output to  Increase  by so re  than I t  would In the  t r a d i t io n a l  
aodel, thereby m it ig a tin g  the  increase  in In te r e s t  r a te s .  To the 
ex ten t th a t  the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  cap tu res  the  e f fe c t  of Monetary 
policy on bank loans, i t  I s  reasonable  to  expect th a t  so n e ta ry  shocks 
would have s n a l l e r  e f f e c t s  on In te re s t  r a t e s  in t h i s  aodel. The 
lap u lse  responses  of DRCP to  an innovation In DLX2 toge ther  with I t s  
confidence bands a re  p lo tted  in the  f i r s t  graph of f ig u re  6.7. These 
Ind ica te  th a t  a one s tan d a rd  dev ia tion  innovation in DLX2 e l i c i t s  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  negative  e f fe c t s  around the f i r s t  horizon and 
in s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c t s  in a l l  o ther horizons. These l a t t e r  e f f e c t s  a re  
e s s e n t ia l ly  id e n tic a l  to th a t  in chap ter  V.
The e f fe c t  of shocks to  DLX2 on output a re  exanlned by looking a t  
the VDCs for DLIP in tab le  6.1, These VDCs show th a t  th e  percent of 
the fo rec as t  e r ro r  variance  in DLIP a t t r ib u ta b le  to  DLX2 ranged f ro a  
7.77 percent in the  tw e lf th  horizon to 8.91 percent In the fo r ty -e ig h th .  
Although these  e f f e c t s  a re  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  5 percent level, they a re  
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  weaker than those  In the  seven v a r iab le  aodel, where the  
fo rec as t  e r ro r  variance  in DLIP explained by v a r ia t io n  in DLK2 varied  
between 15,8 and 14.9 percent. The corresponding  IRFs Ind ica te  th a t  
the  response of DLIP to  a s u rp r i s e  Innovation in DLX2 i s  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
p o s i t iv e  around the  f i r s t  horizon and in s ig n i f ic a n t  in a l l  o ther
horizons. In general these  e f fe c t s  a re  c o n s is te n t  with the  theory in
th a t  they ca rry  th e  r ig h t  s ign  and a re  very s h o r t - l iv e d .  However,
s ince  th e  e f f e c t s  of changes in aoney on output a re  weaker in t h i s
1 7 r,
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■□del, t h i s  r e s u l t  Is  In c o n s is ten t  with the  p red ic t io n s  of the  Bernanke 
- Blinder model.
The ap p ro p ria te  VDCs In tab le  6.1 show th a t  v a r ia t io n  In DLM2 
accounted fo r 5.62 percent of the  fo rec a s t  e r ro r  variance  In DLVPI In 
the  tw e lfth  horizon and th a t  I t  Increased to  6.12 percent by the  fo r ty -  
e igh th  horizon. These e f fe c t s  were a l l  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t  the  10 percent 
level and a re  m arginally  s tro n g e r  than the  In s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c t s  In the 
seven v a r iab le  model. The IRFs reported  In the  th i rd  graph of figure
6.7 In d ica tes  the d i re c t io n  of these  e f fe c t s .  S p ec if ic a l ly ,  a su rp r is e  
Innovation In DLM2 engenders s ig n i f ic a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  responses  in DLVPI 
around the f i r s t  fo rec as t  month and In s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c t s  In a l l  o ther 
horizons. As noted In chap ter  V, i t  seens  reasonable  to  argue th a t  the 
aggregate  supply curve was re la t iv e ly  f l a t  during the ln terw ar period. 
Therefore, s ince  aoney supply shocks a f f e c t  aggregate  deaand but not 
aggregate  supply, they a re  l ik e ly  to  have had only e a a l l  e f f e c t s  on the 
p r ice  level during th a t  period.
V. Suaaary
The a n a ly s is  of t h i s  chap te r  has been an a t t e a p t  to  add e a p l r lc a l  
con ten t to  the burgeoning l i t e r a tu r e  th a t  a t t r i b u t e s  an la p o r ta n t  ro le  
to  f in a n c ia l  fa c to rs  in  the  d e te ra ln a t lo n  of aggregate  econonlc 
a c t iv i ty .  S p ec if ic a l ly ,  concern was centered on the aacroecononic 
e f f e c t s  of a proxy fo r  the  CC1 and thereby of f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  on 
in te r e s t  r a te s ,  output, and p rices .  Further, the  e f f e c t s  of introducing 
the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa co rp o ra te  and long-term US 
governaent bonds (as a proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s )  on th e  consis tency
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of the em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  In the  previous ch ap te r were 
examined.
As ou tlined  In sec tio n  IV. At a d e te r io ra tio n  In the  q u an tity  and 
q u a lity  of f in a n c ia l In term edia tion  as proxled by the  y ie ld  d if f e r e n t ia l  
leads to  s ig n if ic a n tly  negative e f fe c ts  on output, and the  supply of 
noney. F urther, w ith the  exception of a s h o r t- l iv e d  I n i t i a l  p o s itiv e  
e ffe c t , I t  had s ig n if ic a n tly  negative  e f fe c ts  on both In te re s t  r a te s  and 
the  ra te  of In f la tio n . These r e s u l ts  c o n s ti tu te  em pirica l evidence In 
support of th e o re tic a l nodel6 which hold fo r th  th e  view th a t  f in a n c ia l 
fa c to rs  have Im portant macroeconomic e f fe c ts .  F u rther, the  r e s u l ts  
p resen ted  here a re  not In c o n s is te n t w ith the em pirica l evidence
presen ted  by Bernanke (1983), who found th a t  f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  played a 
key ro le  In ex p la in ing  the  du ra tion  and s e v e r ity  of the  Great
D epression. A dd itiona lly , I t  seems reasonab le  to  conclude th a t  the  
Importance of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  a s  an ex p lan a to r of macroeconomic 
f lu c tu a tio n s  in the  in te rw ar period i s  s tro n g ly  sug g estiv e  of the  
n e ce ss ity  to  include th i s  v a r ia b le  In macroeconomic models th a t  propose 
to  analyze or fo re c a s t aggregate  economic behavior.
The Inclusion  of a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  in th l6  c h a p te r 's  
aodel d id  not a l t e r  our conclusions w ith re sp ec t to  the  K icardian
equivalence and debt m onetization hypotheses in th e  previous chap ter. 
However, the Inclusion  of the y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  seemed to  Induce some 
s l ig h t ly  s ig n if ic a n t  negative  e f fe c ts  on output and p ric e s . S ince DDEF 
Is measured a s  re c e ip ts  minus expend itu res, th i s  im plies th a t  an
Increase  in the  d e f ic i t  has expansionary  e f fe c ts .  T his re s u l t  i s  not
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in c o n s is te n t w ith e i th e r  th e  R icardian equivalence hy p o th esis  {when the  
rl6 k  a sso c ia ted  w ith adverse  f lu c tu a tio n s  In fu tu re  lncnse  Is  accounted 
fo r) o r w ith t r a d i t io n a l  nodels. This, of course, i s  an example of the 
d if f ic u l ty  th a t  su rrounds a ttem pting  to  d is tin g u is h  among s tru c tu ra l  
hypotheses w ith reduced form models.
The e f fe c ts  of government ex pend itu res  in th i s  model d iffe red  
s u b s ta n tia l ly  from i t s  e f fe c ts  In the  seven v a ria b le  model. This re s u lt  
is  d i f f ic u l t  to  exp la in  on the  b a s is  of the theory . F u rth er, the 
e f fe c ts  of average personal m arginal tax  r a te s  were e s s e n tia l ly  the 
sane  as In the  prev ious model. A dd itionally , and a s  in chap ter V, the 
Nanklw -  Summers framework was th e  only th e o re tic a l  framework capable 
of c o n s is te n tly  exp lain ing  the  e f fe c ts  of DMTAX on output, p ric e s , and 
In te re s t  r a te s .  F in a lly , the  e f fe c ts  of money In th i s  model were alm ost 
Id e n tic a l to  i t s  e f fe c ts  in the  p rev ious model. This r e s u l t  does not 
appear to  be c o n s is te n t w ith the  Bernanke-B linder model which led us 
to  expect s tro n g e r e f fe c ts  on output In th is  c h a p te r 's  model.
In ad d itio n  to  the  cav ea ts  noted In ch ap te r V, th e  u sefu lness of 
the  conclusions a rr iv e d  a t  In th is  ch ap te r depends c ru c ia lly  on the  
ap p ro p ria ten ess  of the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  a s  a proxy fo r the  CCI and 
thereby  fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  Given the  argum ents p resen ted  In sec tio n  
II, the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  appears to  be a s  good a proxy as  any. 
Therefore, w hile our proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  Is  not p e rfe c t , the 
a n a ly s is  In th i s  ch ap te r In d ic a te s  r a th e r  s tro n g ly  th a t  macroeconomic 
models which do not include some proxy fo r the  e f f e c ts  of f in a n c ia l
179
f a c t o r s  o f  the type d iscu ssed  I d  ch ap te r III  and the  c u rre n t ch ap te r 
nay be se r io u s ly  a ls s p e c lf le d ,
CHAPTER VII 
SUHMARY AID COICLOSIOIS 
As ou tlined  In ch ap te r I, the  purpose of t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n  was to  
lap ro v e  our knowledge and understand ing  o f th e  e f fe c ts  o f monetary and 
f is c a l  po licy  and th e  ro le  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  such a s  d is ru p tio n s  in  
f in a n c ia l in te rm ed ia tion  and d e te r io ra tio n  In th e  q u a lity  of p r iv a te  
balance sh ee ts  in  the  aacroeconoay . Because th e re  la  s u b s ta n tia l
d isagreem ent on th ese  Issu es  and s in ce  th e  ex tensive  l i te r a tu r e  on 
f is c a l  and monetary policy  has concen tra ted  on th e  p o st war e ra  to  the  
exclusion  of the  in te rw ar period , we chose the  in te rw ar period  defined 
a s  July 1921 - June 1936 a s  th e  a p p ro p ria te  sample. A dd itionally , we 
noted th a t  c e r ta in  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f th a t  e ra  such as the  occurrence 
of ba th  d e f ic i t s  and su rp lu ses  and w idespread v o la t i l i ty  in  the  
f in a n c ia l s e c to r  make I t  id e a lly  su ited  to  the  in v e s tig a tio n  of issu es  
such a s  R icard ian  equivalence and th e  macroeconomic e f fe c ts  of 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .
In o rd er to  achieve the  broad o b jec tiv es  ou tlined  above, v ecto r 
au to reg re ss io n  models were sp ec if ie d  and estim ated  A dd itiona lly , IRFs 
and VDCs were ca lcu la ted  from the  moving average re p re se n ta tio n s  of 
the  VAR models and were used to  In te rp re t  th e  models. Furtherm ore, and 
In o rder to  g ive some In d ica tio n  of the  p rec is io n  w ith  which th e  IRFs 
and VDCs a re  estim ated , a Xonte C arla In te g ra tio n  procedure was used to  
c a lc u la te  s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  and means fo r these  param eters. In th e  f i r s t  
of th e  VAR models used, seven v a ria b le s  were se le c ted  to  e n te r  the
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aodel. These were a sh o rt- te rm  In te re s t  r a te ,  th e  aoney supply, 
government expend itu res, d e f ic i t s ,  In d u s tr ia l production , w holesale 
p r ic e s , and average perso n al BargInal tax  ra te s .
In the  survey of th e  l i te r a tu r e  on f i s c a l  and ao n e ta ry  policy
e f fe c ts  p resen ted  in ch ap te r II , the  fa c t  th a t  s u b s ta n tia l  d isco rd  about 
th e  aacroeconoalc  ro le s  of ao n eta ry  and f is c a l  po licy  v a ria b le s  
p e r s i s t s  a t  both th e  th e o re tic a l and e a p lr lc a l  le v e ls  was h ig h lig h ted . 
In a d d itio n  to  the  excessive  co n cen tra tio n  on th e  postw ar period , some 
lim ita tio n s  In the  e a p lr lc a l  l i t e r a tu r e  were Id e n tif ie d . These included: 
(a) a o s t  of the  s tu d ie s  reviewed Involved th e  use of s tru c tu ra l  ao d e ls  
th a t  n e c e s s ita te  the  use of p o te n tia lly  In c o rre c t r e s t r ic t io n s  on the 
param eter space; (b> the  ao d e ls  used In th e se  s tu d ie s  d id  not Include a 
measure of average m arginal tax  r a te s  which I s  neces s a ry  I f  th e  pure
e f fe c ts  o f f i s c a l  po licy  v a ria b le s  such a s  d e f ic i t s  a re  to  iso la te d ; and
Cc) th o se  s tu d ie s  th a t  avoid use of th e  In co rre c t r e s t r ic t io n s
mentioned above by employing a VAR aodel do no t provide m easures of 
the  p rec is io n  w ith which th e  IRFs and VDCs ware estim ated . 
A ccordingly, the  choice of t l a e  period , the  use o f VAR techn iques th a t  
avoid aak lng  p o ss ib ly  spurious exogenlety assum ptions, th e  in c lu sion  of 
a measure of average personal m arginal tax  r a te s ,  and th e  p re sen ta tio n  
of s tan d a rd  e r r o r s  fo r th e  IRFs and VDCs, a re  a l l  p o te n tia lly  usefu l 
a d d itio n s  to  th e  l i te r a tu re .
The re s u l ts  from th e  seven v a ria b le  ao d el were p resen ted  In 
ch ap te r V. In conform ity w ith the  d iscu ss io n  on th e  ap p ro p ria te  uses 
of VARs In sec tio n  IV of ch ap te r IV, th e  r e s u l t s  p resen ted  were In the
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fo ra  of e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  which were subsequently  compared to  the  
p re d ic tio n s  of various th e o r ie s  on th e se  e f fe c ts .  P a r tic u la r  a tte n tio n  
was focused on th e  e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  w ith  re sp e c t to  the  
e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s ,  governaen t expend itu res, average personal m arginal 
tax  ra te s ,  and the  aoney supply on In te re s t  r a te s ,  ou tput, and p ric e s . 
Ve found th a t  d e f ic i t s  had no s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  
ou tput, and p r ic e s , and concluded th a t  th e se  r e g u la r i t ie s  were not 
in c o n s is te n t w ith the  R icardian equivalence h y p o thesis . A dd itionally , 
we found no evidence of deb t m onetization  In the  ln te rw ar period .
F u rth er, our exam ination of th e  ro le  o f governaen t expend itu res In 
the  ln te rw ar period  showed th a t th e  r e g u la r i t ie s  generated were weakly 
c o n s is te n t with Keynesian p re d ic tio n s  and were no t In c o n s is te n t w ith 
the  p re d ic tio n s  of B arro 's  market c lea rin g  approach when I t  I s  assumed 
th a t  Innovations In governaen t expend itu res fo r  the  period under 
co n sid e ra tio n  were la rg e ly  perm anent. The e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  
generated  w ith re sp e c t to  the  e f fe c ts  of Innovations In average 
personal m arginal tax  ra te s  on th e  aacroeconoay d id  not perm it easy 
com parisons. In p a r t ic u la r ,  we found th a t  an Increase  In DXTAI had no 
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c ts  on In te re s t  r a te s .  Vhen th i s  r e s u l t  was coapared 
to  p re d ic tio n s  fro a  the  th e o re tic a l  approaches ou tlin ed  In chap ter 11, 
we found th a t  i t  was not In c o n s is te n t w ith any of th e  th e o re tic a l  
approaches considered  s in ce  a l l  of them p re d ic t ambiguous a f fe c ts  on 
In te re s t  ra te s . The e f fe c ts  of an in c rease  in  DXTAI on output were 
p o s itiv e  and s ig n if ic a n t .  Our com parison of t h i s  re g u la r ity  w ith th e  
th e o re tic a l  approaches In d ic a te s  th a t  th i s  r e s u l t  i s  not c o n s is te n t
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with th e  Key nee lan and Market c lea rin g  approaches. However, I t  was not 
in c o n s is te n t w ith th e  p re d ic tio n s  of th e  Xanklw - S u ese re  aodel which 
allow s fo r the p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  a tax  Increase  w ill have expansionary  
e f fe c ts  on output. F in a lly , DMTAX Innovations were found to  e l i c i t  
s ig n if ic a n tly  p o s itiv e  resp o n ses  In p r ic e s  fo r the  ln te rw ar period . 
This re s u l t  Is  not In c o n s is te n t w ith  any of the  approaches considered  
since  a l l  of th en  sake  anblguous p re d ic tio n s  about th e  e f fe c ts  of 
DNTAX on the p rice  level and th e  r a te  of in f la tio n
The ro le  of aoney in  th e  ln te rw ar period was la rg e ly  c o n s is te n t 
with th e  view th a t  shocks to  th e  aoney supply lead to  in c re a se s  in 
output and p r ic e s  and to  a f a l l  in  In te re s t  r a te s .  Moreover, th ese  
e f fe c ts  were very s h o r t- l iv e d  and c o n s is te n t w ith the  notion th a t  aoney 
la n e u tra l In th e  long-run .
More g en era lly , when th e  foregoing r e s u l ts  a re  considered  a s  a 
whole, they appear to  p rovide s tro n g  sup p o rt fo r  the  B arro 's  Market 
c lea rin g  approach when governaen t bonds a re  not considered  to  be net 
wealth. The Xanklw - S u n aers  aodel provided the  a o s t  c o n s is te n t 
exp lana tion  of th e  e f fe c ts  of M arginal tax  r a te s ,  however, s in c e  I t  
d i f f e r s  f ro a  th e  Keynesian aodel only w ith  re sp ec t to  tax  e f fe c ts ,  lik e  
the Keynesian aodel i t  f a i l s  to  c o n s is te n tly  exp lain  th e  e a p lr lc a l  
re g u la r i t ie s  on the  e f fe c ts  of d e f ic i t s  and governaen t expend itu res.
One of the  o b jec tiv es  of th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  was to  evalua te  the 
lap o rtan ce  of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  a s  a a n lfe e te d  by d e te r io ra tio n  in  the 
q u an tity  and q u a lity  of f in a n c ia l ln te ra e d ia tio n  and in  th e  q u a lity  of 
p r iv a te  balance sh e e ts  du ring  the  ln te rw ar period . In o rd e r to  achieve
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th is ,  the  vecto r a u to re g re ss iv e  Methodology d iscu ssed  I d ch ap te r IT and 
applied  to  th e  seven v a ria b le  so d el In ch ap te r V, was applied  to  an 
e ig h t v a ria b le  sodel co s  p rise d  of th e  seven v a ria b le s  In ch ap te r V s 
so d el and a proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s .  4s the  a n a ly s is  in  ch ap te r VI 
In d ic a te s , the  y ie ld  d i f f e r e n t ia l  between Baa co rp o ra te  and long-term  
D.S. governaen t bonds was chosen to  be the  a p p ro p ria te  proxy.
The e a p lr lc a l  r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  w ith re sp ec t to  th e  e f f e c ts  of 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  on key sac ro eco n o slc  v a r ia b le s  such a s  th e  In te re s t  
ra te , p r ic e s , output, and the  aoney supply in d ic a te  th a t  th e  proxy fo r 
f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  was a d o s ln a n t v a ria b le  In the  so d e l. In p a r t ic u la r ,  a 
worsening of f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  a s  proxled by an Increase  In th e  y ie ld  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  leads to  s ig n if ic a n t ly  negative  e f fe c ts  on output and the 
supply of aoney. F u rth er, w ith the  exception of I n i t i a l  s h o r t- l iv e d  
p o s it iv e  e f fe c ts ,  i t  had s ig n if ic a n t ly  negative e f fe c ts  on both In te re s t  
r a te s  and th e  ra te  of In f la tio n . These r e s u l ts  were Judged to  be not 
In c o n s is te n t w ith what the  th e o re tic a l  d iscu ss io n  In ch ap te r III  would 
lead u b  to  expect.
i s  noted In ch ap te r VI, the  d e so n s tra te d  im portance of th e  proxy 
fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  fo rces  us to  question  th e  v a l id i ty  o f th e  r e s u l ts  
derived  in ch ap te r V on th e  su sp ic io n  th a t  an im portan t v a r ia b le  was 
o s l t te d  fro a  th e  seven v a ria b le  aodel. Therefore, the  e a p lr lc a l  
r e g u la r i t ie s  on the  e f fe c ts  of th e  f is c a l  and ao n e ta ry  po licy  v a ria b le s  
on in te r e s t  r a te s ,  ou tput, and p r ic e s  generated  In ch ap te r V were 
coapared  to  th ose  generated  In the  e ig h t v a ria b le  aodel. The re e u lts  
were e s s e n t ia l ly  s l a l l a r  fo r d e f ic i t s ,  tax es , and aoney. However, a s
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Ind ica ted  by the  IKFe, th e  p a tte rn  o f s ig n if ic a n c e  o f the  e f fe c ts  of an 
in c rease  In governaen t spending on output was rev ersed  f ro a  p o s itiv e  
In the  previous aodel to  negative  In th e  e ig h t v a ria b le  aodel. This 
l a t t e r  re s u l t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  exp la in . A dd itiona lly , I t  weakens the
support found fo r  B arro ’s  a a rk e t c le a r in g  approach w ithout enhancing 
th a t  found fo r e i th e r  th e  Kanklw -  S u a a e rs  o r Keynesian approaches.
In c h ap te rs  V and VI we observed th a t  th e  r e s u l ts  p resen ted  In
th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  a re  su b jec t to  sev e ra l cav ea ts . Of p a r t ic u la r  
la  p o rta  nee was the  reco g n itio n  th a t  the  ta x  aeasu re  used was la  p e rfe c t 
and th a t  the  proxy fo r  f in a n c ia l c r i s i s ,  a s  w ith any o th e r proxy, 
leaves so ae  doubt as to  I t s  e ff ic a cy . These and o ther cav ea ts  a s id e , 
I t  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  la p o r ta n t  to  note th a t  the  la  p o rta  nee of th e  tax  
aeasu re  I d both the  seven and e ig h t v a ria b le  ao d e ls  r a is e s  so ae
se r io u s  q u estio n s  about the  e ff ic a cy  of aacroeconoalc  ao d e ls  th a t  do 
no t Include a a easu re  of a a rg in a l tax  r a te s .  Along th e  aaae  lin e s , th e  
doalnance of the  proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  In th e  e ig h t v a ria b le  aodel
fo rces  one to  question  the  r e s u l ts  of ao d e ls  th a t  ignore th e se  a f fe c ts .
In l ig h t  of the  foregoing d lscu sss lo n  i t  e eea s  reasonab le  to  argue th a t
one of th e  key c o n tr ib u tio n s  of th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  Is  th a t  i t  has
e a p lr lc a l ly  Id e n tif ied  two key v a ria b le s  th a t  should not be Ignored In
the  co n s tru c tio n  of ao d e ls  th a t  p u rp a rt to  cap tu re  the  essence of 
aacroeconoalc  behavior.
In a d d itio n , I t  I s  p o ss ib le  to  Id e n tify  a t  le a s t  four o ther 
la p o r ta n t  c o n tr ib u tio n s  of t h i s  d is s e r ta t io n  to  the  l i te ra tu re .  
F i r s t ly ,  the  d e a o n s tra tlo n  th a t  th e  B lcardlan equivalence h y p o th esis  is
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not In c o n s is te n t w ith the  em pirica l r e g u la r i t ie s  generated  by a aodel 
th a t  Includes a aeasu re  o f m arginal tax  r a te s  and governaen t 
expend itu res  and w ith th ose  generated  by a aodel th a t  tak es  f in a n c ia l 
f a c to rs  in to  c o n sid e ra tio n  p rov ides s u b s ta n tia l  re in forcem ent fo r those  
s tu d ie s  th a t  have found e a p lr lc a l  support fo r the  equivalence 
hy po thesis . Secondly, the  choice of the  ln te rw ar period a s  the 
a p p ro p ria te  s a a p le  period enhances th e  l i te r a tu r e  on th ese  is su es  in 
the  Banner advocated by Brunner. T h ird ly , s in ce  th e  aodel used In 
ch ap te r VI Included a wide a rra y  of a ac ro  v a ria b le s  and th e  a n a ly s is  
covered the  e n tire  ln te rw ar period , the  dem onstrated im portance of the 
proxy fo r f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  in the  VAF aodel used th e re  re in fo rce s  
Bernanke's r e s u l ts .  This i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  so when i t  i s  recognized th a t  
Bernanke's r e s u l ts  were derived  fo r th e  G reat Depression in  a lim ited  
framework th a t  i s  su b jec t to  c r i t ic is m  fo r p o ss ib le  om itted  v a ria b le s  
b ia s  and fo r th e  use uf u n su b stan tia ted  r e s t r i c t io n s  on th e  param eter 
space. Our r e s u l ts  a re  su p p ortive  of the  now burgeoning th e o re tic a l 
l i t e r a tu r e  which id e n tif ie s  an Im portant ro le  fo r f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  In 
the  determ ina tion  of aggregate  economic a c t iv i ty .  F in a lly , our 
p re sen ta tio n  of, and re lia n c e  on, measures of s ig n if ic a n c e  fo r the  IKFs 
and VDCs i s  re la t iv e ly  unique s in ce  previous VAR s tu d ie s  th a t  y ie ld  
r e s u l ts  s im ila r  to  th ose  p resen ted  here have no t provided any 
in d ic a tio n  of the  p re c is io n  w ith which the  po in t e s tim a te s  they 
p re sen t (I.e. IKFs and VDCs) a re  estim ated .
I t  i s  in s tru c t iv e  to  note th a t  t h i s  re sea rch  agenda Is  not 
complete. S p e c if ic a lly , a d d itio n a l re sea rch  e f f o r t  a u s t  be d ire c ted  a t
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th e  c o n s tru c tio n  of comprehensive measures of m arginal tax  ra te s .  
Also, I t  I s  Im portant to  reexamine th e  s u b s ta n tia l  body of em p irica l 
l i te r a tu r e  on f is c a l  po licy  In th e  p o s t war e ra  using models th a t  
Include m easures of m arginal tax  ra te s .  A dd itionally , and s in ce  the  
em pirica l evidence on the  e f fe c ts  of f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  on macroeconomic 
perform ance is  so sp a rse , exam ination of th i s  issu e  fo r o th e r tim e 
periods and the  p re sen ta tio n  of c ro ss-co u n try  evidence appears 
necessary . F in a lly , i t  seems im portan t to  explore  the  im portance of 
th ese  f in a n c ia l fa c to rs  re la t iv e  to  th a t  of money a s  th e  degree of 
economic development and thereby  re lia n c e  on f in a n c ia l m arkets v a rie s .
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